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Financial integration is often perceived to lead to convergence of asset prices, as well as higher
comovements across countries, with the idea that the dependence on world factors should increase
as markets integrate. This dissertation focuses on analyzing how integration has changed over
time in developed and, especially, emerging markets. In particular, the chapters tackle different
aspects of how integration has changed over time and the relevance of particular global factors in
pricing.
In Chapter 1, I study the link between globalization and asset returns. Here, I provide a com-
prehensive analysis of the impact of economic and financial globalization on asset return comove-
ments over the past 35 years. The globalization indicators draw a distinction between de jure
openness that results from changes in the regulatory environment and de facto or realized open-
ness, as well as between capital market restrictions across different asset classes. Although global-
ization has trended positively for most of the sample, the global financial crisis and its aftermath
have provided new headwinds. Equity, bond, and foreign exchange returns often have different
responses to globalization. I generally find weak evidence of comovement measures reacting to
globalization and often find other economic factors to be equally or more important determinants.
In Chapter 2, I analyze variance risk in global markets. Innovations in volatility constitute a
potentially important asset pricing risk factor that can be easily tested through the return on vari-
ance swaps. I characterize the exposure of the returns on three asset classes (equities, bonds and
currencies) in all regions of the world to United States based equity variance risk. I explore the
implications for global risk premiums and asset return comovements using both developed and
emerging markets. I first find that regional portfolios across all three asset classes and practically
all countries exhibit negative loadings with respect to the variance risk factor. This exposure is
not only statistically but also economically significant representing for most assets we consider
around 50% of the global risk premiums implied by a simple three-factor model with global eq-
uity, bond, and variance risks. Second, this simple three-factor model also explains a substantive
fraction of the comovements between international assets, but the fit is best for international eq-
uity correlations and is worse for currency returns and across asset correlations.
In Chapter 3, I study the link between time-varying integration and asset pricing. Emerging
markets are subject to constant integration shocks, which can make markets more integrated or
more segmented. Changes in integration have dynamic effects that are difficult to accommodate
in valuation models, as both time-varying betas and risk premium are needed to capture the direct
and indirect effects of changes in integration on dividend yields. Here, I develop a novel present
value model to value cash flows with time-varying expected returns, where integration affects the
cost of capital in a time-varying fashion. This framework prices expectations about future integra-
tion, which is modeled as a mean reverting process. I calibrate the model using a segmentation
shock in Argentina in 2011 as a case study, and find that the model is able to capture part of the
increase in dividend yields as markets became more segmented. By assuming that investors per-
ceive the shock as permanent and thus price lower mean integration following the segmentation
shock, I am able to model the full extent of the change in dividends.
The three chapters show that, while integration has broadly increased over time, different asset
classes have different responses to globalization. I find that integration is time-varying and that
markets can become more segmented; that is, integration is not a one-way street, as many models
have assumed in the past. Finally, I show that global factors matter in emerging markets in all
asset classes, and identify variance risk as a new risk factor which helps explain why global capital
asset pricing models tend to yield low discount rates in these economies. Therefore, researchers
and practitioners should take into account the importance of both local and global factors when
valuing emerging market assets and take into account that the relative importance of each factor
varies over time.
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Chapter 1
Globalization and Asset Returns
1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Much ink has flowed in discussing effects of globalization on the terms of trade, asset returns,
and the real economy. The literature is so voluminous that providing a comprehensive survey
is nearly impossible. Fortunately, a number of summary articles already exist. Bekaert and Har-
vey (2003) survey both the real and the financial effects of financial openness, mostly focusing
on equity markets. The evidence on the real side remains controversial. The survey articles by
Eichengreen (2001) and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009) conclude that the empirical evidence
on the costs and benefits of capital account liberalization remains mixed, whereas Henry’s (2007)
interpretation of the literature supports Bekaert and Harvey’s ((2003)) view that capital account
liberalization has promoted growth. Studies incorporating the dynamics of liberalization, such as
those by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), Quinn and Toyoda (2008), and Gupta and Yuan
(2009), do find robust positive growth effects. Because the temporary effects of financial openness
are likely small (see Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)), recent work has focused on the effects of fi-
nancial openness on factor productivity, mostly finding positive effects (Bonfiglioli (2008); Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lundblad (2011)). The evidence linking financial openness to both real volatility and
a country’s vulnerability to crises remains mixed (see Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006); Kose,
Prasad, and Terrones (2006)). Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus that the relation between
financial openness and economic growth and volatility is subject to threshold effects, with coun-
tries with better macroeconomic policies and institutions (including better-developed financial
sectors) responding more positively to reforms (e.g., Kose, Prasad, and Taylor (2011)).
Although the bulk of cross-country studies find that trade openness and liberalization increase
growth and factor productivity (see, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995)), others criticize these findings
(see, e.g., Harrison and Hanson (1999), Rodrıguez and Rodrik (2000)). However, recent research
has confirmed the positive effects using microeconomic data and more convincing econometric
identification (see, e.g., Amiti and Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011)). The ef-
fect of trade openness and growth volatility is the topic of a large literature, with many studies
finding that trade openness increases output volatility (see, e.g., Rodrik (1998), Di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2009)). Bekaert and Popov (2016) find that de facto trade openness increases aggregate
consumption volatility but trade liberalization (policy reforms) reduces it.
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One important channel through which financial globalization affects the real sector is its im-
pact on asset prices. Stulz (1999) concludes that opening a country to portfolio flows decreases
its cost of capital without adverse effects on its security markets; Karolyi and Stulz (2003) argue
that despite globalization, standard international asset pricing theory fails to explain the portfolio
holdings of investors, equity flows, and the time-varying properties of correlations across coun-
tries. Both of these survey articles, as well as the survey by Bekaert and Harvey (2003), primarily
focus on equity markets, as does the bulk of the academic literature. Trade links have also been
shown to affect equity market correlations and asset prices across countries (see, e.g., Bekaert and
Harvey (1997)).
In this article, we characterize the link between the globalization process and the comovement
of asset returns. To do so, we start by providing a simple quantitative definition of globalization,
distinguishing between economic and financial globalization and between de jure (regulatory) and
de facto (realized) integration. For de jure financial openness, we measure the degree to which
international capital flows and foreign holdings of domestic assets are unencumbered by regula-
tions; for de jure trade openness, we measure the extent to which trade and service flows are free
of regulatory restrictions. The de facto measures attempt to quantify the extent to which securities
are actually held by foreign investors (as a result of international capital flows) or the magnitude
of actual trade flows.
Conventional wisdom suggests that integration should lead to convergence of asset prices
(projects of similar risk command the same price per unit of cash flow in integrated countries),
as well as higher comovement of returns across countries. Using a large panel of data, we ex-
amine several measures of convergence and comovement and their link to quantitative measures
of globalization. We cast a wider net than the existing literature by examining equity, bond, and
foreign exchange returns. We also use several different measures of globalization, contrasting the
effects of trade and financial openness as well as de jure and de facto integration measures, and
we differentiate between openness measures applicable to equity, bond, and money markets. Our
comprehensive examination may shed light on why many studies fail to document strong evi-
dence of convergence using returns data (see the discussion by Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)).
The distinction between different asset classes is also important given recent findings that the real
effects of liberalization may be positive for equity flows [foreign direct investment (FDI) and port-
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folio equity flows] but negative for bond and money market flows (Kose, Prasad, and Terrones
(2009); Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park (2013)).
The survey article by Stulz (1999) and much of the literature focus on expected returns. We
do not address the important question of whether globalization has reduced the cost of capital,
and we do not provide a comprehensive survey of this literature. For emerging markets, several
studies (Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000), Kim and Singal (2000)) find that stock market
liberalization decreases the cost of capital, although the estimated magnitudes differ. Evidence
from American Depositary Receipts announcements corroborates these findings (see, for exam-
ple, Foerster and Karolyi (1999)). These studies avail themselves of several broad liberalization
programs introduced in many emerging markets at a particular point in time. When globalization
happens more gradually, documenting the cost of capital effects is considerably more difficult.
Some limited evidence suggests that the cost of capital decreases when there is an increase in the
degree of globalization (see, e.g., De Jong and de Roon (2005)), which is also the case in terms of
efforts toward increased regional integration such as the European Union (see Bekaert, Harvey,
Lundblad, and Siegel (2013)).
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has opened new research paths, given that globaliza-
tion may have halted or even reversed course. In terms of trade, the World Trade Organization’s
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in 2001, has come to a standstill, and
the global financial crisis has led to many protectionist tendencies in national policies that are evi-
dent, for example, in the Buy America program in the United States and in the imposition of local
content requirement measures in many countries. The global financial crisis has also spurred re-
search on financial macromanagement and macroeconomic stability, leading various researchers
and policymakers, most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to defend capital con-
trols (Jeanne, Subramanian, and Williamson (2012); Rey (2015)). Brazil implemented controls on
inflows in the face of currency appreciation, and Iceland introduced controls on outflows in the
wake of its banking crisis. The after effects of the global financial crisis are still being felt, with
political sentiment against the perceived negative consequences of globalization being voiced in
many developed countries.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1.2 defines our globalization mea-
sures and examines whether the degree of globalization has changed over the past 30 years. We
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find that globalization has generally increased, with an important exception for debt markets in
emerging countries. Although most measures trend upward, tests show little significance. Sec-
tion 1.3 summarizes asset return data, reflects on where we should expect convergence and where
not, and shows initial results on the convergence of asset returns. Importantly, we find that results
differ across asset classes. For equities, we observe an increase in correlations and global betas and
a decrease in idiosyncratic risk over the sample period. Similar conclusions hold for foreign ex-
change returns. Bond returns behave differently in developed markets, with correlations with the
global bond market decreasing for a large number of countries, primarily driven by increases in
country-specific risk. The various comovement measures do not show a consistent upward trend
but reflect cyclical behavior. The dispersion of risk premiums seems to have consistently trended
downwards. Section 1.4 links convergence measures to globalization and other factors, including
political risk, business cycle variation, and crises. We generally find weak evidence of convergence
linked to globalization, with the results often differing across empirical specifications, across asset
classes, across country groups (developed versus emerging), and across convergence measures.
Correlations are strongly impacted by movements in the variance of global asset returns, and for
bond markets political stability is often an important determinant of return comovements. The
dispersion of equity and bond risk premiums does seem to have fallen with increased financial
openness. A number of robustness checks are presented in Section 1.5. The final section offers
some concluding remarks.
1.2 GLOBALIZATION
We are interested in two aspects of globalization: economic integration, brought about by trade
links, and financial integration, brought about by free capital flows. Measuring integration is
fraught with difficulty and is the topic of a large literature in itself. In particular, de jure openness
may not mean that markets are fully integrated because other factors, such as political risk and
poor liquidity, may cause segmentation (for related analyses, see Bekaert (1995), Bekaert, Har-
vey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011)); conversely, investment barriers may not prevent actual capital
flows. Aizenman and Noy (2009) also show that there are important links between trade openness
and financial openness, arguing that capital controls in trade-open countries are likely ineffectual.
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Our primary interest is de jure measures of globalization. This focus is important because, ulti-
mately, whether the trend toward globalization continues is mostly in the hands of policymakers.
Also, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) identify endogenous dates of market integration
from economic and financial data, finding them to be mostly later than dates of market reforms,
suggesting that de jure financial openness leads to de facto integration, albeit with a lag.
For trade openness, we create an annual current account openness measure following Quinn
and Toyoda (2008). The measure, denoted by TIQTi,t (trade integration, Quinn–Toyoda), varies from
0 to 8, with 8 indicating a country’s full compliance with the IMF’s Article VIII obligations regard-
ing the absence of restrictions on the international trade of goods and services. We rescale the
measure to be between 0 and 1 and update the data from 2011 to 2014 using a regression approach
described in Table A.1. An alternative measure is the trade liberalization indicator of Wacziarg
and Welch (2008), which builds on the classification by Sachs and Warner (1995) of countries as
either open or closed on the basis of five criteria, such as the magnitude of tariffs and nontariff
barriers. Being a 0/1 indicator variable, the Wacziarg–Welch measure displays very little cross-
sectional variation toward the end of the sample, and actually may not fully reflect the ongoing
trend toward more openness. To help capture the reversal in trade openness observed since the
start of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, we also employ a de facto measure: exports plus
imports divided by GDP of the current calendar year, denoted by TIdfi,t.
There are substantially more data available on de jure financial globalization. We first con-
sider the measure of capital account openness compiled by Quinn and Toyoda (2008), which is
based on IMF data. They assess the degree of capital account openness on the basis of, inter alia,
the presence of taxes on foreign investment, leading to an index between 0 and 4.1 This capi-
tal account openness measure does not differentiate between restrictions particularly relevant for
equity, bond, or foreign exchange markets. However, it is conceivable that capital market restric-
tions differ across these various markets. Fernández, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2015)
use IMF data to create various subindices of de jure restrictions on a [0, 1] scale for individual as-
set categories, such as bond securities, money market instruments, etc. It covers 91 countries from
1995 to 2013. We employ several subindices, namely mm (average money market restrictions; most
1We thank Dennis Quinn for sending updated data through 2011; we rescale the measure between 0 and 1 and
extend it through 2014 using a quantitative procedure described in Table A.1.
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relevant for the foreign exchange market), bo (average bond restrictions), and eq (average equity
restrictions). Table A.1 describes the resulting measures, FISmmi,t , FI
Sbo
i,t , and FI
Seq
i,t (financial inte-
gration), in more detail. We refer to these measures as the Schindler measures, as Schindler (2009)
was the first to compile them from information in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The literature has employed alternative measures,
such as that of Chinn and Ito (2008), which essentially represents the first principal component of
four dummy variables on the restrictions on external accounts drawn from the IMF’s AREAER. It
is therefore highly correlated with the Quinn–Toyoda openness measures. Various measures exist
that focus on equity market openness (see Bekaert (1995), Edison and Warnock (2003)), but they
are mostly not up to date. We extend the Schindler indicators to 1980 using a regression procedure
and information from the measures of Quinn and Toyoda (2008) and Chinn and Ito (2008).2
As a measure of de facto financial openness, we use the measure proposed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007): the ratio of foreign assets and foreign liabilities to GDP. Their gross measure adds
up the stocks of direct investment, portfolio equity, debt assets (liabilities), and foreign exchange
reserves, thereby covering all securities in the IMF’s International Investment Position, and di-
vides the aggregate numbers by annual GDP.3 Because of our focus on various asset classes, we
split the measure into a measure focusing on equity, FIdf,eqi,t , and a measure focusing on debt,
FIdf,debti,t , which we use for both bond and foreign exchange markets.
Our sample consists of 58 countries, with varying histories and different coverage across asset
classes. Table A.2 provides the start dates for the various countries and asset classes. The sample
ends in December 2014. All data sources and variable definitions are provided in Table A.1.
Figure 1.1 shows the openness measures averaged over developed and developing countries
separately over time. The openness level is generally substantially higher in developed than in
emerging markets. The QT capital market openness measures trend upward. For developed
countries, financial openness is at about 0.8 by the beginning of our sample, but still continues
to increase during the 1985–1990 period, when countries such as New Zealand, Japan, France,
Italy, and Belgium further liberalized their capital markets. For emerging markets, a wave of
2Karolyi (2015) analyzes nine different de jure measures including four tax measures from Deloitte.
3Also see Karolyi (2015, ch. 6) for a list of de facto measures.
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liberalizations occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and our sample does miss some of these
changes. The Schindler measures for emerging markets show no trend for the money market
openness measure, a negative trend for the bond measure, and an upward trend for equity market
integration until the onset of the global financial crisis. For developed markets, the same patterns
are visible for both bond and equity measures, but for money markets, the integration measure
decreases in the late 1990s before increasing after the global financial crisis. The decrease in the
late 1990s occurs mostly because first the Czech Republic and then Korea enter the sample with
very low openness values. Hence, this stems from the unbalanced nature of the sample. This
is one reason why most of our empirical analysis uses country-fixed effects, which mitigate this
problem.
For the de facto measures, there is a steep upward trend for both bond and equity assets and
liabilities for developed but not for emerging markets, where the bond asset and liability mea-
sure actually decreases over time. IMF reports suggest that there has been a slowdown of capital
inflows into emerging markets since 2010, ascribing the slowdown primarily to reduced growth
prospects in many emerging markets. The renewed capital controls, which were especially bind-
ing for fixed-income investments (see above), may have played a role as well. At the same time, a
number of emerging economies have built up substantial foreign reserves, which should increase
gross international asset positions.
The QT trade openness measure generally trends up sharply at the beginning of the sample
for both developed and emerging countries, with the trend weakening and being halted or even
reversed (for emerging markets) toward the end of the sample. There is some volatile behavior
early on, for example, a sharp increase and decrease of trade openness in the early 1990s for
emerging markets, which was partially influenced by the entry of countries in early 1990 and
late 1992 especially. The same pattern is evident for the de facto measure for emerging markets,
which starts trending up after 1995, as does the measure for developed markets. Both measures
show a steep fall during the global financial crisis as international trade collapsed.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the openness measures for developed and emerging
markets. Focusing first on the de jure [0, 1] measures, for developed markets, the measures fluctu-
ate between 0.5 and 1, with the medians all at 1. For emerging markets, in contrast, there is much
more cross-country variation, with the 90% range between 0 and 1 for the Schindler measures and
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between 0.25 and 1 for the QT measures. The medians are much lower for emerging than for de-
veloped markets. The de facto measures of trade (exports plus imports) and of financial openness
(equity and debt) show a similar pattern.
Table 1.1 also reports averages for the first part versus the second part of the sample and tests
whether the difference is significantly different from zero. The midpoint of the sample is country-
specific. For developed markets, we observe in general an increase in integration, both in finan-
cial and trade terms and for both the de jure and de facto measures. For emerging markets, equity
market integration (both de facto and de jure) and trade integration increase. However, for emerg-
ing markets, we observe a decrease in integration for both the de jure and de facto measures for
debt markets. Several emerging markets reintroduced capital controls following the global finan-
cial crisis. We observe decreases in bond market openness for more than 15 countries, including
Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, and Turkey. Despite this dissimilar variation, the openness measures
are highly positively correlated, with correlations exceeding 0.5 and as high as 0.85 among the de
facto and de jure measures (see Table A.3). 4 The de facto and de jure measures are less correlated,
with correlations mostly in the 0.3–0.4 range.
In addition to the informal visual inspection of graphs, we formally test whether there is a
significant trend in globalization over the past 35 years. The benchmark model for the trend test
is
yt = β1 + β2t+ ut, (1.1)
where yt represents the average globalization measures, and t is a linear time trend. We use the
test developed by Bunzel and Vogelsang (2005), which is robust to I(0) and I(1) error terms and
uses a Daniell kernel to nonparametrically estimate the error variance needed in the test. Our
relatively small sample necessitates the use of a powerful test, and the Bunzel–Vogelsang test has
optimal power properties. Perhaps not surprisingly, given our discussion of the Figures above,
the trend tests only detect one statistically significant upward trend, namely for de facto equity
integration, but (somewhat surprisingly) for emerging, not developed, markets. However, the
trend coefficients are almost always positive, with the only exceptions occurring for bond and
money market openness.
4Correlations across openness variables are calculated over the whole panel.
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1.3 ASSET RETURN COMOVEMENTS
In this section, we consider what should be expected regarding the relation between asset re-
turn comovements and globalization, and we review the extant literature. We then discuss the
convergence measures we employ and finally report how asset return comovements have varied
over time.
1.3.1 Theory
Generally, we are interested in measuring the effects of globalization on returns on three asset
classes: equities, bonds, and foreign exchange. How should globalization impact the comovement
of these asset returns across countries? We study excess log returns, measured in dollars, so the
perspective is that of a US investor. A first important point is that there is a strong link between
bond and equity returns on the one hand and foreign exchange returns on the other. That is,
rji,t+1 = rr
j,LC
i,t+1 + si,t+1 − iUS,t = rj,LCi,t+1 + rfxi,t+1, (1.2)
with j = e (equities), b (bonds), and where st+1 is the change in the dollar per unit of foreign
currency in country i, fx is foreign exchange, r is excess returns, rr is the actual (not excess) return,
iUS,t is the US short rate, and LC is local currency return. Note that the foreign exchange return
is the change in the currency plus the interest rate differential and is proportional to the return on
going long a forward contract in the foreign currency. Therefore, changes in the comovements of
foreign exchange returns can surely lead to more or less comovement in dollar-based bond and
stock excess returns. For this reason, we also investigate local returns in Section 1.5.
The main theoretical restriction of market integration on international pricing is that the pricing
kernel is identical for each country’s returns, whereas the cash flows are country-specific, but may
be affected by trade integration through, for example, business cycle effects. Asset returns reflect
valuation changes, driven by changes in interest rates, in risk premiums, and in (expected) cash
flows. Fundamental factors driving bond prices and exchange rates such as inflation thus also
play a role. Examining convergence of these components lies beyond the scope of this article, but
is the subject of a voluminous and varied literature. Importantly, such convergence may have only
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an indirect effect on many of the comovement measures that we examine, as these involve second
moments, not first moments.5
In reflecting on the fundamentals behind the pricing of asset returns, a first framework to con-
sider is that of interest rate parity. Let us start with real interest rate parity, which implies that
real interest rates are equalized across countries. However, real interest rate parity requires strong
and somewhat unpalatable assumptions to hold: uncovered interest rate parity, purchasing power
parity, and the Fisher hypothesis in both countries. That is, full money market integration does
not suffice, as it does not preclude the existence of currency and country risk premiums. Never-
theless, one would expect globalization to contribute to real rate convergence across the world, as
open financial markets help equalize real returns to capital invested. Although financial market
integration should be the major force affecting interest rates, under imperfect integration, trade
openness may have important effects. Imagine a closed-economy world, in which real rates re-
flect expected real growth rates and local precautionary savings motives. Theoretically, the effect
of trade openness is not clear. Trade integration might lead to specialization, which should lower
output correlations across countries and thus would likely imply real rate divergence, but it might
also lead to synchronization of business cycles through demand spillover effects. The evidence on
real interest rate convergence is mixed but mostly focused on developed markets (see Gagnon and
Unferth (1995); Jorion (1996); Phylaktis (1997); Breedon, Henry, and Williams (1999); Goldberg,
Lothian, and Okunev (2003)).
For nominal interest rates, the uncovered interest rate parity condition holds: The nominal
interest rate in one country equals the interest rate in another country plus expected exchange
rate depreciation. These exchange rate expectations may then be linked to inflation expectations
through purchasing power parity. The relationship may be weak because of the presence of cur-
rency risk and country risk premiums. Importantly, open financial markets and free trade need
not lead to equalization of interest rates (see also Frankel (1989)), but they should lead to the dis-
appearance of country premiums, induced by capital controls. The creation of a monetary union,
as happened in the context of the European Union in 1999, is expected to lead to a convergence of
5See Baele, Bekaert, and Inghelbrecht (2010) for an application of a factor model to bond and stock returns correla-
tions depending on the second moments of the factors; and Dumas, Harvey, and Ruiz (2003) for examining international
stock return correlations as a function of output correlations within an equilibrium pricing model.
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nominal interest rates, and it mostly did so within Europe (see Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova,
and Monnet (2004), Jappelli and Pagano (2008)). One may still observe some divergence for long-
term bond yields, which is driven by variation in default risks or illiquidity across countries. Com-
paring short- versus long-term real interest rates, country-specific monetary policy should exert
more of an influence on short-term interest rates, making convergence more likely to be observed
for longer-term interest rates. However, if capital flows are unrestricted and the exchange rate is
fixed, the trilemma hypothesis would suggest that independent monetary policy is impossible.
An alternative perspective on the convergence of nominal interest rates is a Fisherian world,
where nominal interest rates equal real interest rates plus inflation expectations (and perhaps infla-
tion risk premiums). Inflation is, of course, also an important state variable driving bond returns
(and, to a lesser extent, equity returns). Globalization may impact the inflation process through
a variety of channels. Trade openness generally increases the level of competition in both prod-
uct and labor markets. Openness means increased tradability and substitutability of products and
services across countries; increased contestability of both output and input markets; and increased
availability of low-cost production in previous command economies, such as China. Rogoff (2003)
and Lane (1997) argue that globalization decreases the central bank’s incentive to inflate. Chen,
Imbs, and Scott (2009) and Cox (2007) ague that globalization raises productivity growth, which
is followed by inflation. On balance, these effects may contribute to inflation convergence across
countries (see Chen, Imbs, and Scott (2009)). For example, one interesting recent hypothesis is that
international trade has made it possible for many countries to import low inflation from China,
withstanding the strong inflationary forces coming from commodity price shocks. Globalization
should make country-specific inflation more sensitive to global excess demand conditions, al-
though this, of course, also depends on exchange rate movements. Borio and Filardo (2007) show
that, especially since the early 1990s, the role of global economic slack in explaining domestic
inflation has substantially increased.
Globalization, together with improved central bank coordination, may also have played an
important role in the shift toward lower inflation (see Rogoff (2003)). Inflation volatility (as well
as output volatility) has decreased since the mid-to-late 1980s in a phenomenon known as the
Great Moderation (see McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000)). Indeed, there is a debate in macroe-
conomics about the causes of the break in volatility, which has not been settled even now that it
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is becoming clear that this Great Moderation has come to an end (see, e.g., Baele, Bekaert, Cho,
Inghelbrecht, and Moreno (2015)). The lower level and variability of inflation are important for
us because they may affect comovement measures. At first glance, a substantially lower level of
inflation may lead to convergence; decreased variability at the world level, however, may lead to
decreased comovement if it is caused by the lower variability of global inflation shocks.
An important part of the variation in bond returns and, even more so, of equity returns comes
from variation in risk premiums. Here, we expect financial market integration to be the main
driver behind the convergence of term and equity premiums across countries. In integrated
economies, securities of similar risk should command the same risk premium and we should
likely observe risk premiums converge.
Finally, how should globalization affect the correlation of cash flows across countries? Here
the debate on the effects of openness on business cycle convergence is relevant again. Assume
that cash flows are positively correlated with output. The effect of openness on business cycle
convergence has been studied extensively in the literature, but mostly with a focus on financial
openness. Indeed, most theoretical models predict that financial market integration leads to busi-
ness cycle divergence, through either specialization toward higher return projects Obstfeld (1994)
or the attraction of capital to positive productivity shocks Baxter and Crucini (1995). The empir-
ical evidence is mixed (compare the work of Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Peydró (2013),
who find divergence, with that of Imbs (2004), who finds convergence). Thus, the theoretical liter-
ature would suggest that financial market integration may lead to business cycle divergence and
hence to lower cash flow correlations. Recall that trade openness has ambiguous effects on out-
put growth correlations. Of course, how output translates into cash flows is an entirely different
matter, which may depend on the competitive structure in particular countries. Ammer and Mei
(1996), for example, find that cash flow growth rates are more highly correlated across countries
than are output growth rates.
1.3.2 Measurement
To investigate whether we observe a pattern of cross-country convergence/comovement in re-
turns, we require a measure of convergence. The most obvious convergence statistic is the correla-
tion. There is a long tradition in finance of examining the links between globalization and return
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correlations. (An alternative statistic to examine the correlation for a group of countries would be
the variance ratio proposed by Ferreira and Gama (2005).) Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Kim and
Singal (2000), and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) use the stock market openings of emerg-
ing markets at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s to trace the effects of (a shock
to) integration on asset prices, typically using event study–type methodologies. They find that lib-
eralizations increase the correlation with world market returns. Longin and Solnik (1995) detect
an upward trend in correlations across the G7 countries using a multivariate GARCH model, but
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009a) only find a significant trend within Europe. Of course, corre-
lations have well-known limitations, especially when one is looking for low-frequency changes in
comovement. The reason is that correlations vary considerably over time, particularly in response
to movements in the volatilities of underlying factors. Consider a simple one-factor model for a
variable ri,t for country i:
ri,t = βift + εi,t. (1.3)
Imagine that ft is the world factor. An example of such a model would be the world capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), where ri,t would be the country’s equity (excess) market return and ft the






where σi is the volatility of the variable ri,t and σf the volatility of the factor. Consequently, all
else being equal, if the volatility of the factor increases, it increases the correlation between ri,t
and the global factor, and, given that the εi,t are idiosyncratic, increases the correlations among all
country variables correlated with f , provided they have positive betas. (For related discussions,
see Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999); Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005);
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009a).) It is well known that the volatility of well-diversified equity
portfolios varies substantially over time without showing significant permanent changes. Macro
variables show distinct cyclical variation in volatility, being higher in recessions (for consumption
growth, see, e.g., Bekaert and Liu (2004)). Consequently, there is much scope for correlations to
show substantial temporary movements that make it difficult to detect the possible underlying
trends caused by the globalization process. In particular, they may temporarily increase when
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factor volatilities are temporarily high, a phenomenon we call the volatility bias.
The volatility bias for equity markets is worse in bear markets. Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta
(1994), Longin and Solnik (1995), and Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that stock markets are unusu-
ally highly correlated in bear markets, even beyond what can be attributed to the higher variance
of market factors in such market conditions. Consequently, the incidence of bear markets may
play a role in measuring changes in correlations. In our empirical work, we control for global re-
cessions and crises to mitigate the volatility bias, but this may not suffice; we therefore also control
for it directly using a volatility measure.
Considering Equation 1.3, one sees that financial market and trade integration is most likely to
manifest itself in the betas. As markets integrate, the dependence on world factors presumably
increases. The literature here is large. Articles that have parameterized betas as a function of inte-
gration indicators (most frequently, measures of trade integration) include Harvey (1995), Bekaert
and Harvey (1997), Chen and Zhang (1997), Ng (2000), Fratzscher (2002), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng
(2005), and Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009).
Some caution needs to be exercised; if the global factor simply aggregates the country-specific
variables (which would be the case in a strict application of the world CAPM), then the betas
must add up to 1 and, hence, cannot increase for all countries. However, the bulk of the articles
we mention apply variants of Equation 1.3 in such a way that these constraints do not apply, for
example, by using the United States as the global benchmark. Likewise, we use GDP-weighted
returns for the G7 countries as the benchmark. The model can be represented as
ri,t = αi + βirw,t + εi,t, (1.5)
where ri,t denotes returns in country i at time t and rw,t denotes the global benchmark. Given that
the United States has a dominant weight in the G7 benchmark, we exclude it from the set of coun-
tries in our panel sample, as comovements would be severely upward biased for the United States.
The benchmarks are asset class–specific and are further described in Table A.1. The regressions
are estimated country by country using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
In the context of this one-factor model, the correlation has three main determinants (for more
discussion, see Baele, Bekaert, and Schäfer (2015)): a volatility bias (the ratio of global to local
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volatility), the beta, and the idiosyncratic (country-specific) volatility. We also examine the time
variation in country-specific volatilities.
Our framework does have a shortcoming, as it restricts attention to one factor. Pukthuanthong
and Roll (2009) propose using the R2 of a multifactor model to measure market integration. Using
a principal-components approach with 10 factors to compute time-varying R2s, they uncover a
marked increase in measured integration for most countries, which is not revealed by simple
correlations among country indices.














This statistic measures how dispersed a variable (in this case, xi,t) is around its cross-sectional
mean at each point in time. The measure has obvious appeal, as we would expect that full market
integration might induce low cross-sectional return dispersion, and the statistic can be computed
at each point in time without any historical time series. One concern about the cross-sectional dis-
persion measure is that it may be mechanically increasing in overall volatility even if that volatility
is global in nature. To get more insight into this issue, we decompose the expected value of the
cross-sectional dispersion as follows:














2 − var(x¯t), (1.7)
where CS2 = (1/N)
∑N
i=1(x¯i − x¯)2 is the cross-sectional variance applied to country means, x¯t is
the cross-sectional mean at time t, and var(x¯t) denotes a time-series variance. Hence, the cross-
sectional dispersion comprises the cross-sectional dispersion of country means and also pure
volatility terms: the difference between average total volatility and the volatility of the cross-
sectional mean at time t, where the latter can be viewed as the global factor. Consequently, volatil-
ity only increases dispersion to the extent that it does not reflect volatility of the global factor, that
is, to the extent that it is idiosyncratic. Although this appears intuitive, there is some evidence
that overall volatility and global systematic volatility may be (highly) correlated (see Bekaert, Ho-
drick, and Zhang (2012)). Therefore, we also correct for volatility bias in regressions that involve
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cross-sectional dispersion. For our regression analysis, we transform the dispersion measure into
an annualized volatility measure, which facilitates its economic interpretation.
1.3.3 Empirical Results on the Time Variation in Comovements
Unless we make strong parametric assumptions, our comovement measures, with the excep-
tion of cross-sectional dispersion, require windows of time-series observations to be quantified.
Using short windows likely increases noise, but using long windows prevents a full characteri-
zation of their time variation. We therefore follow a two-pronged approach. In Figure 1.2 and
Table 1.2, we investigate the values of the various statistics (correlation, beta, and idiosyncratic
risk) in the first versus the second half of the sample. Again, note that the sample halves are
country-specific. Such an approach is perhaps coarse, but it provides a robust nonparametric
view on whether the past 15 years have witnessed increases in asset return comovements. In
Figure 1.3, we investigate the time variation in the various statistics. To do so, we must create
time-varying measures of the various statistics. Our approach is to start from a particular data
point, say time t0, split the sample into five-year subsamples, and use 30 data points before and
after this data point. Within subsamples, we use a normal kernel to downweight observations
further away from time t0.6 In particular, we compute the time-varying correlations, betas, and
idiosyncratic risk as follows:
corri,t =
∑j=30













Kh(j)(εi,t+j − ε¯i,t)2, (1.10)
where r¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)ri,t+j , εi,t = ri,t − βi,trw,t, ε¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)εi,t+j , and Kh(j) ≡
K(j/h)/(hT ) is a kernel with bandwidth h > 0. We use a two-sided Gaussian kernel with an
6Note that with this method, we lose the first and last 30 observations of each country’s sample. In order to recover
the first 30 observations, we start with an asymmetric kernel that uses 30 forward-looking observations for the first data
point. As we move forward in the sample, we incorporate all the possible backward-looking observations. We apply
the same methodology, in the opposite direction, to the last 30 observations.
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18-month bandwidth, K(z) = (1/
√
2pi) exp(−z2/2), where z = (t/T − τ)/h, τ = t0/T , and h is
expressed as a fraction of the sample size T . We divide by the sum to ensure the weights add to 1
in a finite sample. Note that 76% of the observations are within 18 months of the base observations.
1.3.3.1 First versus Second Sample Half Results
Figure 1.2 shows the average (correlation, beta, and idiosyncratic risk) in the first and second
halves of the sample period. The sample midpoint averages differ for developed and for emerging
countries and across asset classes and are reported in Table 1.2a. We depict the average statistic for
the first half of the sample on the x-axis and for the second half of the sample on the y-axis. If the
country dots are mostly above the 45◦ line, the statistic increases in the second half of the sample
relative to the first half. In Table 1.2, we report averages across the developed and emerging
markets for the two sample halves and a test of the significance of their difference. We first discuss
the correlation statistics, followed by the beta statistics, the idiosyncratic risk statistics, and finally
the dispersion statistics.
In terms of correlations, the equity return results show that return correlations invariably in-
crease from the first part to the second part of the sample, with the correlation increases often
being very substantial. On average, the correlation increases from 0.56 to 0.79 for developed and
from 0.31 to 0.62 for emerging markets, with both changes highly statistically significant. Bond
returns offer a more mixed picture. For emerging markets, the correlations still generally increase,
with Hungary and Lebanon being the only exceptions. On average, the correlation increases from
0.13 to 0.45, which is economically and statistically significant. However, for developed markets,
correlations decrease for several countries, and the average increase is economically trivial (from
0.70 to 0.71) and statistically insignificant. One potential partial reason for this phenomenon is the
European sovereign debt crisis post-2010, which may explain the presence of Greece, Ireland, and
Portugal among the countries whose correlations decreased. We more formally examine the link
between correlation and crises in Section 1.4. For foreign exchange returns, we observe a more
general increase, with the only currencies that correlate less with the world foreign exchange re-
turn more recently being the yen and the Argentinean peso. Unusual country-specific policies
in these countries are likely to blame. In Japan, substantial monetary easing associated with Abe-
nomics, introduced in 2012, caused a dramatic weakening of the yen. In Argentina, Cristina Kirch-
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ner introduced currency controls in 2011, after which the peso depreciated steadily; by the end of
2015, the gap between the overvalued official and the parallel rate was reported to be nearly 70%.
For developed markets, correlations increase from 0.48 to 0.68, with the change significant at the
10% level, whereas for emerging markets, correlations increase from 0.22 to 0.50, with the change
significant at the 1% level.
It is possible that the increase in correlation we observe stems simply from the volatility bias,
induced by the recent global financial crisis, which we discussed above. Investigating betas and
idiosyncratic risk can shed some initial light on this. An increase in betas is more likely to be per-
manent, as it cannot stem from volatility bias. It is plausible that country-specific risk permanently
decreases with globalization. What happens in a global crisis is unclear. It is possible that idiosyn-
cratic risk temporarily increases in crisis times together with systematic volatility, counteracting
the volatility bias. It is also possible that a global crisis causes investors to focus on global macro
factors rather than on the pricing of country-specific factors.
For equity returns, only a small minority of the countries (5 out of 25 developed countries and
4 out of 22 emerging countries) experience a decrease in beta relative to the global benchmark.
On average, betas increase from 0.97 to 1.18 for developed and from 0.90 to 1.19 for emerging
markets. Both changes are statistically significant. In addition, idiosyncratic risk also decreases
for virtually all countries, with the average changes being 6% (in annualized volatility terms) for
developed markets and a very substantial 16% for emerging markets, both of which are highly
statistically significantly different from 0.
For emerging bond returns, betas invariably increase, consistent with the general observed
increase in correlations. The increase is economically large, from 0.09 to 0.94, and generally sta-
tistically significant. For developed markets, betas only decrease for three countries (Norway, the
United Kingdom, and Japan), and betas increase on average from 1.27 to 1.50, the change being
significant at the 5% level. Average idiosyncratic risk increases insignificantly for developed mar-
kets, but decreases by 6% for emerging markets, the change being significant at the 10% level.
Therefore, the decrease in bond return correlations observed for many developed countries can
likely be attributed to an increase in country-specific risk, which may even counteract increases in
global betas.
For foreign exchange returns, Figure 1.2 shows that betas mostly increase and thus can be a
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reason for observing increased correlations, but the idiosyncratic risk changes show no pattern.
Table 1.2 reveals that the increase in betas exceeds 0.45 for both emerging and developed countries.
For idiosyncratic risk, we indeed do not observe any significant changes. Hence, the observed
increases in correlations are because of increased global betas.
Table 1.2e shows results regarding cross-sectional dispersion, which significantly and substan-
tially decreases for equity returns in both developed and emerging markets. For bonds, it increases
slightly but significantly for developed markets, but decreases significantly by 5% for emerging
markets. For foreign exchange returns, dispersion decreases significantly for emerging markets
by about 4%, whereas for developed markets there is a small increase that is significant at the 5%
level. Eun and Lee (2010) investigate distance measures in returns and volatility of equity returns
and also document strong convergence.
1.3.3.2 The Time Variation in Convergence Statistics
We start with a graphical view of the evolution of the convergence statistics over time. Fig-
ure 1.3 depicts the correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic volatilities for equity returns, bond re-
turns, and foreign exchange returns. To produce the exhibits, we average the kernel-weighted
statistics over respectively, emerging and developed markets.
In Figure 1.3a, with some exceptions, return correlations follow a similar pattern across coun-
try categories and across asset classes: flat or decreasing in the beginning of the sample, showing
a sharp upward trend from about the end of the 1990s through the global financial crisis before
decreasing again. These results are somewhat in contrast with those of Eiling and Gerard (2015),
who find that emerging market correlations increase (both within regional groups and with devel-
oped markets) for most of their sample, and those of Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs, and Langlois
(2012), who find that correlations increase for both developed and emerging markets. Both pa-
pers use different methodologies but rely on certain parametric restrictions to derive their results.
Importantly, their sample ends in 2009, missing the downturn in correlations that we observe.
Figure 1.3 examines the time variation in the global betas. Many studies, mostly focusing on
equity markets, have observed that betas with respect to global factors increased over time. Baele
(2005) and Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004) have documented increases in
shock spillovers with respect to the global market, and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) show that stock
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market liberalizations increase betas. The graphs suggest a somewhat more mixed pattern, similar
to that observed for correlations, at least for bond and foreign exchange returns. For equities, we
see little trend for developed markets, with slow increases only happening toward the end of
the 1990s. For emerging markets, the increase is sharp until about 2000, but then shows more
cyclical movements varying between 1.0 and 1.5. For idiosyncratic volatility in emerging markets,
we observe a sharp downward trend, interspersed with some cyclical movements for all asset
returns. The same pattern, but much weaker, is visible for equity returns in developed markets,
whereas for bonds and exchange rates, cyclical movements dominate, with the recent global and
European sovereign crises causing a spike in volatility.
To detect quasi-permanent movements in convergence/divergence measures, we use trend
tests. This may appear strange at first, as it is quite possible that some measures may move to a
point where they can no longer converge further. Also, if de jure liberalizations drive changes in
the measures, a break analysis around the liberalization dates would appear superior. However,
recall that we are interested in the convergence of returns across countries. Consequently, the
convergence measures are affected by liberalizations in all the countries in the sample. Given
sufficient cross-sectional and temporal variation in the liberalizations over time, the pattern could
look like a slow trend over time, which might coincide with the trends in the globalization process
itself, even though these are somewhat weak (see Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1). Therefore, the test must
have the power to detect a slow trend, even if the break in one country is sudden and abrupt.
Nevertheless, in many countries or regional groups (such as the European Union), integration
itself has been gradual. For instance, Korea relaxed foreign ownership restrictions starting in
1991, in slow increments, to finally become totally open in 2002. The use of trend analysis is also
widespread in the literature (see, e.g., Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009a); Eiling and Gerard
(2015)).
The results are reported in Table 1.2. For correlations, we find positive trend coefficients for
all asset classes and country groups, except for bonds in developed markets, where the trend
coefficient is essentially 0. None of the coefficients is significantly different from 0. A similar
picture emerges for betas, where the coefficient is always positive but, again, no coefficient is
significant. For idiosyncratic risk, the coefficient is negative except for bond and foreign exchange
returns in developed markets. Again, statistical significance is elusive. This may be because of
21
a lack of power of the tests or may simply reflect that many of the comovement measures show
too much cyclical behavior for an underlying trend to shine through. In Section 1.4, we attempt
to control for some of the potential determinants of these cyclical movements. Table 1.2e shows
the tests for cross-sectional dispersion, and these tests prove more powerful. We find negative
trend coefficients in all cases (except for bonds in developed markets), which are all statistically
significant for emerging markets.
1.4 ASSET RETURN CONVERGENCE, GLOBALIZATION AND OTHER
FACTORS
We now directly investigate the link between our return convergence measures and our open-
ness variables. We use two approaches. Our first approach is informal, linking the convergence
measure examined in the previous section to globalization measures and other control variables
using a simple panel model. Our second approach estimates a parametric factor model that allows
for the conditional mean and the beta exposure to the global factor to vary through time with var-
ious determinants. It therefore focuses on the global factor exposure as a convergence measure
but also allows us to extract time-varying risk premiums.
1.4.1 Convergence Measures and their Determinants
We now explore the link between our convergence measures and both trade and financial open-
ness.
1.4.1.1 Empirical Framework
To explore the link between globalization and the convergence of asset returns, we specify
multivariate regressions of the form
Convi,t = αi + β1TIi,t + β2FIi,t + γ
′Zi,t + εi,t, (1.11)
where Convi,t is the convergence measure (correlation, beta, or idiosyncratic risk), TIi,t is the trade
openness measure, FIi,t is the financial openness measure, and Zi,t are control variables that we
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discuss below. We use only one globalization measure in each regression, as they are highly corre-
lated. To accommodate the serial correlation in the error terms, we use country-clustered standard
errors in our main specifications. We also check whether a trend variable survives in such a specifi-
cation. Finally, note that the regressions feature country-fixed effects, so that they are truly picking
up (common) time variation in our sample.
We use four control variables that may ex ante have a significant effect on convergence but that
may not be directly related to openness. The first is a country-specific business cycle variable,
denoted by Cyclei,t. To measure the stage of the business cycle, we subtract a moving average
of past GDP growth (over the last five years) from current GDP growth. However, we only have
quarterly or end-of-year annual GDP growth. To turn this into a monthly variable, Cyclei,t is con-
structed using the weighted average of the quarterly or annual business cycle variable Cyclei,s,a in
the current quarter or year and last quarter or year. For example, assuming we only have annual








It is well known that, in recessions, all asset returns are more variable, which may lead to higher
asset return comovements to the extent that the variability increase is systematic rather than
country-specific. In a robustness check, we replace the country-specific cycle variable with its
global counterpart (a weighted average of the G7 countries’ growth rates). The country-specific
business cycle variable is mildly negatively correlated with the openness variables.
The second variable is a crisis measure, denoted by Crisisi,t. When crises are isolated to a few
countries or one region, they may actually decrease the comovement with global returns. How-
ever, if the crises are global in nature, comovements may increase. We use the crisis variable of
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), who investigate seven varieties of crisis, including banking and cur-
rency crises, for a large panel of countries. We map their [0, 7] score onto the [0, 1] interval. Overall,
the crisis variable is negatively correlated with the openness measures. It is conceivable that gov-
ernments face pressure in times of crisis to impose capital controls. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad,
and Siegel (2011) suggest that in times of crisis, markets become more effectively segmented. We
further comment on the different nature of the crisis variable for developed versus developing
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countries when discussing the results.
The work of Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011) is part of a large literature that
stresses the difference between de jure and de facto integration as reflected in asset prices. For
instance, Bekaert (1995) argues that indirect barriers to investment (such as poor liquidity, poor
corporate governance, political and substantial macroeconomic risks, etc.) may keep institutional
investors out of certain emerging markets and prevent de facto integration, even though these
markets are legally open. Nishiotis (2004) shows how these indirect barriers are more important
than direct barriers using a sample of closed-end funds. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel
(2011) develop a measure of de facto equity market segmentation and find that, apart from equity
market openness, a measure of the quality of institutions, stock market development and certain
global risk variables (proxied for by US credit spreads and the US equity market volatility mea-
sure, VIX) also greatly matter in explaining the temporal and cross-sectional variation in de facto
segmentation.
As a third explanatory variable, we use a variable that consistently shows up as a strong deter-
minant of effective segmentation, namely political risk. We use data on the political risk ratings
of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG; for more information, see Table A.1), which are
available for a large panel of countries. Political risk measures the attitude of a government to-
ward FDI, and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2014) show that high political risk repels
FDI. Because several components of the ICRG political risk measure attempt to reflect the quality
of a government’s institutions and its attitude to businesses more generally, it may be correlated
with measures of corporate governance.
The use of international data in the corporate finance literature has expanded, yet few try to
control for the degree of openness. There is an implicit assumption that cross-country differences
in corporate governance are of first-order importance. This implicit argument was recently made
eloquently explicit by Stulz (2005). He argues that a twin agency problem of rulers of sovereign
states and corporate insiders, pursuing their own interests at the expense of outside investors,
limits the beneficial effects of financial globalization. In other words, corporate governance at the
firm and country level, not financial openness, is the main factor driving cross-country differences
in returns. Unfortunately, panel data on corporate governance for a large set of countries are not
available, but our political risk measure may allow an informal test of Stulz’s theory. Although we
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believe this measure is likely correlated with the quality of corporate governance, we may obtain
a better proxy by focusing on subindices of the overall rating. For a robustness check, we create an
index of the quality of institutions from three of the overall rating’s components, Corruption, Law
and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality, following Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005). Note that
the political risk rating varies between 0 and 100, where 100 represents perfect political stability.
We transform the measure to a [0,1] scale but keep the political stability scaling. The correlation
between political stability and our openness measures is far from perfect, hovering around 0.50.
Finally, we also control for the volatility bias we discussed before by adding a monthly measure
of the realized global equity variance (for details of the computation, see Table A.1).
Our empirical results are organized in Tables 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 for equities, bonds, and foreign
exchange returns, respectively. We consider two alternative specifications for our independent
variables. The approach discussed here applies the same kernel to our control variables as we use
for the dependent variables. Alternatively, we can simply use the control variable observation at
time t. Each table has three panels, with regression results for correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic
volatility, respectively. The first four columns in each table report results for developed and for
emerging markets, first for a de jure and then for a de facto openness measure. The last four
columns repeat these results, adding a trend term to the specification. The last two lines of each
table produce the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where the financial
openness measures are replaced with trade openness. Because of the relatively high correlations
between these two measures, the other coefficients do not change much and are therefore not
reported.
Note that we run a large number of different specifications and therefore should expect some
coefficients to be significant just by chance (for a discussion of the effect of data mining on statisti-
cal inference, see Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016)). To mitigate this problem, we focus our discussion
on results that are statistically significant and robust across two different specifications. That is,
the asterisks in Tables 1.3–1.5 refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance using the kernel-weighted
specification of the control variables. However, we only view a coefficient as robust if it has the
same sign and is at least significant at the 10% level in the alternative specification using the inde-
pendent variables simply at time t. Such coefficients are bolded.
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1.4.1.2 Equity Returns
We start our discussion with the equity return correlations. For developed markets, equity
return correlations are not significantly affected by de jure financial globalization, but they do in-
crease significantly with de jure trade integration. The coefficient of 0.65 indicates an economically
very significant increase of correlation; when trade integration increases from its 5% to 95% value
(a move of 0.47), correlations would be expected to increase by 0.47 × 0.65 = 0.31. The coefficient
is much reduced in value and loses statistical significance when a time trend is introduced. For
de facto integration, the financial and trade openness measures are both positive but marginally
statistically significant (at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively), but all lose statistical significance
when a trend is introduced. For emerging markets, we find positive coefficients for almost all
openness measures, which are significant in about half of the specifications. The effect is econom-
ically and statistically strongest for de facto equity market integration. When a trend is introduced,
the effects lose significance for the de facto measures.
In all specifications, the trend coefficient is highly significant, that is, correlations have trended
upward, even when we control for variables potentially accounting for their time variation. Note
that the significance of the trend coefficient may not mean that openness does not matter. As
Table 1.1 indicates, most openness measures show positive trend behavior, which is, however,
only statistically significant for the de facto financial measure for emerging markets.
As to the other variables, their signs are robust across the different specifications, but only a
minority of the coefficients are statistically significantly different from 0. Political stability is as-
sociated with higher global correlations, but the coefficient is only significant in one specification,
namely for developed markets and de jure financial openness. Its economic effect implies an in-
crease in the correlation of 0.24 × 0.74 = 0.18 when political stability goes from the 5% to the 95%
level in the sample (a change of 0.24 in the measure). The cycle variable does not have a significant
effect on equity return correlations. The crisis variable is only significant for emerging markets
and has a negative coefficient. The negative sign may be surprising if the crisis variable predom-
inately measures global crises, during which we would expect correlations to increase. However,
although the crisis variable, on average, peaks in the global financial crisis, its average value is
higher for emerging markets in the early and late 1990s, whereas for developed markets there are
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a number of occasional peaks (with the variable indeed being highest during the global financial
crisis). Finally, the global variance coefficient is positive and very significant in all specifications,
suggesting that the volatility bias is a key driver of correlations.
In Table 1.3b, we show the same specifications for the time-varying global betas. For developed
markets, the coefficients on openness are mostly small and insignificant, with the exception of the
coefficient on de jure trade openness. Some coefficients even become negative when a trend is
introduced, but the de jure trade measure retains its statistical (at the 10% level) and economic sig-
nificance. A 90% range increase in the trade openness variable would generate a 0.51× 0.83 = 0.42
increase in beta. For emerging markets, we find a statistically significant effect only for de facto
financial and trade openness. The political stability variable again obtains a positive coefficient,
significant in half of the specifications that we show. The cycle variable again is never significant.
Interestingly, the crisis variable coefficient is now positive and, for the developed market specifi-
cations, significant. This is likely induced by the recent global recession, when betas of developed
equity markets relative to the global market may have increased. Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
and Mehl (2014a) suggest that the global financial crisis changed betas in a country-specific way,
with the US-originated crisis hitting countries with bad fundamentals the most. Consistent with
the intuition that the realized variance captures a volatility bias present in correlations, it does not
affect betas for developed markets, with coefficients that are mostly not significant. For emerg-
ing markets, it does appear that in times of high global volatility, betas increase, but the effect is
only statistically significant when no trend is included. The trend coefficient remains positive and
significant in all specifications.
For the idiosyncratic volatility regressions in Table 1.3c, we find no significant effect of de jure fi-
nancial openness. However, de facto financial globalization leads to lower idiosyncratic risk in both
developed and emerging markets, with the significance disappearing when a trend is introduced.
The effects are stronger for trade openness, especially for developed markets. The coefficients are
always negative, with the exception of the last specification (emerging markets, de facto integra-
tion, with trend). High GDP growth decreases idiosyncratic risk for emerging markets, which is
only significant when a trend is included in the regression. Crises invariably increase idiosyncratic
risk, with the effect being mostly significant. The effect of the variance variable on idiosyncratic
risk mimics its effect on betas but with the opposite sign.
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1.4.1.3 Bond Returns
Given that we do not have daily data on bond and foreign exchange returns, we use the equity
return realized variance in both the bond and foreign exchange return regressions. Although
there is likely positive correlation between realized variances across all three asset classes, it is
also possible that in certain market scenarios (e.g., flights to safety), the correlation is relatively
low. Therefore, this variable can serve as only an imperfect volatility bias control and may, in part,
simply reflect priced global equity volatility risk.
We now move to Table 1.4, which focuses on bond return regressions. The bond financial
openness variables do not have a significant impact on bond return correlations. The lack of
significance is also observed for trade openness but, in this case, the effect turns significantly
negative when a trend is included for developed markets for the de jure measure. The political
risk variable now has a more robust and significant effect on correlations across countries. Its
coefficient is mostly positive and statistically significant for developed markets, whereas it is only
significant for emerging markets when a trend is allowed for. The effect is economically large (a
coefficient of 2.0 means a 0.48 = 2.0 × 0.24 increase in correlation for a 90% range improvement
in political stability). This is not surprising from the perspective of the literature on sovereign
bond pricing, where political risk is a key determinant of sovereign spreads (for empirical results
and a survey of the literature, see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2016)). To the extent that
political risk is idiosyncratic, its presence would induce more country-specific pricing of sovereign
bonds. The cycle variable again is never statistically significant. The crisis variable has a negative
effect, which is significant for emerging markets, again indicating that, for these countries, crises
are dominated by country-specific events. The realized equity variance has no significant effect
on global bond return correlations.
The effect of financial and trade openness on local bond return betas mimics their effect on
correlations, with one single positive significant coefficient (de facto debt openness) and even a few
significantly negative ones. Political stability increases betas for developed markets but reduces
betas for emerging markets. The latter effect is surprising but does not survive when a trend is
allowed for, even though political stability does not show much trending behavior for emerging
markets. The results for the cycle variable are very similar to those for the political risk variable,
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but with the coefficient signs reversed. That is, for developed (emerging) markets, betas increase
(decrease) in recessionary times. This may partly pick up the upward trend in betas in the second
half of the sample when the global crisis hits, an event which may dominate the developed market
business cycle, whereas emerging market business cycles are more country-specific.7 The crisis
variable mostly follows the coefficient pattern of the political stability variable and is significant for
emerging markets for all specifications. In developed markets, perhaps the higher crisis incidence
during the global financial crisis caused bond betas to increase, whereas for emerging markets the
crises are mostly country-specific, making them decouple from global bond markets in times of
crisis. The equity variance variable is positive and significant at the 5% level when no trend is
included for emerging markets.
For idiosyncratic risk, there are no significant effects due to globalization. Here again, politi-
cal stability generates stronger effects, mostly decreasing idiosyncratic risk, with the effects being
similar in magnitude and statistically significant for developed markets and for emerging markets
when a trend is allowed for. Although the cycle variable does not have a significant effect on id-
iosyncratic risk, it is not surprising that crises invariably increase it significantly for both emerging
and developed markets. Global equity variance risk is also associated with higher idiosyncratic
bond risk, but only for emerging markets.
1.4.1.4 Foreign Exchange Returns
In Table 1.5, we investigate the convergence statistics for exchange rate returns. For finan-
cial and trade openness, only 3 coefficients (out of 16) are statistically significant at the 5% or 10%
level. de jure financial integration for developed markets and de jure trade integration for emerging
markets are associated with higher foreign exchange correlations. Political stability increases cor-
relations, but only for developed markets, with the effect weakening when a trend is included; for
emerging markets, in contrast, this effect surfaces only when a trend is included. The cycle vari-
able is not significant, and the crisis variable significantly decreases correlations only for emerging
markets when no trend is included. The realized variance variable has a positive coefficient only
for emerging markets, an effect which is always statistically significant. There does appear to be a
7Levy Yeyati and Williams (2012) show that emerging economies decoupled from the business cycle of developed
countries during the 2000s.
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positive trend in foreign exchange correlations, but it is significant only for emerging markets.
Regarding betas, de jure financial openness significantly increases betas for developed markets,
and de jure trade openness does so for emerging markets; there are no other significant effects.
Thus, the link between globalization and higher return correlations is at least partially driven by
higher global betas. There are very few significant coefficients for the political risk, cycle, crisis,
and realized variance variables. The trend term is here more pronounced and significant than for
correlations.
Openness is mostly associated with increases in idiosyncratic risk. The effects are significant
for de jure financial openness and for de jure trade openness, but only for developed markets.
Political stability and cycles have no effect on idiosyncratic foreign exchange risk. Because crises
in emerging markets are mostly idiosyncratic and often currency-related, it is not surprising that
we find significantly positive coefficients for the crisis variable. Global equity variance risk always
has a positive and statistically significant positive coefficient, but only for developed markets.
The foreign exchange results show that currency movements are not likely driving the major
results we observe for bond equity returns; we verify this more formally in Section 5. Regarding
equities, we do not confirm Stulz’s hypothesis, as the globalization variables seem to have a more
important effect on our convergence measures than do political risk measures, although the glob-
alization effects are far from strong in statistical terms. These results are reminiscent of the results
of Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007), who argue that the literature on the channels
of growth ignores openness in favor of financial development and institutional factors, but that
financial openness plays a much more important role than these other factors in aligning growth
opportunities with actual growth. Here we show, as do Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel
(2011) with an entirely different approach, that financial openness is more important than corpo-
rate governance and (the lack of) political risk in integrating financial markets. However, these
results do not extend to bond markets. For bond markets, political stability is a much more impor-
tant determinant of correlations and idiosyncratic risk than is globalization. Political stability is
also a very significant determinant of global bond betas, but increases global betas for developed
markets while decreasing them for emerging markets, a result that deserves further scrutiny.
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1.4.1.5 Return Dispersion
In Section 1.3, we found strong evidence of negative trends in cross-sectional dispersion. We
now examine whether the cross-sectional dispersion movements over time are related to the dis-
persion and levels of our fundamental variables, including globalization, political risk, business
cycle variation, and crises. To conserve space, we provide a detailed discussion and detailed re-
sults in the Supplemental Appendix. Here, we simply summarize the salient and robust results.
We start with equity return dispersion. First, de jure financial and trade openness significantly re-
duce dispersion for both developed and emerging markets. Second, the dispersion of the political
stability measure is positively associated with return dispersion, as is the dispersion of the cri-
sis variables. The latter variable thus explains peaks in return dispersion due to country-specific
crises. Third, dispersion is positively linked to realized equity variances, so there is a positive
volatility bias, despite the decomposition in Equation 8. Finally, the trend survives in most but
not all regressions.
This equity volatility effect is also present for bond returns, but there are fewer robust and
significant effects than for equities. Financial globalization, both de jure and de facto, increases
dispersion, which is perhaps surprising, but may be related to the openness reversal for bond
markets we witnessed at the end of the sample. There are two more significant effects, but they
apply only to developed markets. First, there is more return dispersion in good economic times
(measured by the cycle variable); returns in good times are more likely to be country-specific than
are returns during bad times. Second, the cross-sectional dispersion of crises is also positively
linked with the dispersion of the crisis variable.
For foreign exchange returns, the cross-sectional dispersion of de jure financial globalization
is positively correlated with return dispersion for emerging markets, whereas for de facto finan-
cial globalization, this effect is significant only for developed markets. For emerging markets, the
level effect for de jure financial globalization is also positive (but recall that money market open-
ness goes down slightly over the sample). For trade openness, there are robust effects only across
specifications for developed markets and de facto trade openness. Again, there are positive dis-
persion and level effects. Other robust significant effects include the positive effect of the realized
variance variable and the negative trend for emerging markets.
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1.4.2 A Parametric Model and Time-varying Betas
We now explore a model whereby the sensitivity of the asset return to the world factor is a
time-varying function of openness, the business cycle, political risk as well as crises.
1.4.2.1 The Model and Empirical Results
Our second model attempts to more directly deal with the volatility bias critique and focuses
on how openness affects the beta with respect to the global factor. We estimate the following panel
factor model:





αi,t = αi + αopenOpeni,t + αprPRi,t + αcycleCyclei,t + αcrisisCrisisi,t,
δi,t = δ0 + δopenOpeni,t + δprPRi,t + δcycleCyclei,t + δcrisisCrisisi,t,
βi,t = β0 + βopenOpeni,t + βprPRi,t + βcycleCyclei,t + βcrisisCrisisi,t,
(1.13)
where rj denotes excess returns for j = e, b, fx; Zi,t is a vector of instruments that help deter-
mine the expected return for market i (specifically, dividend yields DYi,t and short-term interest
rates ii,t); and Openi,t is either financial openness (FI) or trade openness (TI). All the coefficients
vary over time with the independent variables we introduced before (that is, a country-specific
openness measure, Openi,t; a political risk indicator, PRi,t; a business cycle variable, Cyclei,t; and
a crisis indicator, Crisisi,t). The constant term (αi) depends on a country-specific fixed effect, and
the remaining coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries for identification. The
coefficient in which we are most interested is βopen. Standard errors are clustered at the country
level.
Although conditional mean effects are not the main focus in this article, we investigate the
behavior of risk premiums in Section 1.4.3. Therefore, we use a set of predictive instruments to
capture time variation in the conditional mean. As before, we include only one openness variable
in each regression we run. Also, although the country-specific betas showed some cross-country
variation, they did not add much to the fit of the model, so we focus on a model without country-
specific betas. All variation in betas must therefore be generated by the exposures to the four
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control variables.
Tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 report the results for equity, bond, and foreign exchange returns, respec-
tively. Each table has eight columns, looking at two financial openness measures (de jure and de
facto) and two trade openness measures (de jure and de facto) and splitting the sample over devel-
oped and emerging markets. The first set of rows include the conditional mean parameters, which
we discuss in Section 4.3. We first focus on the beta exposures, and provide a discussion across
asset classes.
Given the multiple interaction effects, the constant beta is hard to interpret, but we report it for
completeness. The first result is that financial and trade openness have no significant positive ef-
fects on the conditional beta for any asset class. It is true that we have estimated some alternative
specifications where some of the positive coefficients turned out stronger and significant. For ex-
ample, for foreign exchange, joint samples across developed and emerging markets provide more
powerful results. Political stability shows somewhat stronger results in that for equity returns,
political stability in emerging markets increases betas significantly, whereas for foreign exchange
returns, it does so only for developed markets. The cycle variable is never significant. The cri-
sis variable, in contrast, is positive and significant for both equity and bond returns, but only in
developed markets for foreign exchange returns.
To get a sense of the economic importance of the effects we estimate here, Tables 1.9–1.11 show
the change in beta when moving from the 5th to the 95th percentile of the variable in question,
leaving the other variables at their overall means. Although many of the coefficients are insignifi-
cant, it is interesting to obtain an economic picture of the effects implied by the regressions. Given
relatively large standard errors, we define a beta difference of 0.20 as economically significant.
Assuming a global equity premium of 6%, such a change in beta is associated with an increment
in the country risk premium of 1.2% attributable to global risk. For bond and foreign exchange
returns, the risk premium changes would, of course, be smaller.
First, if we consider global betas as capturing potentially permanent effects of globalization,
the results differ across types of openness and across asset classes. For equity returns, there is
only one economically significant result: Financial globalization in emerging markets would in-
crease betas from 1.05 to 1.33 when moving from low to high openness. For bond returns, among
financial globalization measures, only de facto financial globalization increases global betas sub-
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stantially, and this only for developed markets. However, trade openness is generally associated
with substantially higher bond betas. There is an almost significant decline in bond betas with
higher financial openness for emerging markets. For foreign exchange returns, globalization is
mostly associated with relatively large decreases (increases) in world betas for developed (emerg-
ing) markets.
Second, the effect of political risk is a bit more robust across asset classes and openness mea-
sures. When it is associated with a major change in beta, it is almost always an increase in beta,
and the increase in beta is often very large. For equities, global betas in emerging markets increase
by 0.5–0.6 moving from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the political stability variable;
for bond returns, the effect is about 0.20, but only for developed (not emerging) markets, whereas
for foreign exchange, the effect is generally very large but largest for developed markets. This
is also the case for the crisis variable, which increases betas substantially for all asset classes and
country groups, with the exception of bond returns in emerging markets. The cycle variable does
not generate meaningful economic results.
1.4.2.2 Interpreting the Results
There are a number of possible interpretations for the weak links we find between globaliza-
tion and global betas. First, regional integration may be stronger than global market integration;
that is, we may observe strong within-region convergence, but weaker integration across regions.8
The past 35 years have witnessed several strong regional economic and financial integration initia-
tives, including free trade arrangements in North America (NAFTA) and Asia (ASEAN), with the
most momentous change taking place within the European Union, which established an economic
and monetary union with one currency in 1999. There is a substantial literature on European in-
tegration (for recent surveys, see Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004), Jappelli
and Pagano (2008)), but most of the formal academic literature has focused on equity returns.
Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, Krylova, and Monnet (2004) document a clear increase in regional and
global betas, with the regional increase stronger than the global one. Baele (2005) also finds a
8Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2008) find convergence of business cycle fluctuations among developed countries and
among emerging economies, but nevertheless find the relative importance of the global factor to have declined over
the previous 20 years, suggesting decoupling between developed and emerging economies.
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larger increase in regional than in global effects (betas and variance ratios), with spillover intensi-
ties (betas) increasing most strongly in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.
He links these changes to many structural determinants, such as trade integration, equity market
development, and inflation. Hardouvelis, Malliaropoulos, and Priestley (2004) document strong
convergence in the cost of equity across different countries in the same sector, but much less con-
vergence across different sectors. They list the launch of the single currency as a major factor.
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2013), focusing on valuation differentials, find that the
European Union (but not the Euro) strongly contributed to European equity market integration.
For Asia, Ng (2000) uses a conditional GARCH model to investigate spillovers from Japan and the
United States to Pacific Basin markets. She finds evidence of both regional and global spillover
effects, but the effects of measures of trade and financial integration are not always significant or
of the correct sign. These results are consistent with ours. She also finds that the proportions of
the Pacific Basin market volatility captured by regional and world factors are small. Eiling and
Gerard (2015) document strong within-region increases in correlations, which are partially due to
financial and trade openness. Although our model could be easily adapted to account for regional
integration, we defer this to further research. In a precursor to this article, Bekaert and Wang
(2009) found regional betas to be larger than global betas in Europe but not in Asia.
Second, our beta model may suffer from an omitted variable problem. There are many factors
affecting comovements, and without properly controlling for them, we may fail to pick up the ef-
fects of globalization. One variable for which we fail to control is industry structure. Whereas the
early literature (see Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994)) suggested that country factors dominated
the variation of firm returns relative to industry factors, more recent work (see, e.g., Cavaglia,
Brightman, and Aked (2000) argues that industry factors have become at least as important as
country factors, likely because of financial integration, and can no longer be ignored. Campa and
Fernandes (2006) directly link the relative importance of industry and country factors to measures
of economic and financial international integration and development. Their results suggest that
industrial structure may matter too and that countries with a more specialized production struc-
ture will have more country-specific risk. Nevertheless, several results in the literature suggest
that our failure to create industry factors is not critical. First, several studies show that country
factors are still more important than industry factors (see Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009a);
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Eiling, Gerard, Hillion, and de Roon (2012)). One reason that several studies overestimate the im-
portance of industry factors is simply sample selection; their sample periods end around the year
2000, a time of huge technology-sector volatility. Brooks and Del Negro (2004) ascribe the rela-
tive change of importance of industry versus country factors to the 1998–1999 stock market bub-
ble. Further, Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009) correct directly for industry misalignment in a study
of stock return comovements without finding much of an effect. Finally, Bekaert, Hodrick, and
Zhang (2009a) show that parsimonious risk-based models are better at capturing comovements
than are models with multiple country and industry factors for developed countries, whereas
Phylaktis and Xia (2006) show that country factors remain dominant in emerging markets.
Third, a potential sampling problem is that the end of our sample period is dominated by the
global financial crisis, in which globalization was halted or even reversed. We have argued before
that crises may lead to temporary higher comovements that have nothing to do with liberaliza-
tions. However, in much of our analysis, we control for global recessions (typically associated
with higher volatility of asset prices) and for crises. Our focus on betas in the parametric model
bypasses the volatility bias critique. Yet, we find that the crisis variable is associated with large
increases in global betas, especially for developed markets. This implicitly suggests that the time-
varying beta model does not fit crisis returns well. Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2014a)
measure such changes in betas for the global financial crisis and other crises and, building on an
intuition first laid out by Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005), suggest they constitute crisis contagion,
representing the unexpected comovements from the perspective of the asset pricing model. Such
contagion also happened, to a lesser extent, during the LTCM/Russia crisis in 1998, but did not
happen at all during the technology-sector bust at the end of the 1990s. They analyze the sources of
the beta changes, finding a strong role for country-specific policy factors over and above measures
of integration or even international banking links. The crisis may therefore represent a nonlinear
shift in exposures not well captured by our linear parametric model.
Finally, several articles have attempted to estimate more dynamic models, specifying an asset
pricing model, linking the second moments to the first moments, and then examining the degree
of integration over time (see Bekaert and Harvey (1995); Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2007);
Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza (2013)). This research finds that the evolution toward more inte-
grated markets is not always a smooth process for each country, and our linear model may not
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capture these dynamics very well.
We conclude that parametric models of global betas do not uncover strong links with globaliza-
tion measures and that other factors (such as political stability and crises) often matter more. This
contrasts somewhat with the results for the nonparametric kernel-weighted regressions. There
we did find that equity rerun correlations increased with openness measures and this increase
was attributable to increases in beta (and partly also to lower country-specific risk). Interestingly,
we find the results typically to be stronger for trade, rather than for financial globalization, and
typically also stronger for de facto rather than de jure openness. Somewhat weaker but similar re-
sults apply to foreign exchange returns. However, for bond returns, the globalization measures
are not as important as the other variables, especially political risk, even in the kernel-weighted
regressions. It is conceivable that the recent period dominated by a severe sovereign bond crisis
in Europe may be partially to blame.
1.4.3 Risk Premium Results
We now explore both the relation between our openness measures and risk premiums as well
as the dispersion in risk premiums.
1.4.3.1 Risk Premiums in a Parametric Model
We now investigate briefly the conditional mean results. We already pointed out that it is not
obvious that financial openness (and even less so trade openness) will lead to stronger comove-
ments of asset returns. However, under most dynamic pricing models, risk premiums should
become more highly correlated when markets integrate. It is notoriously difficult to estimate risk
premiums from asset return data. The regression model we formulated above implies proxies for
risk premiums through its conditional mean function. Bekaert (1995) and Campbell and Hamao
(1992) use similar methods to extract expected equity returns and argue that in a one-factor model,
these expected returns should be perfectly correlated under perfect market integration. Note that
the conditional mean function that we estimate is quite complex, as it involves each variable we
use to model the time variation in betas and the interaction of each of those variables with in-
struments. The instruments we use are the local dividend yield and the short-term interest rate,
as in Ang and Bekaert (2007). Table A.1 describes the data sources for these variables. The slope
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coefficients are reported in Tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8, for equity, bond, and foreign exchange returns,
respectively.
For equity returns, the crisis variable, not surprisingly, has an overall negative and significant
coefficient, but for the other variables, significance is not consistent across specifications. The
direct effect of trade integration is negative and significant, but trade integration also increases the
dependence on the short-term interest rate. For developed markets, de jure financial globalization
surprisingly has a positive direct effect, but also decreases the dependence of the equity premium
on the local dividend yield. For de facto equity integration, the effect is reversed, with the direct
effect being negative, but the interaction effect being positive for the short rate for developed
markets and for the dividend yield for emerging markets. Political stability has a negative direct
effect on expected returns in emerging markets, and there are no significant interaction terms.
For bond returns, we do not observe significant coefficients for the financial globalization vari-
ables or their interactions with the instruments. We do find a significant negative direct effect of
de jure trade integration for developed markets. There are no significant direct effects for the other
three variables, but a few significant interaction effects. For example, the cycle variable has a pos-
itive interaction effect with the short rate for developed markets. That is, the dependence of the
risk premium on the short rate increases in good times. It has a negative interaction with the local
dividend yield for emerging markets, however. For developed markets, the crisis variable now
has a negative significant interaction effect with the local dividend yield. Such an effect can im-
plicitly ensure that during a global crisis, the bond premium becomes more global. These effects
are robust across the various specifications.
For foreign exchange returns, globalization measures do not feature significant coefficients for
developed markets. In emerging markets, de jure financial globalization increases the expected
exchange rate return directly, but the interaction effect with both the local dividend yield and the
interest rate is negative. The interest rate itself has mostly a significant negative coefficient for
emerging markets; that is, high short-term interest rates reduce the expected return on foreign
exchange, which would appear to be inconsistent with standard unbiasedness hypothesis regres-
sions. However, Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) show that the deviations from unbiasedness, which
typically suggest that expected returns increase in the interest differential with the dollar, are con-
fined to (a subset of) developed countries, whereas foreign exchange risk premiums in emerging
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markets depend on various local factors, as we document here as well. The negative interaction
effect with the short rate is also present for de jure trade integration. Political stability in emerg-
ing markets increases the dependence of the expected foreign exchange return on the short rate.
The cycle and crisis variables do not have significant direct effects on expected foreign exchange
returns, but have significant negative interaction effects with the local interest rate for emerging
markets (cycle variable) and developed markets (crisis variable).
Examining the regression coefficients does not suffice to appreciate the full effect of globaliza-
tion on expected returns. The market integration process is likely to change many relationships
in the economy and may serve as a structural break for the return generating process.9 We par-
tially accommodate this by allowing for interaction effects between the predictive instruments
and the globalization variables, but our instruments (dividend yields and interest rates) are them-
selves affected by the globalization process. We therefore conduct further analysis, extracting the
risk premiums from the predictive regression framework and examining whether these premi-
ums have undergone comovement changes correlated with globalization and our other variables.
Of course, we make the strong implicit assumption that time-invariant parameters on our factors
such as globalization and political stability capture all the changes in the predictive relationship
between the instruments and returns. Moreover, we have not included global instruments in the
relationship (for early work on foreign and domestic instruments predicting equity and foreign
exchange returns, see Bekaert and Hodrick (1992)), which would have greatly complicated the
already heavily parameterized model.
1.4.3.2 Risk Premium Dispersion
To examine convergence of risk premiums, we simply compute the cross-sectional dispersion
of our premium estimates at each point in time. Recall that we have eight different specifications
for each asset class, and thus eight alternative estimates of risk premiums at each point in time. We
simply compute the convergence measures for all specifications. In Table 1.12, we report Bunzel–
Vogelsang trend tests on these dispersion statistics. With few exceptions, we find strong negative
trends for all specifications and all three asset classes. Positive trends are only observed for bond
9Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) exploit these structural breaks to date the time of integration.
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return premiums for developed markets. For both bond and equity premiums, we find only one
trend coefficient to be statistically significant, but for foreign exchange risk premiums, the trend
coefficients are significant for five out of eight specifications.
It is interesting that we find the strongest evidence of convergence in an asset class that has
received considerably less attention in the market integration literature, which has mostly focused
on equities. Of course, these findings may simply reflect the limited power of trend tests and the
fact that foreign exchange returns are less noisy than equity returns.
The downward trend in the dispersion of risk premiums across countries raises the question
whether this convergence is linked to any of our fundamental variables, including globalization,
political risk, business cycle variation, or crises. It is not necessarily only the level of these vari-
ables that ought to matter, but also their cross-sectional dispersion. For example, we indicated
before that business cycle convergence may impact the return convergence, whereas global reces-
sions may also impact risk premiums worldwide. We therefore use both the (average) levels and
cross-sectional dispersion of our four variables as independent variables. For the cycle and crisis
variables, we do use global versions of the level variables, as the incidence of global recessions
or crises may affect return comovements. Unfortunately, we cannot include the cross-sectional
dispersion and levels of the globalization measures in one regression, as in many instances they
are too negatively correlated. That is, as the degree of globalization increases, the dispersion of
openness measures unsurprisingly decreases (e.g., for equity de jure openness, the correlation is
−0.93).
We begin with equity risk premiums (see Table 1.13). The table reports the specification with a
trend term. Bolded coefficients indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10% level or lower
and has the same sign in a regression without the trend term. We focus on robust findings. For
de jure financial globalization, we find its cross-sectional dispersion to positively affect the disper-
sion of equity risk premiums and its level to decrease dispersion, but this is only robustly true for
developed markets. Surprisingly, for de facto openness, we find a negative effect of its dispersion
on return dispersion. However, the dispersion of de facto openness shows a strong upward trend
over time, which may explain this result. For trade openness, we only find significant robust re-
sults for de jure trade openness in emerging markets. Here the signs are again unexpected, with
the dispersion having a negative effect (this may be explained by the volatile period in the early
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1990s) and the level a positive effect. In terms of the other variables, we find a positive effect of
both the dispersion and level of political stability, with the latter perhaps being surprising. This
effect is only present for emerging markets. Dispersion in the cycle variable is overwhelmingly
negatively related to risk premium dispersion in emerging markets. Perhaps high cycle disper-
sion is observed in normal times when country-specific shocks (as opposed to global recession
shocks) drive the economy. In such periods, risk premiums may be relatively normal and not very
dispersed. The cycle level is negatively related to equity premium dispersion, but only in devel-
oped markets. In global recessionary periods, risk premiums likely rise substantially, which may
be accompanied by more dispersion across different countries. The realized variance variable is
positively related to premium dispersion for developed markets.
For bond return risk premiums, there are very few globalization effects that are significant and
robust across specifications in Table 1.14. Both the level and dispersion of de jure financial open-
ness lower bond premium dispersion. The cross-sectional dispersion of de facto trade openness
increases the dispersion of bond premiums for developed markets, whereas its level increases pre-
mium dispersion in both developed and emerging markets. In terms of other effects, the level of
the cycle variable affects dispersion negatively in both emerging and developed markets; that is,
bad times are associated with mostly higher and thus more dispersed risk premiums. This may
be exacerbated by the fact that in bad times, flights to safety may make benchmark bonds (such as
US and German bonds) have very low or negative risk premiums. The global crisis variable de-
creases dispersion of bond risk premiums in emerging markets, and the realized variance variable
increases dispersion in both developed and emerging markets.
For foreign exchange return risk premium dispersion in Table 1.15, we find that both level and
dispersion of all financial globalization measures increase their dispersion in emerging markets.
For developed markets, only the dispersion of de facto openness increases premium dispersion
robustly and significantly. For trade openness, we find more significant results for developed
markets. The cross-sectional dispersion of both de jure and de facto trade openness increases the
dispersion of foreign exchange risk premiums in developed markets, but in terms of level, de
jure openness decreases and de facto trade openness increases dispersion. For emerging markets,
only the de jure openness measures are significant with the expected positive (negative) sign for
dispersion (level). We also find that political stability in developed markets contributes to lower
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dispersion of foreign exchange risk premiums, and bad times (negative cycle variables) increase
dispersion in emerging markets. The cross-sectional dispersion of GDP growth decreases the dis-
persion of exchange rate premiums in developed markets.
1.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Here we report on some additional analyzes we conducted.
1.5.1 Local Currency Returns
One potential problem with our analysis for equity and bond returns is that we expressed all
returns in dollars, and they thus feature a common currency component across countries. Because
foreign exchange return correlations increased over time, they may be partially responsible for
higher global correlations for bond and equity returns. To verify this, we computed local currency
bond and equity returns (for details, see Table A.1). The panel correlation between dollar and
local currency equity returns is 0.85, but it is only 0.35 for the corresponding bond returns. This
is obviously because of the variability of equity markets dominating that of currency changes,
whereas the latter dominates the variability of fixed-income instruments.
Note that we consider the correlation, betas, and idiosyncratic volatility relative to the global
dollar-denominated benchmark as before. Although the implicit regressions use two different cur-
rencies, the idea here is to decompose the previous findings in components due to local currency
returns and due to the joint dollar component. While removing the common currency component
must reduce the beta and correlation statistics, we focus on how the changes in these statistics are
related to globalization measures and other determinants.
Here we survey which results are different from the dollar-denominated results, and detailed
results are relegated to the Supplemental Appendix. First, we investigate results from the first half
versus the second half of the sample. Significant increases for return correlations are still observed
for both equity and (only for emerging markets) bond returns from the first to the second half of
the sample, but the result does weaken for bonds. For betas, the beta increases for equities weaken
considerably, and in fact are no longer significant for emerging markets. For bond returns, the
beta increases are smaller but remain significant. The idiosyncratic volatility results (decreases for
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equities and for bonds, but only for emerging markets in the latter case) are entirely robust.
Second, we redo the panel regressions on the kernel-weighted comovement statistics. For eq-
uities, the significant correlation increases under de facto openness remain robust, whereas the
trade openness results weaken somewhat, especially when a trend coefficient is included in the
regression. Interestingly, the positive effect of political stability on correlations is more uniformly
significant; this is also true of its effect on betas. For financial openness, we do not observe any
significant effects on betas, but de jure trade openness continues to positively affect betas for de-
veloped markets. The idiosyncratic volatility results are entirely robust. For bonds, we see in fact
somewhat stronger, more significant, and more positive results for the effect of de facto financial
integration, and of both de facto and de jure trade integration, on correlations. These results extend
to betas. Globalization did not have much effect on idiosyncratic bond volatility, and that remains
true for local bond returns. In terms of the other coefficients, the main change is that for emerging
markets, the cycle variable now has a strong significant and positive effect on correlations and
betas, which was much weaker when convoluted with currency changes. Similarly, it now has a
robust negative effect on the idiosyncratic bond return variability. The results for the parametric
model largely mimic the beta results from the panel regressions, with, for example, trade openness
now having a positive and significant effect on bond betas.
In sum, while there are some small changes, the dollar denomination did not spuriously induce
an effect of globalization on convergence. For example, the results for idiosyncratic volatility are
completely robust.
1.5.2 Global Cycles
In the main regression, we used a country-specific business cycle variable. However, it is con-
ceivable that the global business cycle is more important in driving cross-country correlations. As
we argued before, the sign of the effect is ex ante unclear. More generally, in bad times, higher
global volatility increases the volatility bias, but our regressions control for this. Nonetheless,
much research suggests that there may be more home bias in bad times (Ang and Bekaert (2002);
Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011)), so that de facto integration may reverse.
When we rerun the kernel-weighted regression, replacing the country-specific with the global
business cycle variable, the variable mostly has a strongly positive and significant effect on equity
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return correlations, which only disappears for developed markets when a trend is accounted for.
This is also true for equity betas, suggesting again that bad times are associated with more seg-
mentation, once one controls for volatility biases. The results on idiosyncratic volatility are very
sensitive to whether one controls for a trend, suggesting that the negative trend in idiosyncratic
volatility may be linked to the increased prevalence of global recessions over time. The parametric
model largely confirms this result, but the interaction between the global cycle variable and the
global beta is only statistically significant for developed markets.
For bond returns, the cycle variable generates robustly significant effects only in developed
markets, with global recessions increasing bond return correlations, a result that was not signif-
icant before. It is also not entirely driven by the exchange rate component in bond returns. One
possible explanation is that global bond markets jointly reacted to the global recession and the
ensuing unusual monetary policies that were exported from the United States to other countries
(see Rey (2015)). However, the effect does not survive for betas (except when one controls for
a trend), which suggests that it may also be because we imperfectly control for volatility bias in
these regressions, having no available measure of global bond return volatility. This lack of ro-
bustness is further confirmed by the parametric regression, where the interaction effects with the
cycle variable are negative for emerging markets but positive for developed markets.
For currency returns, the global cycle variable has a robust significantly positive effect on cor-
relations for emerging markets, which is also present for global foreign exchange betas. Thus, as
for equities, there is more comovement in good times. This is confirmed in the parametric model
results, but the interaction coefficient is only significant in one specification.
1.5.3 Corporate Governance
Here we investigate the effect of replacing the general political risk index by a quality of in-
stitutions variable, combining corruption, law and order, and quality of bureaucracy subindices.
This measure may prove a better indication of the corporate governance framework in a country,
but it is far from a perfect measure. The panel correlation with the political risk index is only 0.62
for developed markets, but it is 0.70 for emerging markets. However, there are many countries for
which both indices show very low correlation across time (e.g., Brazil, India, Poland, Russia, and
Thailand among emerging markets and Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden among
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developed markets). Thus, it is conceivable that this variable generates different results from our
main results.
In the previous panel regressions, political stability mostly increased global equity correlations
and betas without significantly affecting idiosyncratic volatility. Although the other coefficients
mostly remain robust, the coefficient on the corporate governance variable is negative for devel-
oped markets in the correlation regressions and mostly loses significance in the beta regressions.
In the idiosyncratic volatility regressions, the coefficients for developed markets (when no trend
is included) turn positive. For bond return correlations, the signs on the corporate governance
variable are also mostly negative, but this time are only significant for emerging markets when
no trend is allowed. The pattern is even stronger for betas, where it holds for both bonds and
equities, but only when no trend is included in the regression. For idiosyncratic volatility, the
corporate governance variable does not have much of an effect. For exchange rates, the signs are
still predominantly negative on the corporate governance variable for both correlations and betas,
but only one coefficient is statistically significant in 16 different specifications. In the parametric
regressions, the corporate governance variable never enters significantly.
These results are somewhat surprising. If corporate governance is an effective segmenting
factor, one would not expect improvements in corporate governance to lower comovements with
the global market. The results also appear inconsistent with the Stulz hypothesis, which suggests
that corporate governance is a main driver of international asset returns. It is therefore likely that
the positive association we found before between the more general index of political stability and
correlations/betas does not reflect a corporate governance effect, but may be an indirect openness
effect because political stability, in general, is highly correlated with FDI.
1.5.4 Effect of Unbalanced Samples
All of our results make use of an unbalanced sample, with countries added on as data become
available. We selected the starting point of the sample requiring a minimum number of countries
to minimize the problem as much as possible. There may be a negative correlation between incom-
plete data and globalization, so that the unbalanced sample may actually bias the results against
finding increased comovement over time as a result of globalization, as less integrated countries
enter the sample. To verify this, we rerun our kernel-weighted regressions, adding an independent
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variable measuring the change in the number of countries. Hence, if the addition of countries af-
fects our results, this variable may capture the bias, and the other coefficients may change as well.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we show that changes in the number of countries often have a
significant effect on comovements, but not always in the expected direction. For example, for eq-
uities, an increase in the number of countries decreases correlations in all specifications; decreases
betas in emerging markets but has a non-robust effect on betas in developed markets; and has little
effect on idiosyncratic variability. Importantly, whatever the bias, the addition of the variable does
not change the other coefficients in any meaningful way, with all significant coefficients remaining
significant and the magnitudes barely altered.
1.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we examine whether globalization has been associated with increased comove-
ment of asset returns across the world, focusing on equity, bond, and foreign exchange returns.
We start the analysis by measuring the globalization process in developed and emerging markets
over the past 35 years. We investigate measures of de jure and de facto financial and trade openness.
Perhaps surprisingly, for our sample period, globalization does not invariably trend upward. Two
factors may play a role here. First, the recent global financial crisis halted the globalization pro-
cess in some countries and even reversed it for some. This is particularly evident from regulatory
actions applied to bond and money markets, as well as from actual trade flows that collapsed dur-
ing the crisis. Second, our sample may have missed the biggest globalization wave by starting too
late. For developed countries, it is conceivable that trade openness generated most globalization
effects before 1980. It is hard to imagine financial openness generating large effects then, as it only
began in earnest in the 1980s for most countries. For emerging markets, capital market liberaliza-
tions were mainly concentrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Our average starting date for
emerging markets is September 1991 for equities and even later for the other asset classes, so it is
possible that we have missed some liberalization effects.
Our analysis focuses on comovements relative to a global benchmark return for each asset class
(representing G7 countries). The evidence shows that global comovements have increased sub-
stantially over our sample period. Correlations between country returns and a global benchmark
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return are higher in the second half versus the first half of our sample. Time-varying correlations
show both trending behavior and cyclical movements. Exceptions are developed market bonds,
where global correlations often decreased.
Correlations can increase because global betas increase, because the variability of global factors
increases, or because country-specific variances decrease. The volatility bias is particularly impor-
tant for our analysis, as our sample period witnessed several economic crises. Controlling for
such a bias, we still find that betas increased and idiosyncratic volatilities decreased, with some
notable exceptions. In particular, country-specific volatilities increased substantially in developed
bond markets, and bond return correlations therefore do not display an upward trend. However,
financial and trade globalization seem to only weakly correlate with these movements. We use a
regression model linking rolling correlations, betas, and country-specific volatilities to our glob-
alization measures and other determinants of comovements as well as a parametric time-varying
global beta model. Although the latter model yields few significant and robust results, there are
some important associations between globalization measures and convergence measures in the
regression framework, especially for equity returns and for the de facto openness measures.
Much of the existing evidence focuses only on equity returns and has used correlations as a
measure of comovement, with some research foreshadowing our results. Karolyi (2003) calls the
evidence on trends in correlations linked to stronger real and financial linkages remarkably weak.
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009a) examine return correlations between developed countries
and find a significant trend only among the European countries, and no trend at all in the Far East.
The literature on international factor models applied to individual stocks has also yielded results
consistent with our findings. The extant literature (see, e.g., Griffin (2002); Hou, Karolyi, and
Kho (2011a); Fama and French (2012)) typically finds that local models outperform global ones.
Petzev, Schrimpf, and Wagner (2016) attempt to characterize the time variation in fit of local versus
global models. They confirm our finding that the R2 of global factor models has increased and
has reduced the gap with the explanatory power of local models (even when controlling for the
volatility bias). However, the pricing errors of global models are still much larger than those for
local models and have failed to converge. Petzev, Schrimpf, and Wagner (2016) speculate that the
increased comovement must therefore stem from real rather than financial integration, in contrast
to, e.g., Baele and Soriano (2010). Our direct tests reveal a much more nuanced picture, in which,
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for example, increased return correlations in developed markets are positively associated with
trade integration, but in emerging markets also depend significantly on financial globalization.
There are several possible explanations for the weak links between globalization and the co-
movement of asset returns. First, regional integration could dominate world integration. Our
framework can be easily generalized to accommodate regional betas. We expect that such an ex-
ercise would generate a strong comovement increase within certain regions (see also Eiling and
Gerard (2015)), but that the recent worldwide and European crises may weaken the link between
regional globalization measures and return comovements.
Second, because of the increased incidence of crises, we may find stronger results focusing
on tails in asset return distributions, rather than on the linear measures we have employed here
(for efforts in this line, see Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003); Beine, Cosma, and Vermeulen (2010);
Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs, and Langlois (2012)).
Third, given that we included a number of alternative comovement determinants in our anal-
ysis, it does not appear that our results are driven by the omission of relevant factors in our re-
gressions. This is reminiscent of the results of King, Sentana, and Wadhwani (1994), who put
forward a long list of observable economic factors to explain covariances among stock market re-
turns, but find that these factors explain very little. This state of affairs may also help explain the
strong results of Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), who document a marked increase in the degree
of integration in equity markets over time. They explain global equity returns using a 10-factor
principal component analysis. Because they extract factors from the return data, their integration
measure is not affected by the poor explanatory power of observable factors. Their method also
nicely circumvents the problem that integration may well decrease comovements under certain
types of events; e.g., competitive pressure or supply shocks (e.g., commodity price shocks) may
benefit certain countries but hurt others more swiftly in an integrated market.
Fourth, the challenge of documenting strong effects of globalization on the convergence of asset
returns was already apparent in some early studies of the dynamics of market integration. Bekaert
and Harvey (1995), for example, argue that integration is a nonsmooth process that may actually
reverse, and is only weakly linked to de jure openness.
We do believe it is possible to devise more powerful tests. Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009) are
not the only researchers who find strong convergence in measures of de facto financial integration.
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Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007) characterize each country by a vector of industry
weights (measured using stock market capitalization weights) and then compute the (logarithmic)
difference between a country’s price to earnings (PE) ratio and the PE ratio for the country’s basket
of industries at world multiples. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2007, 2011) show that
under some strong assumptions of real and financial integration, this measure should be close
to zero. Although their measure confounds economic and financial integration, they show that de
jure globalization, especially financial globalization, has a strong negative effect on these valuation
differentials, which tend to decrease over time. They also show that they diverge again in crises, a
result that also holds true within the European Union (see Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel
(2013)).
This article and earlier work by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) has suggested that the focus on
returns may prevent powerful econometric tests of the effects of globalization. A focus on prices
instead of returns may be necessary to detect more powerful links. In addition, it would be fas-
cinating to decompose returns and prices in their various economic components. Equity returns
have a valuation and cash flow component. Bond returns reflect interest rate changes which, in
turn, reflect real and inflation components. Foreign exchange returns reflect the pure currency and
a carry component. Finer decompositions of returns may yield valuable insights.
Our analysis can be expanded in other directions. First, we have focused on three major asset
classes, but omitted others such as real estate. Second, the growth of the Chinese stock market
and its dramatic gyrations in 2015 suggest that in the future, we may have to include some of the
larger emerging markets in our factor models. Third, we have focused on comovements within an
asset class, and not across asset classes. Recent work on the demand for global safe assets (Bruno
and Shin (2015)) suggests that this may create spillover effects between Federal Reserve policies
(and thus US bond returns), the dollar, and asset returns across the world.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1.1: Openness Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the openness measures for developed (Panel A) and emerging markets (Panel B). Columns
two to seven report summary statistics for the whole sample, while columns eight and nine divide the sample in half and report
averages for the first part versus the second part of the sample. Given the unbalanced nature of the panel, the midpoint of the
sample is country-specific. Start dates for each country can be found in Appendix ??. The penultimate column (difference) shows a
difference in means test to find out if the first half of the sample is significantly different from the second half. Whereas the summary
statistics are calculated over the pooled sample, here we calculate the country means and then run a cross-sectional test to compare
the first and second halves. Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The last
column shows the results of the Bunzel and Vogelsang (2005) trend tests conducted on regional measures, which are constructed as
equally-weighted averages across countries. This trend test is based on the series model yt = β1 + β2t+ ut, where yt is the variable
of interest and t for the linear time trend, and uses a Daniell kernel to nonparametrically estimate the error terms. We test for the null
hypothesis that β2 = 0. A number in bond font indicates that the trend beta is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance
level. See Appendix ?? for details on variable definitions and sources.
Variable N Mean Median sd p5 p95 Mean Half 1 Mean Half 2 Diff Trend
Panel A: Developed Markets
FISeqi 9562 0.90 1.00 0.18 0.50 1.00 0.87 0.93 0.06 0.10
FISboi 6127 0.93 1.00 0.16 0.71 1.00 0.92 0.93 0.00 0.09
FISmmi 3725 0.93 1.00 0.15 0.50 1.00 0.92 0.94 0.04 -0.02
FIQTi 9562 0.90 1.00 0.14 0.62 1.00 0.84 0.96 0.13*** 0.24
FIdf,eqi 9562 0.56 0.27 1.09 0.01 2.02 0.17 0.95 0.11*** 1.44
FIdf,debti 6127 2.47 1.69 2.62 0.58 6.07 1.59 3.34 0.14 3.39
TIQTi 9562 0.93 1.00 0.12 0.62 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.78** 0.21
TIdfi 9380 0.74 0.51 0.69 0.26 2.61 0.66 0.82 1.72** 0.31
Panel B: Emerging Markets
FISeqi 6142 0.37 0.25 0.33 -0.00 1.00 0.35 0.39 0.06 0.13
FISboi 5561 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.48 0.00 -0.15
FISmmi 3514 0.38 0.25 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.37 0.04 0.01
FIQTi 6142 0.61 0.62 0.23 0.25 1.00 0.58 0.64 0.13*** 0.16
FIdf,eqi 6142 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.36 0.06 0.14 0.11*** 0.16
FIdf,debti 5561 0.75 0.58 0.63 0.24 2.25 0.82 0.67 0.14 -0.30
TIQTi 6142 0.71 0.77 0.24 0.25 1.00 0.68 0.74 0.78** 0.13
TIdfi 6142 0.53 0.45 0.35 0.17 1.37 0.47 0.59 1.72** 0.22
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Table 1.2: Asset Prices - Difference in Means Tests
This table reports the difference in means tests for the correlation between country returns and world returns, the beta with world
returns, idiosyncratic risk, and cross-sectional dispersion in the first half of the sample versus the second half. The sample midpoint
and start dates differ across countries, given the unbalanced nature of the panel, and are presented in panel a. Panel b reports corre-
lations, and panels c and d report betas and annualized idiosyncratic risk, respectively, calculated from the following country-specific
regressions for each half: ri,t = αi + βirw,t + εi,t. Panel e presents the difference in means test for cross-sectional dispersion. This is














Note that we report the cross-sectional dispersion in annualized volatility units. For the difference in means tests, asterisks (***, **,
and *) represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table also reports the results of the trend tests
of Bunzel and Vogelsang (2005) conducted on time-varying correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic risk for equity, bond, and exchange
rate returns using a kernel method and on the cross-sectional standard dispersions. This trend test is based on the series model
yt = β1 + β2t + ut, where yt is the variable of interest and t is a linear time trend, and uses a Daniell kernel to nonparametrically
estimate the error terms. We test for the null hypothesis that β2 = 0. A bold number means that the trend beta is significantly different
from 0 at the 5% significance level. All results are presented for developed and emerging markets, which are grouped according to
International Monetary Fund classifications (for details, see Table A.2).
Developed Emerging
Panel A: Country-Specific Midpoints and Start Dates
Equities Average Middle Date 1998m12 2003m3
Average Start Date 1983m2 1991m9
Bonds Average Middle Date 2002m9 2005m8
Average Start Date 1990m8 1996m9
Exchange Rates Average Middle Date 2002m12 2006m11
Average Start Date 1991m2 1998m11
Panel B: Correlations
Equities First Half 0.56 0.31
Second Half 0.79 0.62
Difference 0.23*** 0.30***
Trend Test 0.34 0.56
Bonds First Half 0.70 0.13
Second Half 0.71 0.45
Difference 0.01 0.32***
Trend Test 0.02 0.72
continued
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Table 1.2 – Continued
Developed Emerging
Exchange Rates First Half 0.48 0.22
Second Half 0.68 0.50
Difference 0.20* 0.28***
Trend Test 0.27 0.52
Panel C: Betas
Equities First Half 0.97 0.90
Second Half 1.18 1.19
Difference 0.21*** 0.30**
Trend Test 0.36 0.79
Bonds First Half 1.27 0.09
Second Half 1.50 0.94
Difference 0.23** 0.85***
Trend Test 0.48 1.90
Exchange Rates First Half 0.55 0.38
Second Half 0.98 0.87
Difference 0.43** 0.49***
Trend Test 0.69 0.77
Panel D: Idiosyncratic Risk
Equities First Half 0.21 0.40
Second Half 0.15 0.24
Difference -0.06*** -0.16***
Trend Test -0.10 -0.31
Bonds First Half 0.08 0.18
Second Half 0.09 0.12
Difference 0.02 -0.06**
Trend Test 0.00 -0.15
Exchange Rates First Half 0.07 0.13
Second Half 0.07 0.11
Difference 0.00 -0.02
Trend Test 0.02 -0.10
Panel E: Cross-Sectional Dispersion
continued
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Table 1.2 – Continued
Developed Emerging
Equities First Half 0.17 0.29
Second Half 0.13 0.19
Difference -0.047*** -0.102***
Trend Test -0.07 -0.18
Bonds First Half 0.05 0.12
Second Half 0.06 0.07
Difference 0.015*** -0.050***
Trend Test 0.02 -0.12
Exchange Rates First Half 0.06 0.12
Second Half 0.07 0.08
Difference 0.010** -0.038***
Trend Test 0.00 -0.08
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Table 1.3: Equity Kernel Weighted Regressions
This table reports the results of time-varying correlation, beta, and idiosyncratic risk regressions for equities. We create time-varying
measures using a kernel method. For each country, given any date t0, we split the sample into five-year subsamples and use the 30 data
points before and after that point. Within these subsamples, we use a normal kernel to assign weights to the individual observations
according to how close they are to t0. We then compute kernel-weighted correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic risk as follows:
corri,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t) (rw,t+j − r¯w,t)√∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t)2
√∑j=30




j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t) (riw,t+j − r¯w,t)∑j=30





Kh(j) (εi,t+j − ε¯i,t)2 .
where r¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)ri,t+j , εi,t = ri,t − βi,trw,t, and ε¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)εi,t+j , and Kh(j) ≡ K(j/h)/h is a kernel







, and divide by the sum to ensure the weights
add to one in a finite sample. We link these measures to openness and other control variables using variations of the following panel
regression:
xi,t+1 = αi + β1Openi,t + β2PRi,t + β3Cyclei,t + β4Crisisi,t + β5RV w,t+1 + β6trend+ εi,t+1
where xi,t+1 reflects correlation, beta, or idiosyncratic risk and Openi,t represents either financial integration (FI) or trade integration
(TI). Note that the same kernel approach is applied to the independent variables (i.e., we use the time-varying means of these
variables, which are calculated as z¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)zi,t+j ). All regressions have country level fixed effects and clustered standard
errors. Panel a presents the results for correlations, panel b for betas, and panel c for idiosyncratic risk. In each panel, there are two
rows labeled TIQTi,t and TI
df
i,t. These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is
replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients in these regressions are robust and therefore are not reported. Coefficients
in bold represent variables that are also significant and have the same signs in regressions where the independent variables are taken
at one point in time. Asterisks (***, **, and *) represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables
are described in Table A.1.
Panel A: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1
FISeqi,t 0.035 0.15 -0.032 0.18**
[0.17] [1.11] [-0.20] [2.64]
FIdf,eqi,t 0.085** 0.79*** -0.031 0.073
[2.74] [4.05] [-1.36] [0.41]
PRi,t 0.74*** 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.26 0.40 0.34 0.53
[2.97] [1.02] [1.45] [1.13] [1.07] [1.02] [1.45] [1.37]
Cyclei,t 0.22 0.37 -0.14 0.59 -0.66 0.67 -0.64 0.70
[0.26] [0.72] [-0.15] [1.20] [-0.84] [1.55] [-0.79] [1.54]
Crisisi,t 0.27 -0.69*** 0.18 -0.57*** -0.088 -0.25* -0.085 -0.28*
[1.05] [-5.40] [0.71] [-4.18] [-0.47] [-1.83] [-0.45] [-1.97]
RVw,t+1 42.3*** 62.7*** 37.0*** 56.1*** 25.0*** 44.8*** 25.1*** 46.1***
[7.51] [10.1] [5.75] [8.55] [5.22] [8.59] [4.92] [8.28]
Time Trend 0.088*** 0.12*** 0.096*** 0.12***
[7.11] [6.64] [5.84] [4.66]
TIQTi,t 0.65*** 0.28** 0.16 0.23**
[3.61] [2.31] [0.74] [2.16]
TIdfi,t 0.30* 0.33* 0.095 -0.059
[1.93] [1.90] [0.96] [-0.52]
Observations 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676
Adjusted R-squared 0.535 0.623 0.571 0.660 0.698 0.732 0.701 0.721
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Panel B: Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1
FISeqi,t 0.15 0.42 0.055 0.47
[0.36] [1.01] [0.14] [1.38]
FIdf,eqi,t 0.064 1.01** -0.14** -0.57
[0.68] [2.30] [-2.34] [-0.93]
PRi,t 1.29** 2.13** 1.05 2.30** 0.58 2.21** 0.95 2.71**
[2.13] [2.12] [1.46] [2.21] [0.80] [2.17] [1.27] [2.39]
Cyclei,t -0.46 0.16 -0.57 0.48 -1.76 0.73 -1.46 0.72
[-0.19] [0.059] [-0.23] [0.17] [-0.76] [0.28] [-0.64] [0.27]
Crisisi,t 2.43*** -0.062 2.35*** 0.061 1.91*** 0.75 1.89*** 0.71
[3.98] [-0.11] [3.77] [0.10] [2.89] [1.22] [2.97] [1.15]
RVw,t+1 5.62 47.9** 2.69 40.7** -19.7 14.5 -18.2 18.6
[0.37] [2.83] [0.19] [2.38] [-1.59] [1.12] [-1.50] [1.27]
Time Trend 0.13*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.26**
[3.24] [3.22] [3.75] [2.83]
TIQTi,t 1.42*** 0.10 0.83* -0.0011
[3.68] [0.38] [1.88] [-0.0047]
TIdfi,t 0.25 0.66* -0.080 -0.038
[0.76] [1.95] [-0.31] [-0.13]
Observations 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676
Adjusted R-squared 0.346 0.360 0.349 0.363 0.438 0.420 0.455 0.411
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1
FISeqi,t -0.0057 0.039 0.021 0.027
[-0.13] [0.60] [0.98] [0.76]
FIdf,eqi,t -0.042*** -0.23*** 0.0010 0.12
[-5.42] [-3.16] [0.065] [1.03]
PRi,t -0.14 0.052 0.029 0.12 0.052 0.034 0.051 0.032
[-0.77] [0.28] [0.14] [0.84] [0.29] [0.18] [0.28] [0.18]
Cyclei,t -0.19 -0.86** 0.0059 -0.91** 0.17 -0.98** 0.19 -0.96**
[-0.71] [-2.54] [0.025] [-2.65] [0.76] [-2.78] [0.89] [-2.76]
Crisisi,t 0.20 0.76*** 0.25 0.71*** 0.34** 0.58*** 0.34** 0.57***
[1.27] [11.2] [1.60] [11.0] [2.47] [7.99] [2.40] [7.69]
RVw,t+1 -2.70 -7.90*** -0.023 -5.40** 4.22* -0.60 4.33* -0.48
[-0.95] [-3.25] [-0.0084] [-2.47] [1.80] [-0.35] [1.84] [-0.29]
Time Trend -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.035*** -0.058***
[-7.93] [-5.71] [-5.52] [-4.50]
TIQTi,t -0.31*** -0.093 -0.13 -0.070*
[-4.26] [-1.38] [-1.66] [-1.79]
TIdfi,t -0.14*** -0.13** -0.060** 0.038
[-3.41] [-2.44] [-2.56] [0.70]
Observations 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676 7,047 5,676
Adjusted R-squared 0.540 0.763 0.591 0.774 0.695 0.819 0.694 0.820
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.4: Bond Kernel Weighted Regressions
This table reports the results of time-varying correlation, beta, and idiosyncratic risk regressions for bonds. We create time-varying
measures using a kernel method. For each country, given any date t0, we split the sample into five-year subsamples and use the 30 data
points before and after that point. Within these subsamples, we use a normal kernel to assign weights to the individual observations
according to how close they are to t0. We then compute kernel-weighted correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic risk as follows:
corri,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t) (rw,t+j − r¯w,t)√∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t)2
√∑j=30




j=−30Kh(j) (ri,t+j − r¯i,t) (riw,t+j − r¯w,t)∑j=30





Kh(j) (εi,t+j − ε¯i,t)2 .
where r¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)ri,t+j , εi,t = ri,t − βi,trw,t, and ε¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)εi,t+j , and Kh(j) ≡ K(j/h)/h is a kernel







, and divide by the sum to ensure the weights
add to one in a finite sample. We link these measures to openness and other control variables using variations of the following panel
regression:
xi,t+1 = αi + β1Openi,t + β2PRi,t + β3Cyclei,t + β4Crisisi,t + β5RV w,t+1 + β6trend+ εi,t+1
where xi,t+1 reflects correlation, beta, or idiosyncratic risk and Openi,t represents either financial integration (FI) or trade integration
(TI). Note that the same kernel approach is applied to the independent variables (i.e., we use the time-varying means of these
variables, which are calculated as z¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)zi,t+j ). All regressions have country level fixed effects and clustered standard
errors. Panel a presents the results for correlations, panel b for betas, and panel c for idiosyncratic risk. In each panel, there are two
rows labeled TIQTi,t and TI
df
i,t. These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is
replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients in these regressions are robust and therefore are not reported. Coefficients
in bold represent variables that are also significant and have the same signs in regressions where the independent variables are taken
at one point in time. Asterisks (***, **, and *) represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables
are described in Table A.1.
Panel A: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1
FISboi,t 0.068 -0.16 0.049 -0.087
[0.50] [-1.16] [0.37] [-0.80]
FIdf,debti,t 0.016* -0.089 -0.0062 0.00049
[1.96] [-0.69] [-0.22] [0.0043]
PRi,t 2.37*** -0.51 2.41*** -0.67 2.35*** 0.97* 2.40*** 0.94*
[4.34] [-0.80] [4.34] [-0.91] [4.20] [1.94] [4.28] [1.95]
Cyclei,t -1.58 1.23 -1.68 1.44 -1.89 1.24* -1.82 1.30*
[-1.46] [1.50] [-1.35] [1.56] [-1.49] [1.82] [-1.38] [1.76]
Crisisi,t -0.22 -1.37*** -0.32 -1.34*** -0.34 -0.61*** -0.31 -0.62***
[-1.00] [-5.76] [-1.28] [-5.17] [-1.16] [-4.25] [-1.14] [-4.01]
RVw,t+1 2.89 10.9 0.73 11.9 -1.23 -6.42 -1.09 -5.86
[0.43] [1.58] [0.11] [1.64] [-0.18] [-1.17] [-0.16] [-1.08]
Time Trend 0.024 0.26*** 0.029 0.26***
[1.12] [8.70] [0.72] [9.12]
TIQTi,t -0.43 0.29 -0.78** 0.18
[-1.26] [0.95] [-2.19] [1.15]
TIdfi,t -0.034 0.36 -0.29* -0.050
[-0.39] [1.39] [-1.84] [-0.33]
Observations 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310
Adjusted R-squared 0.634 0.584 0.637 0.579 0.643 0.791 0.642 0.789
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Panel B: Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1
FISboi,t 0.066 -0.55 -0.068 -0.37**
[0.24] [-1.09] [-0.28] [-2.36]
FIdf,debti,t 0.064* -0.45 -0.14* -0.23
[1.89] [-1.06] [-1.88] [-1.32]
PRi,t 2.69*** -3.43** 2.65** -4.08** 2.54** 0.23 2.53** -0.12
[2.89] [-2.45] [2.84] [-2.41] [2.17] [0.31] [2.16] [-0.13]
Cyclei,t -5.40*** 3.09 -6.06*** 3.98* -7.47*** 3.13 -7.33*** 3.65*
[-3.95] [1.61] [-4.38] [1.79] [-4.05] [1.65] [-4.56] [1.91]
Crisisi,t 1.58** -2.81*** 1.13 -2.66*** 0.76 -0.95** 1.23 -0.88**
[2.40] [-6.14] [1.56] [-5.18] [0.72] [-2.55] [1.37] [-2.27]
RVw,t+1 10.3 54.6** 1.32 57.7** -17.4 12.0 -15.0 14.1
[0.48] [2.53] [0.061] [2.17] [-0.76] [0.53] [-0.63] [0.58]
Time Trend 0.16** 0.64*** 0.26** 0.64***
[2.46] [9.37] [2.33] [9.66]
TIQTi,t 0.41 0.36 -1.35* 0.079
[1.26] [0.45] [-1.93] [0.19]
TIdfi,t 0.42 0.98 -0.90* -0.028
[1.30] [1.49] [-1.82] [-0.086]
Observations 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 0.482 0.463 0.474 0.537 0.751 0.563 0.746
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1
FISboi,t -0.068 0.017 -0.067 0.0070
[-1.06] [0.63] [-1.03] [0.18]
FIdf,debti,t -0.0048 0.064* -0.0086** 0.052
[-1.26] [1.72] [-2.60] [1.55]
PRi,t -0.37*** -0.14 -0.43*** -0.077 -0.37*** -0.35** -0.43*** -0.29*
[-3.43] [-1.28] [-2.92] [-0.68] [-3.34] [-2.50] [-2.93] [-2.04]
Cyclei,t -0.72 -0.075 -0.75 -0.16 -0.71 -0.077 -0.78 -0.14
[-1.33] [-0.27] [-1.16] [-0.53] [-1.22] [-0.29] [-1.18] [-0.51]
Crisisi,t 0.15 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.29*** 0.15* 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.20***
[1.68] [6.91] [2.93] [5.34] [2.09] [4.46] [3.07] [3.42]
RVw,t+1 1.02 10.2** 1.55 10.2*** 1.12 12.6*** 1.24 12.6***
[0.44] [2.78] [0.56] [2.90] [0.40] [3.54] [0.44] [3.55]
Time Trend -0.00058 -0.036*** 0.0050 -0.035***
[-0.14] [-3.79] [1.40] [-4.28]
TIQTi,t -0.0014 -0.059 0.012 -0.044
[-0.019] [-1.07] [0.17] [-1.00]
TIdfi,t -0.0063 -0.045 0.0029 0.012
[-0.16] [-0.82] [0.078] [0.28]
Observations 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310 5,414 4,310
Adjusted R-squared 0.512 0.719 0.505 0.727 0.512 0.759 0.507 0.764
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.5: Exchange Rate Kernel Weighted Regressions
This table reports the results of time-varying correlation, beta, and idiosyncratic risk regressions for exchange rates. We create time-
varying measures using a kernel method. For each country, given any date t0, we split the sample into five-year subsamples and use
the 30 data points before and after that point. Within these subsamples, we use a normal kernel to assign weights to the individual
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√∑j=30
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Kh(j) (εi,t+j − ε¯i,t)2 .
where r¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)ri,t+j , εi,t = ri,t − βi,trw,t, and ε¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)εi,t+j , and Kh(j) ≡ K(j/h)/h is a kernel







, and divide by the sum to ensure the weights
add to one in a finite sample. We link these measures to openness and other control variables using variations of the following panel
regression:
xi,t+1 = αi + β1Openi,t + β2PRi,t + β3Cyclei,t + β4Crisisi,t + β5RV w,t+1 + β6trend+ εi,t+1
where xi,t+1 reflects correlation, beta, or idiosyncratic risk and Openi,t represents either financial integration (FI) or trade integration
(TI). Note that the same kernel approach is applied to the independent variables (i.e., we use the time-varying means of these
variables, which are calculated as z¯i,t =
∑j=30
j=−30Kh(j)zi,t+j ). All regressions have country level fixed effects and clustered standard
errors. Panel a presents the results for correlations, panel b for betas, and panel c for idiosyncratic risk. In each panel, there are two
rows labeled TIQTi,t and TI
df
i,t. These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is
replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients in these regressions are robust and therefore are not reported. Coefficients
in bold represent variables that are also significant and have the same signs in regressions where the independent variables are taken
at one point in time. Asterisks (***, **, and *) represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables
are described in Table A.1.
Panel A: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1 corrit+1
FISmmi,t 0.44*** 0.043 0.34*** -0.0048
[3.34] [0.29] [3.73] [-0.042]
FIdf,debti,t -0.0021 -0.11 -0.024 0.055
[-0.35] [-0.49] [-1.69] [0.33]
PRi,t 2.30** -0.62 2.13* -0.56 1.72 1.33* 1.31 1.34**
[2.28] [-0.72] [2.20] [-0.71] [1.60] [1.99] [1.15] [2.17]
Cyclei,t -0.47 0.17 -0.81 0.40 -1.81 0.13 -2.55 0.011
[-0.27] [0.12] [-0.42] [0.32] [-0.85] [0.17] [-1.09] [0.013]
Crisisi,t 0.65 -0.80*** 0.39 -0.72*** 0.78 -0.20 0.61 -0.23
[0.90] [-3.30] [0.48] [-3.16] [1.06] [-1.06] [0.79] [-1.07]
RVw,t+1 2.40 35.4*** 5.35 35.0*** -15.3 27.1*** -14.6 27.2***
[0.12] [3.56] [0.26] [3.53] [-0.94] [3.39] [-0.86] [3.37]
Time Trend 0.078 0.27*** 0.11* 0.28***
[1.77] [6.33] [1.93] [6.85]
TIQTi,t -0.46 0.75** -1.56 0.28
[-0.31] [2.38] [-0.98] [1.38]
TIdfi,t 0.038 0.48 -0.039 -0.22
[0.28] [1.08] [-0.24] [-1.54]
Observations 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453
Adjusted R-squared 0.592 0.568 0.572 0.570 0.631 0.791 0.632 0.792
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Panel B: Betas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1 betait+1
FISmmi,t 1.05** 0.42 0.75** 0.33
[2.59] [1.43] [2.42] [1.12]
FIdf,debti,t 0.028 -0.034 -0.024 0.28
[1.54] [-0.070] [-0.81] [0.67]
PRi,t 2.82 -2.03 2.53 -1.51 1.16 1.63 0.54 2.14
[1.38] [-1.00] [1.46] [-0.82] [0.53] [0.83] [0.24] [1.23]
Cyclei,t -1.47 -1.47 -2.20 -1.51 -5.25* -1.53 -6.44** -2.26
[-0.68] [-0.58] [-0.91] [-0.69] [-1.98] [-0.80] [-2.28] [-1.08]
Crisisi,t 0.87 0.031 0.33 0.21 1.23 1.16** 0.84 1.15
[0.60] [0.058] [0.21] [0.30] [0.79] [2.17] [0.53] [1.35]
RVw,t+1 32.9 28.3* 32.1 27.5 -17.1 12.6 -16.1 12.4
[0.95] [1.78] [0.85] [1.66] [-0.60] [0.92] [-0.54] [0.91]
Time Trend 0.22** 0.51*** 0.26** 0.53***
[3.05] [4.32] [2.89] [4.57]
TIQTi,t 1.00 2.34*** -1.70 1.55***
[0.45] [3.85] [-0.65] [3.44]
TIdfi,t -0.15 1.18 -0.37 -0.095
[-0.70] [1.41] [-1.56] [-0.30]
Observations 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453
Adjusted R-squared 0.562 0.551 0.534 0.535 0.661 0.753 0.647 0.747
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
Panel C: Idiosyncratic Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1 ivolit+1
FISmmi,t 0.044*** 0.049 0.042*** 0.054
[3.61] [0.83] [3.57] [1.08]
FIdf,debti,t -0.00073 -0.026 -0.0015 -0.044
[-0.87] [-0.28] [-1.40] [-0.51]
PRi,t -0.015 -0.075 -0.034 -0.012 -0.026 -0.28 -0.063 -0.22
[-0.27] [-0.27] [-0.55] [-0.056] [-0.51] [-0.74] [-1.01] [-0.64]
Cyclei,t 0.0091 -0.31 -0.025 -0.27 -0.017 -0.31 -0.087 -0.23
[0.075] [-0.84] [-0.23] [-0.55] [-0.13] [-0.92] [-0.81] [-0.53]
Crisisi,t 0.035 0.43** 0.0086 0.47** 0.038 0.37*** 0.016 0.41**
[0.68] [2.73] [0.19] [2.18] [0.74] [3.20] [0.37] [2.47]
RVw,t+1 5.81*** 1.11 6.23*** 0.95 5.47*** 2.00 5.52*** 1.79
[4.13] [0.32] [4.02] [0.26] [3.68] [0.63] [3.61] [0.55]
Time Trend 0.0015 -0.029 0.0038 -0.030
[0.56] [-1.40] [1.65] [-1.34]
TIQTi,t 0.19*** 0.012 0.19** 0.071
[3.59] [0.11] [3.08] [0.69]
TIdfi,t -0.012 -0.11 -0.015* -0.046
[-1.56] [-1.40] [-1.88] [-0.80]
Observations 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453 3,265 3,453
Adjusted R-squared 0.798 0.565 0.781 0.557 0.800 0.594 0.788 0.586
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.6: Equity Returns, Globalization, Political Risk, Cycles and Crises
We estimate a panel factor model with betas that vary over time with openness, political risk, cycles and crises. Specifically, we estimate
r
e






















where re denotes equity excess returns, Zi,t is a vector of instruments which help estimate the expected return of market i (specifically, dividend yieldsDYi,t and short-term
interest ratesii,t), Openi,t is either financial openness (FI) or trade openness (TI), PRi,t is a political risk indicator, Cyclei,t is a business cycle variable and Crisisi,t
is a crisis indicator. Note that αi denotes a country-specific fixed effect, while the remaining coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries. All regressions include
fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country-level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
































PRi,t -0.017 -0.13** -0.0033 -0.099** -0.013 -0.097** -0.013 -0.11**
[-0.46] [-2.90] [-0.088] [-2.17] [-0.37] [-2.21] [-0.33] [-2.23]
Cyclei,t 0.031 0.092 0.019 0.11 -0.0035 0.073 0.027 0.098
[0.46] [1.07] [0.31] [1.42] [-0.045] [0.97] [0.44] [1.23]
Crisisi,t -0.069** -0.061 -0.071** -0.091* -0.078** -0.081** -0.074** -0.072*
[-2.43] [-1.66] [-2.29] [-2.01] [-2.48] [-2.52] [-2.35] [-1.91]
DYi,t -0.31 0.70 -0.45 0.62 -0.72 0.22 -0.83 0.52
[-0.29] [0.73] [-0.45] [0.63] [-0.71] [0.28] [-0.94] [0.54]
FI
Seq














PRi,tDYi,t 1.38 -0.37 0.37 -0.73 0.95 0.014 0.75 -0.52
[1.18] [-0.24] [0.29] [-0.55] [0.83] [0.0098] [0.68] [-0.38]
Cyclei,tDYi,t -1.57 -0.038 -1.21 -0.56 -1.08 -0.60 -1.28 -0.27
[-0.59] [-0.012] [-0.51] [-0.20] [-0.41] [-0.20] [-0.58] [-0.093]
Crisisi,tDYi,t 1.14 -0.18 1.10 0.30 1.28 -0.36 1.22 -0.072
[1.21] [-0.18] [1.14] [0.24] [1.35] [-0.37] [1.27] [-0.072]
iSi,t 0.51*** -0.062 0.46** -0.042 0.039 -0.15 0.45*** -0.023



























i,t -0.74*** 0.11 -0.57*** 0.031 -0.63*** -0.018 -0.53*** 0.061
[-3.21] [0.95] [-3.02] [0.27] [-3.85] [-0.16] [-3.08] [0.46]
Cyclei,ti
S
i,t -0.24 -0.26 -0.076 -0.17 0.15 -0.18 -0.24 -0.26
[-0.49] [-1.24] [-0.22] [-1.15] [0.37] [-0.88] [-0.61] [-1.63]
Crisisi,ti
S
i,t -0.50** -0.036 -0.38* 0.067 -0.35* 0.071 -0.39* 0.0050
[-2.17] [-0.41] [-1.85] [0.86] [-1.91] [0.99] [-1.94] [0.089]
rw,t+1 1.00** -0.20 0.96** -0.21 0.82* -0.13 0.91** -0.20
[2.46] [-0.62] [2.57] [-0.74] [2.00] [-0.33] [2.25] [-0.63]
FI
Seq














PRi,trw,t+1 0.090 1.72*** 0.030 1.95*** -0.048 1.87*** 0.082 1.93***
[0.18] [3.21] [0.067] [4.24] [-0.092] [3.79] [0.16] [3.52]
Cyclei,trw,t+1 0.60 -1.31 0.59 -1.30 0.66 -1.33 0.62 -1.34
[0.83] [-1.20] [0.76] [-1.23] [0.92] [-1.26] [0.79] [-1.25]
Crisisi,trw,t+1 1.31*** 1.17*** 1.31*** 1.15*** 1.30*** 1.17*** 1.33*** 1.18***
[3.94] [3.93] [3.89] [3.41] [3.81] [3.36] [3.91] [3.59]
Observations 7,520 4,593 7,520 4,593 7,520 4,593 7,388 4,593
Adjusted R-squared 0.484 0.291 0.483 0.290 0.483 0.290 0.483 0.289
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.7: Bond Returns, Globalization, Political Risk, Cycles and Crises
We estimate a panel factor model with betas that vary over time with openness, political risk, cycles and crises. Specifically, we estimate
r
b






















where rb denotes bond excess returns, Zi,t is a vector of instruments which help estimate the expected return of market i (specifically, dividend yields DYi,t and short-term
interest ratesii,t), Openi,t is either financial openness (FI) or trade openness (TI), PRi,t is a political risk indicator, Cyclei,t is a business cycle variable and Crisisi,t
is a crisis indicator. Note that αi denotes a country-specific fixed effect, while the remaining coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries. All regressions include
fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country-level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.






























PRi,t -0.040 0.0011 -0.035 0.0045 -0.039 -0.011 -0.038 -0.0047
[-1.06] [0.021] [-1.09] [0.077] [-1.03] [-0.23] [-1.13] [-0.084]
Cyclei,t -0.011 0.022 -0.019 -0.014 -0.012 0.017 -0.023 0.015
[-0.26] [0.80] [-0.47] [-0.29] [-0.28] [0.51] [-0.59] [0.45]
Crisisi,t -0.0011 0.0060 0.00050 -0.0077 -0.0061 0.0050 -0.0028 0.0058
[-0.079] [0.19] [0.033] [-0.30] [-0.37] [0.17] [-0.17] [0.23]
DYi,t 0.13 1.53 0.091 1.69 -1.24 1.17 0.13 1.47
[0.34] [1.34] [0.28] [1.59] [-1.48] [1.07] [0.44] [1.24]














PRi,tDYi,t 0.14 -1.70 -0.031 -2.21 0.023 -1.21 -0.088 -1.97
[0.43] [-1.06] [-0.092] [-1.28] [0.059] [-0.79] [-0.27] [-1.04]
Cyclei,tDYi,t -1.43 -3.75** -1.36 -2.89** -1.37 -3.85** -1.30 -3.55**
[-0.93] [-2.80] [-0.88] [-2.51] [-0.86] [-2.88] [-0.83] [-2.90]
Crisisi,tDYi,t -0.93* -1.32 -1.03** -0.85 -0.94** -1.29 -1.05** -1.11
[-2.01] [-1.01] [-2.34] [-1.06] [-2.16] [-1.05] [-2.59] [-1.25]
iSi,t -0.40 0.0071 -0.47 -0.080 -0.47 -0.012 -0.49 -0.060

























i,t 0.54 0.024 0.57 0.13 0.60 0.013 0.65 0.095
[0.59] [0.16] [0.68] [1.03] [0.67] [0.085] [0.72] [0.74]
Cyclei,ti
S
i,t 0.78* 0.27 0.96** 0.30 0.75* 0.30 0.85** 0.29
[1.74] [1.50] [2.44] [1.09] [1.95] [1.32] [2.15] [1.22]
Crisisi,ti
S
i,t 0.24 0.073 0.24 0.086** 0.35 0.068 0.29 0.060
[0.50] [1.26] [0.48] [2.54] [0.65] [1.53] [0.58] [1.50]
rw,t+1 0.15 0.89** 0.40 0.88** -0.27 0.55 0.33 0.91***
[0.17] [2.88] [0.58] [2.91] [-0.22] [1.57] [0.45] [3.88]














PRi,trw,t+1 1.21 -0.32 0.87 -0.24 1.02 -0.45 0.95 -0.56
[1.60] [-0.78] [1.14] [-0.64] [1.41] [-1.25] [1.21] [-1.35]
Cyclei,trw,t+1 -0.61 0.32 -0.59 0.38 -0.52 0.78 -0.70 0.45
[-0.57] [0.13] [-0.51] [0.16] [-0.49] [0.30] [-0.60] [0.18]
Crisisi,trw,t+1 1.33*** -0.43 1.03*** -0.34 1.26** -0.39 1.23** -0.46
[3.12] [-0.62] [3.23] [-0.40] [2.78] [-0.57] [2.85] [-0.67]
Observations 5,702 3,351 5,702 3,351 5,702 3,351 5,667 3,351
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.060 0.449 0.059 0.447 0.061 0.446 0.057
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.8: Exchange Rate Returns, Globalization, Political Risk, Cycles and Crises
We estimate a panel factor model with betas that vary over time with openness, political risk, cycles and crises. Specifically, we estimate
r
fx






















where rfx denotes exchange rate excess returns, Zi,t is a vector of instruments which help estimate the expected return of market i (specifically, dividend yields DYi,t and
short-term interest ratesii,t), Openi,t is either financial openness (FI) or trade openness (TI), PRi,t is a political risk indicator, Cyclei,t is a business cycle variable and
Crisisi,t is a crisis indicator. Note thatαi denotes a country-specific fixed effect, while the remaining coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries. All regressions
include fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country-level. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.






























PRi,t -0.050 -0.15** -0.045 -0.087 -0.045 -0.13 -0.045 -0.12
[-1.14] [-2.33] [-1.08] [-0.98] [-1.11] [-1.70] [-1.04] [-1.37]
Cyclei,t -0.018 0.19 -0.015 0.13 -0.017 0.16 -0.0048 0.10
[-0.47] [1.00] [-0.44] [0.62] [-0.42] [0.84] [-0.14] [0.60]
Crisisi,t 0.0016 0.0056 0.0033 0.036 -0.0029 0.030 0.0050 0.034
[0.062] [0.47] [0.15] [1.14] [-0.100] [1.47] [0.22] [1.58]
DYi,t -1.20 -0.43 -1.52 -0.0019 -1.42 -0.56 -1.41 -0.27
[-0.81] [-0.31] [-1.54] [-0.0013] [-0.65] [-0.39] [-1.31] [-0.19]














PRi,tDYi,t 1.65 0.95 1.77 -0.060 1.63 1.39 1.67 0.48
[1.31] [0.46] [1.57] [-0.028] [1.46] [0.66] [1.39] [0.21]
Cyclei,tDYi,t 0.056 -1.66 0.20 -0.31 0.10 -1.19 -0.065 -0.14
[0.046] [-0.45] [0.16] [-0.086] [0.086] [-0.34] [-0.051] [-0.039]
Crisisi,tDYi,t -0.28 -0.62 -0.30 -0.76 -0.17 -0.80 -0.34 -0.67
[-0.37] [-1.07] [-0.50] [-1.31] [-0.23] [-1.16] [-0.53] [-1.01]
iSi,t 0.36* -0.68*** 0.38 -0.75*** 0.40 -0.50*** 0.34 -0.79***

























i,t -0.32 1.13*** -0.40 0.95*** -0.39 1.04*** -0.36 1.33***
[-1.23] [5.08] [-1.19] [5.53] [-1.23] [4.83] [-1.07] [3.41]
Cyclei,ti
S
i,t 0.13 -1.97*** 0.11 -1.84*** 0.091 -1.99*** 0.067 -1.78***
[0.28] [-3.38] [0.24] [-3.17] [0.21] [-3.42] [0.13] [-4.29]
Crisisi,ti
S
i,t -0.45** 0.017 -0.42** -0.12 -0.46** -0.066 -0.44** -0.042
[-2.80] [0.26] [-2.50] [-1.55] [-3.13] [-1.17] [-2.55] [-0.50]
rw,t+1 -3.31*** -0.23 -2.89** -0.62 -2.54** -0.91 -2.33** -0.29
[-3.54] [-0.30] [-3.12] [-0.93] [-2.45] [-1.18] [-2.42] [-0.41]














PRi,trw,t+1 4.37*** 0.83 4.23*** 1.74* 4.54*** 1.08 3.65*** 0.79
[4.30] [0.68] [4.08] [1.84] [4.89] [0.91] [3.45] [0.66]
Cyclei,trw,t+1 0.88 0.40 0.54 0.39 0.66 0.69 0.069 0.39
[0.83] [0.30] [0.49] [0.26] [0.57] [0.49] [0.065] [0.24]
Crisisi,trw,t+1 2.36*** 1.16 2.23*** 1.23 2.21*** 1.37* 1.89** 1.40
[5.35] [1.53] [4.68] [1.51] [5.48] [1.75] [3.15] [1.62]
Observations 3,235 3,135 3,235 3,135 3,235 3,135 3,235 3,135
Adjusted R-squared 0.419 0.262 0.419 0.252 0.419 0.261 0.426 0.257
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.9: Equity Beta: Effect of Changes in Openness, Political Risk, Cycle and Crises
This table characterizes the economic effects of changes in openness, political risk, cycle and crisis levels on the equity beta for devel-
oped and emerging markets. The columns in the table correspond to the regression specifications in Table 1.6, which allow betas to
vary with the variables mentioned above. The first eight rows report the 5th and 95th percentiles for the instruments. The following
rows calculate the total effect on beta. Rows labeled "Low" ("High") compute the total beta using the the 5th (95th) percentile for the
















Openp5 0.50 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.62 0.30 0.26 0.18
Openp95 1.00 1.00 2.05 0.40 1.00 1.00 2.63 1.43
PRp5 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.68 0.47
PRp95 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.79 0.92 0.79
Cyclep5 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
Cyclep95 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
Crisisp5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Crisisp95 0.21 0.43 0.21 0.43 0.21 0.43 0.21 0.43
Low Openness 1.11 1.05 1.06 1.18 1.00 1.19 1.06 1.18
High Openness 1.07 1.33 1.11 1.07 1.09 1.12 1.13 1.09
Low Political Risk 1.06 0.84 1.07 0.80 1.08 0.81 1.06 0.80
High Political Risk 1.09 1.39 1.08 1.43 1.07 1.41 1.08 1.42
Low Cycle 1.05 1.23 1.05 1.24 1.04 1.24 1.05 1.24
High Cycle 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.08 1.10 1.08
Low Crisis 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.02
High Crisis 1.28 1.52 1.28 1.52 1.28 1.52 1.28 1.52
Sample DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
Table 1.10: Bond Beta: Effect of Changes in Openness, Political Risk, Cycle and Crises
This table characterizes the economic effects of changes in openness, political risk, cycle and crisis levels on the bond beta for devel-
oped and emerging markets. The columns in the table correspond to the regression specifications in Table 1.7, which allow betas to
vary with the variables mentioned above. The first eight rows report the 5th and 95th percentiles for the instruments. The following
rows calculate the total effect on beta. Rows labeled "Low" ("High") compute the total beta using the the 5th (95th) percentile for the
















Openp5 0.71 0.00 0.58 0.23 0.88 0.25 0.26 0.18
Openp95 1.00 1.00 6.07 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.18 1.53
PRp5 0.73 0.48 0.73 0.48 0.73 0.48 0.73 0.48
PRp95 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.80 0.93 0.80
Cyclep5 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.07
Cyclep95 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05
Crisisp5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Crisisp95 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.23 0.44
Low Openness 1.32 0.63 1.23 0.63 1.27 0.33 1.27 0.52
High Openness 1.34 0.47 1.65 0.44 1.36 0.69 1.51 0.71
Low Political Risk 1.21 0.63 1.29 0.61 1.24 0.65 1.24 0.67
High Political Risk 1.44 0.53 1.46 0.53 1.44 0.50 1.43 0.50
Low Cycle 1.36 0.55 1.40 0.54 1.37 0.52 1.38 0.54
High Cycle 1.32 0.59 1.36 0.58 1.33 0.60 1.32 0.59
Low Crisis 1.26 0.62 1.32 0.60 1.27 0.61 1.27 0.62
High Crisis 1.56 0.43 1.55 0.45 1.55 0.44 1.55 0.42
Sample DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.11: Exchange Rates Beta: Effect of Changes in Openness, Political Risk, Cycle and
Crises
This table characterizes the economic effects of changes in openness, political risk, cycle and crisis levels on the exchaneg rate beta for
developed and emerging markets. The columns in the table correspond to the regression specifications in Table 1.8, which allow betas
to vary with the variables mentioned above. The first eight rows report the 5th and 95th percentiles for the instruments. The following
rows calculate the total effect on beta. Rows labeled "Low" ("High") compute the total beta using the the 5th (95th) percentile for the
















Openp5 0.50 0.00 0.51 0.22 0.81 0.38 0.21 0.20
Openp95 1.00 1.00 9.52 0.99 1.00 1.00 3.10 1.35
PRp5 0.67 0.54 0.67 0.54 0.67 0.54 0.67 0.54
PRp95 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.80
Cyclep5 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
Cyclep95 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
Crisisp5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Crisisp95 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.36 0.20 0.36
Low Openness 0.53 0.42 0.69 0.63 0.75 0.28 0.75 0.45
High Openness 0.66 1.01 0.52 0.63 0.62 0.88 0.36 1.02
Low Political Risk -0.05 0.52 -0.02 0.41 -0.07 0.49 0.08 0.54
High Political Risk 1.00 0.74 0.99 0.86 1.02 0.77 0.95 0.74
Low Cycle 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.65 0.62
High Cycle 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66
Low Crisis 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.53
High Crisis 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.01 0.95 1.02
Sample DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.12: Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Risk Premiums
This table reports statistics for expected returns calculated based on Tables 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8 for equity, bond, and exchange rate markets,
respectively. Global expected returns are estimated using the following predictive regressions:
rew,t+1 = α+ β1r
e
us,t + β2DYus,t + β3i
S
us,t + β4termus,t + εw,t




us,t + β3termus,t + εw,t




us,t + β3termus,t + εw,t
where DYus,t is the U.S. dividend yield, iSus,t is the U.S. short rate and termus,t is the U.S. term premium. Note that expected
returns are calculated using a balanced sample. In addition to mean expected returns, this table shows the results of the Bunzel and
Vogelsang (2005) trend tests conducted on the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns. A bold number means that the trend beta
is significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. The cross-sectional dispersion, CSt is reported in annualized volatility















mean CS Trend Test mean CS Trend Test
Panel A: Equities
FISeq 0.023 -0.010 0.052 -0.016
FIdf,eqi,t 0.020 -0.004 0.054 -0.012
TIQT 0.022 -0.004 0.070 -0.002
TIdf 0.020 -0.003 0.050 -0.015
Panel B: Bonds
FISbo 0.010 0.000 0.024 -0.009
FIdf,debti,t 0.011 -0.003 0.025 -0.001
TIQT 0.010 -0.004 0.027 -0.015
TIdf 0.010 0.000 0.028 -0.004
Panel C: Exchange Rates
FISmm 0.016 -0.008 0.030 -0.029
FIdf,debti,t 0.013 -0.006 0.022 -0.021
TIQT 0.025 -0.007 0.026 -0.033
TIdf 0.019 -0.007 0.020 -0.016
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Table 1.13: Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Equity Risk Premiums and Globalization
This table reports regressions for the cross-sectional dispersion of the equity risk premium. Expected returns are calculated based on Table 1.6, with global expected returns estimated using the following predictive regression:
r
e
w,t+1 = α + β1r
e
us,t + β2DYus,t + β3i
S
us,t + β4termus,t + εw,t
whereDYus,t is the U.S. dividend yield, iSus,t is the U.S. short rate and termus,t is the U.S. term premium. Note that expected returns are calculated using a balanced sample and the cross-sectional dispersion of the equity premium
is computed in annualized volatility units. We then estimate
CS(Et[r
e
i,t+1]) = α + β1f(Openi,t) + β2CS(PRi,t) + β3PRi,t + β4CS(Cyclei,t) + β5Cyclew,t + β6CS(Crisisi,t) + β7Crisisw,t + β8RVw,t + β9t + εi,t
where f(Openi,t) is either the cross-sectional dispersion or the mean across countries of the openness variable. We report the complete results for the financial openness variables. In each specification, there are four rows with TI
QT
i,t
and TIdfi,t . These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients are robust and therefore not reported. Bolded coefficients are also
significant at the 10% level or lower and have the same sign in a regression without the trend term. Asterisks (***, **, and *) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
































CS(PRi,t) 0.015 0.080*** -0.023 0.076*** 0.021 0.11*** -0.0072 0.11***
[0.39] [7.18] [-0.52] [6.56] [1.08] [11.7] [-0.38] [11.9]
PRi,t 0.041* 0.26*** 0.084** 0.26*** -0.11*** 0.16*** -0.021 0.13***
[1.73] [6.88] [2.57] [6.77] [-2.63] [4.06] [-0.81] [3.80]
CS(Cyclei,t) -0.038*** -0.025** -0.049*** -0.023** -0.056*** -0.030*** -0.041*** -0.035***
[-3.33] [-2.57] [-3.85] [-2.28] [-3.94] [-3.41] [-2.74] [-4.05]
Cyclew,t -0.0011*** 0.000083 -0.00099*** 0.00011 -0.00073** 0.00016 -0.0012*** 0.00015
[-3.47] [0.20] [-2.97] [0.27] [-1.99] [0.58] [-3.50] [0.54]
CS(Crisisi,t) 0.069*** 0.019*** 0.073*** 0.019*** 0.084*** 0.013*** 0.073*** 0.018***
[7.09] [4.79] [6.92] [4.79] [8.50] [3.86] [10.6] [4.56]
Crisisw,t -0.047*** 0.025** -0.042*** 0.025** -0.042*** 0.034*** -0.029** 0.037***
[-4.59] [2.33] [-3.46] [2.31] [-2.82] [3.44] [-2.09] [3.71]
RVw,t 0.24*** 0.38*** 0.25*** 0.38*** 0.16** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.34***
[3.02] [5.74] [2.94] [5.73] [2.04] [6.02] [3.32] [6.15]
time trend -0.0096*** -0.0022 -0.012*** -0.000053 0.037* -0.017*** 0.00021 -0.015***
[-6.79] [-0.76] [-7.59] [-0.017] [1.95] [-3.61] [0.020] [-3.53]
CS(TI
QT














Observations 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Adjusted R-squared 0.618 0.581 0.588 0.581 0.578 0.588 0.532 0.586
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.14: Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Bond Risk Premiums
This table reports regressions for the cross-sectional dispersion of the bond risk premium. Expected returns are calculated based on Table 1.7, with global expected returns estimated using the following predictive regression:
r
b




us,t + β3termus,t + εw,t
where iSus,t is the U.S. short rate and termus,t is the U.S. term premium. Note that expected returns are calculated using a balanced sample and the cross-sectional dispersion of the risk premium is computed in annualized volatility
units. We then estimate
CS(Et[r
b
i,t+1]) = α + β1f(Openi,t) + β2CS(PRi,t) + β3PRi,t + β4CS(Cyclei,t) + β5Cyclew,t + β6CS(Crisisi,t) + β7Crisisw,t + β8RVw,t + β9t + εi,t
where f(Openi,t) is either the cross-sectional dispersion or the mean across countries of the openness variable. We report the complete results for the financial openness variables. In each specification, there are four rows with TI
QT
i,t
and TIdfi,t . These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients are robust and therefore not reported. Bolded coefficients are also
significant at the 10% level or lower and have the same sign in a regression without the trend term. Asterisks (***, **, and *) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.




























CS(PRi,t) -0.045*** 0.012 -0.056*** 0.10*** -0.063*** 0.042*** -0.068*** 0.028**
[-3.36] [0.54] [-4.86] [4.23] [-5.09] [3.67] [-5.35] [2.04]
PRi,t -0.14*** 0.12*** -0.16*** 0.15*** -0.20*** 0.19*** -0.20*** 0.15***
[-5.01] [3.53] [-6.05] [3.68] [-6.66] [5.88] [-6.63] [3.93]
CS(Cyclei,t) -0.046*** 0.037** -0.049*** 0.018 -0.038*** -0.0060 -0.036** 0.00034
[-3.35] [2.34] [-3.64] [1.08] [-2.66] [-0.50] [-2.57] [0.027]
Cyclew,t -0.0011*** -0.0041*** -0.0011*** -0.0044*** -0.0013*** -0.0020*** -0.0012*** -0.0019***
[-7.88] [-7.86] [-7.94] [-7.64] [-7.90] [-7.17] [-7.84] [-6.94]
CS(Crisisi,t) 0.0073*** 0.032*** 0.0082*** 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.033***
[3.38] [4.42] [3.78] [4.32] [6.09] [5.83] [4.51] [6.06]
Crisisw,t 0.020*** -0.047** 0.019*** -0.051*** 0.015* -0.047*** 0.017** -0.046***
[3.01] [-2.60] [2.77] [-3.44] [1.94] [-5.08] [2.11] [-5.30]
RVw,t 0.21*** 0.50*** 0.20*** 0.62*** 0.22*** 0.55*** 0.22*** 0.51***
[4.72] [3.07] [4.71] [3.38] [4.46] [4.27] [4.38] [4.29]
time trend -0.0093*** 0.0026 -0.0091*** 0.0021 -0.015*** 0.022*** -0.011*** 0.015***
[-5.75] [0.41] [-5.48] [0.42] [-4.67] [7.33] [-3.54] [3.84]
CS(TI
QT














Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 206
Adjusted R-squared 0.644 0.526 0.643 0.560 0.644 0.478 0.646 0.483
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Table 1.15: Cross-Sectional Dispersion in Exchange Rate Risk Premiums
This table reports regressions for the cross-sectional dispersion of the exchange rate risk premium. Expected returns are calculated based on Table 1.8, with global expected returns estimated using the following predictive regression:
r
fx




us,t + β3termus,t + εw,t
where iSus,t is the U.S. short rate and termus,t is the U.S. term premium. Note that expected returns are calculated using a balanced sample and the cross-sectional dispersion of the risk premium is computed in annualized volatility
units. We then estimate
CS(Et[r
fx
i,t+1]) = α + β1f(Openi,t) + β2CS(PRi,t) + β3PRi,t + β4CS(Cyclei,t) + β5Cyclew,t + β6CS(Crisisi,t) + β7Crisisw,t + β8RVw,t + β9t + εi,t
where f(Openi,t) is either the cross-sectional dispersion or the mean across countries of the openness variable. We report the complete results for the financial openness variables. In each specification, there are four rows with TI
QT
i,t
and TIdfi,t . These are the coefficients on the trade openness measures in regressions where financial openness is replaced with trade openness. The remaining coefficients are robust and therefore not reported. Bolded coefficients are also
significant at the 10% level or lower and have the same sign in a regression without the trend term. Asterisks (***, **, and *) indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.






























CS(PRi,t) 0.053*** 0.032 0.033* 0.017 0.026* -0.0053 0.023 0.0048
[2.74] [1.57] [1.85] [0.84] [1.84] [-0.18] [1.56] [0.17]
PRi,t -0.11*** 0.047 -0.14*** 0.041 -0.20*** -0.0057 -0.19*** 0.018
[-3.54] [0.56] [-4.60] [0.52] [-8.50] [-0.078] [-8.19] [0.28]
CS(Cyclei,t) -0.051*** -0.015 -0.055*** -0.024** -0.047*** 0.018 -0.056*** 0.014
[-2.87] [-1.13] [-2.81] [-1.98] [-3.55] [1.00] [-4.00] [0.83]
Cyclew,t 0.00023 -0.00092*** -0.000025 -0.00073*** 0.00031* -0.0022*** 0.00031* -0.0022***
[0.94] [-3.42] [-0.11] [-2.77] [1.94] [-6.95] [1.86] [-7.00]
CS(Crisisi,t) -0.011** -0.0045 -0.010** -0.0080* 0.044*** 0.0077 0.040*** 0.00093
[-2.43] [-1.03] [-2.51] [-1.68] [10.2] [1.50] [10.7] [0.18]
Crisisw,t 0.060*** -0.019* 0.047*** -0.039*** 0.0029 -0.033*** 0.0098 -0.028**
[3.54] [-1.97] [3.00] [-3.91] [0.21] [-2.68] [0.69] [-2.54]
RVw,t 0.17** -0.18** 0.20** -0.14** 0.21*** 0.047 0.21*** 0.10
[2.17] [-2.48] [2.59] [-2.16] [2.98] [0.56] [3.02] [1.40]
time trend -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.0099***
[-5.93] [-6.83] [-6.15] [-6.66] [-7.01] [-4.15] [-7.60] [-2.62]
CS(TI
QT














Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
Adjusted R-squared 0.480 0.787 0.474 0.787 0.717 0.567 0.714 0.592
Region DM EM DM EM DM EM DM EM
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Figure 1.1: Openness Measures
This figure shows de jure and de facto openness measures for developed and emerging markets. The averages are equally
weighted across countries and are calculated as openxcg,t =
∑N
i=1 wi,txi,t, where cg is the country group (emerging or
developed), x is the openness measure, wi,t is the country weight i and N is the number of countries. For a description
of all the openness measures, see Table A.1. Countries are classified as developed or emerging markets according to IMF







































































Figure 1.2: Correlations, Betas and Idiosyncratic Risk: First Half versus Second Half
Correlations, betas and idiosyncratic risk: first half versus second half of sample. This figure shows various statistics based on equity,
bond, and exchange rate returns in the first versus second half of the sample. Given the unbalanced nature of the panel data, the
midpoint is country-specific. Start dates for each country can be found in Table A.2. (a) Correlations between country returns and
world returns for each asset class. (b) Betas with world returns and (c) annualized idiosyncratic risk, calculated from the following
country-specific regressions for each half: ri,t = αi + βirw,t + εi,t. We report scatter plots for developed and emerging markets,
which are grouped according to International Monetary Fund classifications (for details, see Table A.2). The solid line in each graph
is a 45◦ line.
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Figure 1.3: Time-Varying Correlations, Betas and Idiosyncratic Risk
This figure plots regional time-varying correlations, betas, and idiosyncratic risk for equity, bond, and exchange rate returns using a
kernel method. For each country, given any date t0, we split the sample into five-year subsamples and use the 30 data points before
and after this point. Within these subsamples, we use a normal kernel to assign weights to the individual observations according to
how close they are to t0. We then compute kernel-weighted (a) correlations, (b) betas, and (c) idiosyncratic risk at the country level.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
The conditional volatility of the market return changes over time as the economy goes through
periods of tranquility and periods of turbulence. It has long been known that these changes in
the volatility of asset returns are priced in option markets. Jurek and Stafford (2015), Dew-Becker,
Giglio, Le, and Rodriguez (2017), and Ait-Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2019) provide recent
evidence. In theory, the price of this volatility risk is negative as increases in volatility are viewed
by investors as a deterioration in the investment opportunity set. Hence, assets like variance
swaps that pay off positively when the economy unexpectedly becomes more turbulent should
have negative expected returns, and they do have negative average returns. Said differently,
selling volatility in option markets makes money on average because losses on such strategies
occur in bad states of the world. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) argue that aggregate
market return volatility should be a priced risk factor in the cross-section of U.S. stock returns,
and they find that stocks with a higher sensitivity to volatility risk earn lower average returns
consistent with the idea that volatility risk is negatively priced.1
It is also well known that a global capital asset pricing model (CAPM), in which the world
market return is the only priced risk, yields low discount rates for emerging market assets. While
it could be that emerging markets provide valuable diversification benefits to international in-
vestors, most people find low discount rates for emerging market companies to be counter-intuitive.
Consequently, investors often employ various ad hoc adjustments to discount rates such as adding
political risk premiums associated with the default risk of emerging market government bonds to
the required return on emerging market equites implied by the CAPM.2 Because emerging mar-
ket equities also perform poorly during turbulent, high-variance regimes, variance risk may be
a risk factor across various emerging market asset classes that has the potential to increase their
required rates of return. While increases in equity volatility and poor equity market returns often
occur together, it is important to recognize that the correlation between the return on equity and
the return to the variance swap is only -58%, which is far from perfect. Thus, our postulated
1Other recent papers that argue for a negative price of variance risk in the cross-section of stocks include Cremers,
Halling, and Weinbaum (2015) and Campbell, Giglio, Polk, and Turley (2018)
2See Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2014) for a discussion of political risk in international valuations.
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variance risk factor has the potential to affect expected returns on various assets in addition to the
influence from equity market risk premiums.
In summary, we seek to explain the excess returns on a a variety of assets with a simple three-
factor model that includes the return on a benchmark equity portfolio and two additional sources
of risk. Because we primarily use U.S. dollar (USD) denominated returns, we also include the
excess return on a long-term USD bond. The third source of risk is the return on a variance swap
that captures a traded measure of unanticipated increases in volatility.
There are two main parts in the paper. First, we examine the exposure of returns to variance
risk at the regional level in developed and emerging equity markets, bond markets, and foreign
currency markets. This section also explores whether our three-factor model correctly prices the
average excess returns on equities, bonds, and foreign currencies. While the equity and bond
exposures strongly vary with the different asset classes we consider, we find a nearly uniform
and mainly negative exposure to the variance risk factor. Because the average return on buying
volatility is negative, such negative exposures should be compensated by positive risk premiums,
and we quantify how much of the global risk premiums assigned by the three-factor model is
accounted for by variance risk, finding it to be highly statistically significant and often exceeding
50% of the total risk premium.
Given the short sample, though, it is difficult to distinguish different asset pricing models or to
evaluate the fit of factor models using average realized returns. We therefore also ask how much
of the cross-country correlation structure is explained by the models for each asset class and how
much of the cross-asset correlation structure is explained by the models for each region. For this
second part, we use the models to calculate implied correlations across regions, but within asset
classes, and then across asset classes, but within regions.
There is extensive evidence in the literature (see Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009b); Hou,
Karolyi, and Kho (2011b)) that local factors improve the fit of factor models for equities. We do not
include such regional risk factors, and we therefore do not expect our model to fully explain the
sample correlation structure. There is much less evidence on how global factor models fare with
respect to international bond markets (Xu (2018) is an exception) whereas the foreign currency
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literature mostly focuses on currency-centric models.3 There is no evidence to our knowledge
on how global factor models fit correlations across asset classes. We find that the global factor
model explains a substantive fraction of the comovements between international assets, but the
fit is best for international equity correlations and is worse for currency returns and across asset
correlations.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the sources of the
data and some summary statistics. Section 2.3 documents the factor exposures for the three asset
classes across the world. Section 2.4 focuses on the implications of the factor model for risk
premiums, and Section 2.5 analyzes the effects on comovements aross assets. Section 2.6 considers
the impact of currency of denomination (dollar versus local returns), and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 DATA
This section describes the country-specific, regional, and global data used in the empirical
analysis, along with some summary statistics. We use MSCI monthly country-level total USD
equity returns from January 1995 to November 2018 for a total of 287 observations. The balanced
sample consists of 22 developed markets and 25 emerging markets. The developed markets are
subdivided into four groups: Developed Commodity countries (denoted DM Comm) contains
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; Developed Asia includes Japan, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore, whereas the 16 European countries are split up into those countries that use the euro (de-
noted EU Euro) and those that do not (denoted EU Non-Euro), to which we add Switzerland and
Norway who are not members of the EU. The emerging markets are subdivided into three groups:
Emerging Asia; Emerging Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA); and Latin America.4 Addi-
tional information on the regional affiliations of the various developed and emerging markets and
3See for example Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014), Verdelhan (2018), and Lustig and Richmond (2017).
Aloosh and Bekaert (2019) provides an exception.
4The included emerging market countries and their two-letter ISO codes are the following: Argentina (AR), Brazil
(BR), Chile (CL), China (CN), Colombia (CO), Czech Republic (CZ), Egypt (EG), Hungary (HU), India (IN), Israel
(IL), Indonesia (ID), Jordan (JO), Korea (KR), Morroco (MA), Mexico (MX), Malaysia (MY), Peru (PE), Pakistan (PK),
Philippines (PH), Poland (PL), Russia (RU), Thailand (TH), Turkey (TR), Taiwan (TW), and South Africa (ZA). The
included developed countries are the following: Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Switzerland
(CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), Hong
Kong (HK), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), New Zealand (NZ), Portugal (PT),
Sweden (SE), and Singapore (SG).
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which countries are used for each asset class are described in Table B.1. Excess returns are calcu-
lated by subtracting the one-month U.S. Treasury Bill return obtained from Ibboston Associates.
As a proxy for global equity market risk, we use the excess return on the S&P 500 Index.
Bond market data are from JPMorgan’s emerging markets bond index (EMBI Global) for emerg-
ing countries and from Bloomberg Barclays global indices for developed markets. Exchange rates
are from Bloomberg. Foreign currency returns are calculated as the excess return to investing in
the short-term money market of a country (short rates come from Global Financial Data). Thus,
foreign currency returns reflect the interest rate differential between the foreign currency and the
USD and the appreciation of the currency relative to the USD. As a proxy for global fixed income
risk, we use the return on the U.S. bond index.
Our main innovation is to consider the global pricing of volatility risk. As a proxy for global
equity market volatility, we define the return on a one-month variance swap on the U.S. equity
market. This return is calculated as the difference between the realized variance during a month,
calculated from squared daily returns over the month, and the implied variance given at the be-











− V IX2t , (2.1)
where Ndays represents the number of trading days in a month, Pt+1,d is the value of the S&P
500 index on day d of month t+ 1, and the V IX measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index
options over the next thirty day period, as calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE).5 We use the returns to the variance swap, as we have measured them, because they are
easily calculated and should do a reasonable job capturing the innovation in volatility that should
be priced in asset markets.
Figure 2.1 shows the V IX and the variance swap return over its full sample. The spikes in the
5See Exchange (2009) for how the V IX is constructed using a weighted average of put and call option prices with
different strike prices. In using the squared V IX as the risk-neutral expectation of the summation of future squared
returns, we follow Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011). See Martin (2013) and Martin
(2017) for a discussion of why the squared V IX is not the risk-neutral conditional variance of future returns when
prices can jump and for an alternative calculation that weights option prices differently resulting in a simple variance,
SV IX , that is appropriate. Ait-Sahalia, Karaman, and Mancini (2019) use data on OTC traded variance swaps to
characterize the term structure of variance risk. These data are not publicly available.
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variance swap are certainly influential data points, and we therefore acknowledge that in 24 years
of monthly data it may be difficult to accurately measure the statistics underlying our analysis.
Nevertheless, we think it is useful to explore the data keeping this caveat in mind.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the asset returns of all regions as well as the global
risk factor returns (the regional indices are simply the equally weighted averages across countries).
The sample means of the annualized excess equity returns range from 1.35% for Emerging Asia to
6.20% for the EU Non-Euro countries. Mean annualized excess bond returns range from -0.07%
in Developed Asia to 7.34% in Latin America. The sample means for the currency returns range
from -0.95% for Developed Asia to 2.36% for Emerging Asia.
The fact that the sample means of bond excess returns exceed the sample means of equity
excess returns in Emerging Asia, Latin America, and the EU Euro countries is suggestive that
using slightly less than 24 years of monthly data may not provide a long enough sample to allow
sample mean returns to accurately reflect true unconditional expected returns. Correlations, on
the other hand, may be far better measured.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the risk factors. The annualized mean returns of
the risk factors are 5.20% for equities, 2.61% for long term bonds, and -1.14% for the variance
swap. The negative price of variance risk indicates that negative correlation of individual country
or regional indexes with the return on the variance swap has the potential to increase required
rates of return as a negative exposure to this risk factor combined with a negative price of risk
implies a positive increment in expected return. The unconditional correlations between the
risk factors are both negative and positive. Excess returns on equities and bonds are somewhat
negatively correlated at -0.22, while the excess equity return and the variance swap return are
strongly negatively correlated at -0.53. Bond returns and the variance swap return at positively
correlated at 0.15.
2.3 MEASURING GLOBAL VOLATILITY RISK IN EQUITY, BOND, AND
CURRENCY MARKETS
We begin our analysis of equity, bond, and currency market excess return exposures to equity
market volatility with a graphical analysis. To demonstrate the sensitivity of returns to the vari-
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ance swap return, we first divide the sample into quartiles depending on the realized returns to the
variance swap. The first quartile contains the months with the lowest realizations of the variance
risk factor, while the fourth quartile contains the months with the highest realizations. We then
calculate average excess returns for these sub-samples at the regional level. The four regions are
simply the equally weighted averages of country excess returns in Developed Markets; Emerging
Asia; Emerging Europe, the Middle East, and Africa; and Latin America.
The bars in Figure 2.2 show the annualized mean excess equity returns for these four portfolios
across the different quartiles of realized variance. We see that, across all regions, average excess
returns are high, approaching 40% per annum (p.a.), when volatility innovations are low, and
average excess returns are negative, also approaching -40% p.a., when volatility innovations are
high. The Figure also shows that average excess returns decrease monotonically in Developed
Markets, the Emerging EMEA, and Latin America; and they almost monotonically decline for the
Emerging Asia sample.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 repeat this exercise for the excess returns in the bond and foreign currency
markets. Once again we see that when volatility is high, emerging market bonds perform poorly
and emerging market currencies depreciate versus the dollar. Conversely, in low volatility states,
emerging market bonds do well, and their currencies appreciate relative to the dollar. Latin Amer-
ican bond markets and currencies are particularly notable with USD denominated gains of around
15% p.a. in low volatility environments and losses of about 15% in high volatility environments.
The broadly monotonic pattern of emerging market bond and fully monotonic pattern of currency
returns rather dramatically decreasing with increased U.S. variance swap returns shows that vari-
ance risk presents a global risk that affects the major asset classes. The pattern is not entirely
monotonic for developed markets, however, as developed market bond and foreign currency av-
erage returns in the fourth quartile are higher than they are in the third quartile. It is conceivable
that these results are due to the safe haven role of certain foreign bonds and currencies (such as
the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen).6
Variance risk may be correlated with equity risk. Therefore, Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 repeat the
exercise of plotting regional average excess returns across the quartiles of realized returns to the
6See Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderlind (2011) and Xu (2018) for a discussion of these issues as they relate to
currency returns and international bond returns, respectively.
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variance swap, but now, these Figures also condition first on whether the equity market return
is up or down. The top panel of each Figure contains the down market results, and the bottom
panel contains the up market results.
It is clear from the top part of Figure 2.5 that the four regions all perform much more poorly
in high variance down equity markets than in low variance down equity markets. The bottom
part of the Figure indicates that average returns are lower in high variance up markets than in
low variance up markets. Because variance swap returns and equity returns are correlated (re-
call Table 2.2), we mostly lose full monotonicity, but the returns in high variance return markets
(4th quartile) are invariably and substantially lower than in the low variance return markets (1st
quartile).
In global bond markets, the effect of variance risk is starker in that it changes the sign of returns
in the down equity markets. Across all regions, bond market returns are positive in low variance
return states, but they turn negative in high variance return states. For up equity markets, all
bond markets have positive returns, but it is still the case that they are higher in low variance
swap return states than they are in high variance swap return states. The patterns are not always
monotonic across the regions, but for up equity markets, the pattern is monotonic for Latin Amer-
ica. Figure 2.6 indicates that Latin American bonds do particularly poorly in volatile down equity
markets and do particularly well in quiescent up markets, with the return spread a staggering
70%.
The conditional foreign currency returns in Figure 2.7 show patterns similar to the equity re-
turns in Figure 2.5. They are mostly negative in bad equity return states and positive in good
equity states. Presumably, the dollar’s movements are somewhat correlated with the perfor-
mance of the equity market. Conditional on the up or down equity states, it remains the case that
foreign currency returns are higher in low variance return states than they are in high variance
return states, and mostly considerably so. Yet again, we do not observe full monotonicity across
the 4 bins. Figure 2.7 also indicates that part of the extreme bond market performance in Latin
America emanates from the currency return.
These Figures are suggestive that volatility risk, as proxied by the return on a variance swap,
is systematic and not simply reflective of overall equity risk. If volatility risk is systematic, it has
the ability to affect the expected returns on a wide variety of asset classes worldwide, including in
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emerging markets. The following subsections examine this conjecture more rigorously.
To hold constant other sources of risks, we specify a three-factor model. The first risk factor
is the return on the S&P 500 Index, which is our proxy for the global equity market excess return.
The second risk factor is the excess return on the the U.S. bond market, and the third risk factor is
the return on a variance swap, our volatility risk factor. Since each risk factor is either an excess
return or a zero-investment derivative contract, we can assess whether the exposures of an asset
to the risk factors correctly price the asset by simply regressing the excess return on an asset class















US,t + εi,t, (2.2)
where the estimated αi, the "alpha" of the model, measures the average performance of the asset
class not explained by exposures to the risk factors. In presenting the results of equation (2.2), we
will superscript the asset classes with an e for equity, a b for bond, and an fx for foreign currency.
2.3.1 Empirical Results for Equities
This section examines whether volatility risk is important in the pricing of equities in global
asset markets. The results for the equity markets are presented in Table 2.3, which contains two
panels. Panel A reports regression results for our seven regions of the world.
In each case the slope coefficients on the U.S. equity excess return are highly significant. The
estimated slope coefficients also are relatively similar, ranging from 0.80 for Latin America to 0.95
for the EU Euro region. The U.S. bond return is only marginally significant in one region, the
EU Non-Euro region, and the coefficient is negative. The exposures to the variance risk factor
are also highly significant in all cases with coefficients ranging from -2.99 for Developed Asia to
-5.19 for Latin America. The three-factor model overestimates the average returns realized in the
sample as all of the alphas are negative. The alphas for the Developed Asia and Emerging Asia
regions and for the EU Euro region are significantly different from zero; and the model overstates
these annualized average excess returns by about 6% p.a. This should not be surprising as Table
2.1 shows that these regions happened to have quite low average returns during this particular
sample period. The factor model likely provides more plausible estimates of equity risk premiums
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for these regions than do the sample averages.
The results in Panel A use data on regional equity indexes that are equally weighted averages
of the countries in those regions. Because there are too many countries in the regions to present
all the individual country-level results in the paper, Panel B of Table 2.3 provides additional diag-
nostic statistics associated with the individual country-level regressions.7 The means of the slope
coefficients across countries for a given region are presented in the first row, and the percent of
those coefficients that are significant at the 10% level are presented in the second row. The third
row presents the 10-th and 90-th percentiles of the estimated slope coefficients in a region.
Unsurprisingly, most of the individual countries show significant exposures to the global eq-
uity return as only in Emerging EMEA do we see less than 100% significant coefficients. Yet, there
is still cross-country dispersion in the country exposures, especially in the emerging market re-
gions. Whereas for developed markets the 80% range for the coefficients is [0.73,1.11], it increases
to [0.49, 1.20] for Latin American and to [0.08,1.44] for the Emerging EMEA region.
Similarly, given the aggregate results, it is unsurprising that the percentage of countries with
significant equity market exposures to the bond market risk factor range between 0% for Latin
America and 23% for the Developed countries. The bond exposures of the various equity mar-
kets are very dispersed, with large negative and positive exposures, but the average exposure is
negative for all four groups. This is consistent with the portfolio results.
Finally, the exposures to the volatility factors are mostly negative and statistically significant,
with the percent of significant coefficients above 90%, except for the Emerging Asia region where
it is 78%. We also observe considerable dispersion in the individual coefficient estimates. These
range from -7.80 for the 10-th percentile of Latin America to 0.98 for the 90-th percentile of Emerg-
ing Asia. In the other three regions, the 10%-90% range for the coefficients is uniformly negative.
At the country level, there are few significant alphas in the regressions (36% in the developed
markets; 11% in Emerging Asia and none elsewhere). Note that the factor model understandably
produces lower R2?s for the individual countries than for the regional portfolios, with larger R2’s
occurring for the developed markets. This finding is largely due to the higher country-specific
risks in emerging markets.
7Individual country results are provided in the Online Appendix.
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2.3.2 Empirical Results for Bonds
Table 2.4 contains two panels as in Table 2.3, but the dependent variables are now USD denom-
inated excess bond returns. Panel A reports regression results for the same seven regions of the
world. As one might expect, the U.S. bond return is highly significant in all regions, with slope
coefficients ranging from 0.51 for the Emerging EMEA region to 0.99 for the EU Euro region. The
slope coefficients on the U.S. excess equity return and the variance swap are significant in six of
these seven portfolios, with the exception being Developed Asia. The exposures to the variance
risk factor once again show the largest range of coefficients from 1.23 for Developed Asia to -4.98
for Latin America. Yet, the remaining exposures vary in a tight range between -1.33 (EU Euro) and
-2.10 (DM Commodities). The alphas are all insignificant with the largest mispricing estimated at
-2.2% for the DM Commodities region.
Panel B of Table 2.4 reports the means of the coefficients of the individual country regressions,
as well as the percent significant and the 10-th and 90-th percentiles of the estimated coefficients.
Between 73% (Emerging EMEA) and 92% (Latin America) of bond returns for the individual coun-
tries have significant exposure to the equity risk factor, while between 55% (Emerging EMEA) and
100% (Developed) of the bond returns for the individual countries have significant exposures to
the bond risk factor. Exposure of the individual bond market returns to the variance risk factor
shows comparable significance with between 55% (Emerging EMEA) and 100% (Emerging Asia)
of the countries having significant exposures.
Once again, the magnitude and the spread of the coefficients associated with the variance risk
factor are larger than the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients and the spreads for the other
two risk factors. However, the 10-th to 90-th percentile ranges show only one positive coefficient
namely for Emerging EMEA at 0.29. The alphas are statistically significant in less than 10% of the
countries.
2.3.3 Empirical Results for Currencies
Table 2.5 is similar to the previous two Tables, but the dependent variables are now USD-
denominated excess currency returns. Panel A reports regression results for the same seven areas
of the world.
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The slope coefficients on the U.S. excess equity return are now mostly much smaller than for
bond returns, but they are all at least marginally significant. Coefficients on the U.S. bond return
are significant in five of the regions, and the exposures are invariably positive. The coefficients on
the variance swap are significant in six of the seven markets with the exception being Developed
Asia. The exposures to the variance risk factor once again show the largest range of coefficients
across the regions ranging from 0.37 for Developed Asia to -2.04 for DM Commodities. Again,
similar to the bond return analysis, the range is tighter outside these extremes, varying between
-0.57 and -1.64. Finally, three of the alphas are marginally significant with the largest mispricing
estimated at -3.9% for the EU Euro region.
Examining the summary statistics of the individual country regressions in Panel B indicates
that most of the currencies show significant exposure to the equity market with the percent signif-
icant across the regions ranging from 80% for Emerging EMEA to 88% for Emerging Asia.
The importance of the bond market risk ranges from 0% significant for Emerging Asia and
Latin America to 82% significant for Developed. The bond risk exposures of currency returns
are quite dispersed, with the 10-th to 90-th percentile range for bond market exposures switching
signs for all three emerging market groups.
The variance risk factor is significant for 91% of the Developed market currency returns, 86%
of the Latin American currencies, 60% of the Emerging EMEA currencies, but only in 38% of the
Emerging Asia currencies. The coefficients on the variance swap risk factor once again show the
largest range across the countries of the different regions, with the 90-th percentile values positive
for the Emerging Asia and Emerging EMEA regions. Not surprisingly, given the regional portfolio
results, the alphas are only significant in a small fraction of the emerging markets (less than 20%),
but the proportion of statistically significant alphas rises to 73% for developed markets.
2.4 THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL VOLATILITY RISK
This section explores the economic importance of volatility risk in more detail. We calculate
implied returns for two models calculated as exposures to risk factors times the average returns
of the risk factors. Model 1 includes only the excess returns on the equity and bond markets as
risk factors whereas Model 2 includes the return on the variance swap as an additional risk factor.
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Table 2.6 repeats the average returns across the different regions and for the three asset classes
in the second column and presents the implied expected returns from the two models in the third
and fourth columns. In most cases, the average returns are closer to the implied expected returns
of Model 1. In 19 of the 21 portfolios, the implied expected return from Model 2 is larger than the
implied expected return from Model 1. The exceptions are bonds and currencies for Developed
Asia. Although the average return to the variance risk factor is only -1.2% p.a., because the
exposures are large, the implied expected returns from Model 2 are sometimes increased quite
substantially compared to those of Model 1.
To highlight the economic importance of the variance risk premium as a determinant of the
overall expected return in Model 2, we examine the proportions of the risk premiums that are
accounted for by variance risk. That is, we examine the ratio of the part of the expected return
due to variance risk relative to the total expected return implied by the model:
βi,3µ3
βi,1µ1 + βi,2µ2 + βi,3µ3
, (2.3)
where the βi’s are the regression coefficients in equation (2.2), and µ1, µ2, and µ3 are the sample
means of the U.S. equity excess return, the U.S. bond excess return, and the variance swap return,
respectively.8
The results are summarized in column five of Table 2.6 with the standard errors of the ratio
given in column six. For the equity markets, the proportions of the implied expected returns of
Model 2 that are due to the inclusion of the variance swap return range from 47% with a standard
error of 5% to 67% with a standard error of 18%.
For the bond and foreign currency markets, the results are similar except for the Developed
Asia region, which has a large negative contribution due to the positive beta on the variance swap
return documented above. The proportions of the implied expected returns of Model 2 due to the
variance swap range from 31% to 59% for the bond markets and from 43% to 67% for the foreign
currency markets. Most of these proportions appear statistically significantly different from zero,
and they are clearly economically large. In sum, exposure to variance risk almost invariably
8Appendix A.2 formally describes the GMM system of orthogonality conditions used to conduct inference about
the ratio in equation (2.3).
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increases required risk premiums, across all regions and the three major asset classes.
There remains the issue that the two-factor model appears to fit the historical average returns
better than the three-factor model, at least for a number for regions. To verify this formally,
we conduct standard Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) tests for the joint significance of the
alphas. This test assumes conditional homoskedasticity of innovations in returns, which is gener-
ally counterfactual, so we also report an analogous GMM test that corrects for heteroskedasticity
and possible autocorrelation.
Table 2.7 reports the chi-square test statistics and the p-values for three sets of test assets. The
column indicated by "regional" uses the seven regional portfolios, the EM columns use all emerg-
ing markets separately, and the DM columns use all of the developed markets. The tests largely
confirm our main point that historical average returns have little information that can be used to
distinguish models. For the regional portfolios, we only reject the null of zero alphas for Model
2 for equities, at the 5% level for the GMM test and at the 10% level for the GRS test. Other than
that, the performance of both models is similar, but of course, it is likely the tests lack power. For
emerging markets, we again fail to reject the null of the zero alphas at the 5% level for both bonds
and equities, whatever the test considered, but we strongly reject the null under either test for
foreign currency returns. The tests fail to distinguish Models 1 and 2. For developed markets,
the evidence depends on which test is used. There is no evidence against zero alphas for bonds
returns under either test. For foreign currency returns, the GRS tests rejects zero alphas for both
Model 1 and Model 2; the GMM tests fails to reject both models. For equities, the GMM test re-
jects both models at the 5% level, but the GRS test only rejects Model 2. Clearly, the tests weakly
confirm that Model 1 fits the historical averages slightly better than Model 2, but only for equities.
However, recall that the period we consider is relatively short and includes a major global finan-
cial crisis, making it unlikely that historical returns are representative of long-run risk premiums.
It is therefore important to get independent validation on the factor model. We do so now by
examining the fit of the models with return correlations.
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2.5 COMOVEMENTS OF RETURNS
In this section we ask how much of the sample correlation structure of returns is explained by
our factor model. Given the statistical noise in average returns, the ability of the factor model
to explain comovements of returns provides an alternative, potentially more powerful, test of its
usefulness. We investigate comovements of returns from two perspectives. First, we investigate
the correlations of returns across regions or countries within an asset class. Here, we build on
a large literature that examines international stock return comovements, often focusing on how
globalization has increased correlations over time (see e.g. Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009b)
Christoffersen, Errunza, Jacobs, and Langlois (2012); and Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009)). Xu
(2018) examines both bond and stock return correlations across countries, showing that bond re-
turn correlations are mostly lower than stock return correlations. Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher,
and Mehl (2014b) suggest that local factors are necessary to fully explain comovements across
worldwide industry equity portfolios. We therefore cast our investigation as determining how
much of the cross-region return correlations over the 1995-2018 period can be explained by our
very parsimonious global factor model.
Second, we also investigate the correlations across asset classes within each region. While
clearly useful from an asset management perspective, there is, in fact, fairly little research on
cross-asset correlations, with the exception of research focusing on stock-bond return correlations
(see e.g. Baele and Soriano (2010)).
The model-implied correlation of two returns, ri,t and rj,t, is calculated as in Bekaert, Hodrick,
and Zhang (2009b) by dividing the model-implied covariance of the two returns by the product of





where var(ft) is the covariance matrix of the three risk factors and the βi and βj are the vectors
of factor exposures of the two assets. We first report the ratio of model implied correlations to
sample correlations interpreting this ratio as the percentage of the cross-region correlation that is
explained by the model. Table 2.8 presents the results for the equity, bond, and currency markets
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in three panels.
2.5.1 Proportion of Correlations Explained
In equity markets, we find that the three-factor model explains a substantive fraction of the
cross-country correlations (on average, 73%). The proportion of explained correlation ranges
from 57% for the correlation between the Developed Asia and Emerging Asia regions to 88% for
the correlation between the EU Euro and Developed Asia regions. It is perhaps telling that the
model does not fit as well for nearby regions, indicating that it may be missing a regional factor.
The explained proportion is on average 60% for the three Emerging market regions, 80% for the
four developed market groups, and 74% when considering emerging markets relative to the four
developed market portfolios. We report the underlying sample correlations that we would like
the model to fit in Table 2.9. Over our sample period, these correlations are quite high, varying
between 61% for Emerging Asia and the EU Euro countries, and 92% for the EU Euro and EU
Non-Euro countries. On average, the correlations are 75%.
These sample correlations reveal that bond returns indeed show smaller correlations than eq-
uity markets, in some cases quite considerably smaller. The average correlation between bond
markets is 40%, although there is considerable dispersion with the pairwise correlations as low as
1%. The correlation between the Latin-American and Developed Asian bond markets is very low
correlation (3%), and the factor model estimates the correlation to be negative. So, even though
the fit is actually good in an absolute sense, when expressed as a fraction of the sample correlation,
we obtain a large negative number for the explained proportion. The model also over-fits several
correlations, leading to ratios greater than 1. We circumvent this problem below by examining
root mean squared error statistics for the difference between the sample and model correlations.
Finally, in the foreign currency markets, the three-factor model explains about 30% of the corre-
lations across regions, with the fractions being the highest for the correlations between Developed
Commodity region with the Emerging Market regions and the Latin America region with other
the regions. Within the emerging market regions, the average proportion is 42%, but it is only
18% within the developed market regions. The proportion for the cross-correlation between de-
veloped and emerging market regions is on average 30%. As indicated above, the Developed
Commodity countries play a large role here. Actual correlations for currency returns are mostly
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in-between those for bond and equity markets, varying between 22% for Latin-American and De-
veloped Asia, to 94% for the two European country groups. While the high correlation within
Europe is not surprising given the efforts there to reduce currency variation, the fact that they
are generally relatively high may be due to a common dollar factor. However, commodity fac-
tors may also play a role, as the currency returns of the Developed Commodity countries appear
highly correlated with emerging market currencies.9
Next, we study the comovements of equity, bond, and foreign currency returns within regions
in Table 2.10. The bottom panel of the table reports the actual correlations between the various
asset classes for the seven regional portfolios. On average the correlations of returns are highest
between bonds and foreign currency, followed by the correlations between equities and foreign
currency, with the correlations between equities and bonds being the lowest. However, these
averages hide large cross-regional dispersion. The equity-bond return correlation varies from
0.11 in Developed Asia to 0.78 for the Developed Commodity countries. The lowest and highest
correlations of equity returns with foreign currency returns occur for the three same regions. The
correlation in Developed Asia is 0.36 and in Developed Commodity countries it is 0.83. The
correlations of bond returns and foreign currency returns are as low as 0.32 for the Emerging
EMEA region, but they are as high as 0.93 for thee Developed Commodity countries.
The upper panel of the Table 2.10 reports the proportion of the correlations explained by the
three-factor model. In emerging markets, the three-factor model explains, on average, 53%, 43%
and 55% of the correlations between equities and bonds, equities and exchange rates, and bonds
and exchange rates, respectively. Meanwhile, in developed markets, the model is less successful;
it explains, on average, only 39% and 19% of the correlations between equities and foreign cur-
rency, and bonds and foreign currency, respectively. For bonds and equities, the Developed Asia
correlation (which is low at 0.11) is predicted with the wrong sign, explaining the negative ratio.
The fit for the other three regions is 41% on average. When the model correlation overshoots, or
the sign is wrong, the ratio we report is not very informative.
9Aloosh and Bekaert (2019) show that a dollar currency factor (including the USD, the CAD, the AUD, and the
NZD) and a commodity factor describe currency market correlations rather well.
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2.5.2 Root Mean Squared Error Correlation Analysis
Table 2.11 provides an alternative, overall perspective on the fit of the model-implied corre-
lations. We provide the root mean squared error of the difference between the model-implied
correlations and the sample correlations for both within-asset and across-asset correlations. That








[corrs(ri,t, rj,t)− corrm(ri,t, rj,t)]2. (2.5)
We use the regional portfolios as underlying assets (in this case N is seven). We also perform the
same analysis for individual counties within emerging or developed markets (the EM and DM
columns). Starting with the correlations across countries but within one asset class in Panel A, the
RMSE for equities for our regional portfolios is only 0.046. This is a remarkable fit for correlations
which average 75%. The fit worsens only slightly when considering individual developed market
countries (0.05) or emerging market countries (0.076). The RMSE is 0.070 for the regional bond
returns and 0.080 for emerging market bond returns, but worsens considerably for developed
market bonds, increasing to 0.273. Given an average correlation among developed market bonds
of 48%, this is a poor fit.
The three-factor model has the most difficult time matching the correlations among foreign cur-
rency returns, where the RMSE is a respectable 0.100 for emerging markets but increases to 0.443
for developed markets. Because the exposures of foreign currency returns to our global factors
are relatively modest, we miss a currency-centric factor that can fully capture the international
correlations here.
In Panel B, we report the RMSE for the correlations across asset classes. Here the RMSE statis-
tics vary between 0.114 for emerging market countries and 0.240 for developed markets. This
number must be judged relative to an average correlation across asset classes of 43%, for emerg-
ing markets, 60% for developed markets.
Finally, Table 2.11 also reports the same RMSE statistics for Model 1, which does not contain
the variance swap return as a risk factor. It is invariably the case that the RMSE produced by the
three-factor model, Model 2, is lower than the RMSE produced by the two-factor model, Model
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1. However, we must concede that the improvement is marginal and unlikely to be statistically
significant.
2.6 VARIANCE BETAS: DOLLAR VERSUS LOCAL CURRENCY
One potential issue with analysis thus far is that all returns have been measured in dollars.
This raises two issues. First, it is conceivable that the bond and equity results are really driven
by exposures of the dollar exchange rates to volatility risk. Second, there is considerable interest
in hedged investment strategies that mitigate currency exposures. For example, ETFs that are
hedged against currency risk have become available in the U.S. offering U.S. investors exposure to
international bond and equity markets essentially denominated in foreign currency. Such hedged
returns would not be subject to a ?currency factor? due to exposure of currencies to variance risk.
In this section, we decompose country-level equity returns into local currency and dollar com-
ponents. We summarize the results in Figure 2.8, with more detailed results relegated to the
Online Appendix. We run multiple regressions of equity returns on the three risk factors as in
equation (2.2). The bars represent the betas on the variance swap return from these regressions
with equity returns denominated in dollars, while the diamonds are the betas from these regres-
sions with equity returns denominated in local currency. The beta from the foreign currency
regression is approximately the difference between the height of the bar and the diamond. Dia-
monds that are filled indicate statistical significance at the 10% marginal level of significance. Bars
are shaded according to denote the country’s region within emerging and developed markets. We
find that most of variance risk betas in emerging market equities arise from the covariances of the
variance swap return with the local currency equity returns. The local currency variance risk beta
is statistically significant in 18 out of 24 countries.10 In developed markets the currency compo-
nent plays a greater role. Here the local currency equity return betas with respect to variance risk
are not significant for 8 out of 22 countries, and the currency component adds 50% or more of the
variance risk for about 10 countries. The local currency equity return variance risk beta is positive
for Switzerland and Finland. Note that the difference between the bar and the diamond measures
the exposure of the currency to variance risk. This exposure remains predominately negative for
10In Turkey and Pakistan, the beta is positive, but it is solidly negative in all other countries.
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all of the countries. One prominent exception is Japan where the currency exposure is positive, as
the exposure of the local currency return is more negative than the exposure of the dollar equity
return, reflecting the well-known safe haven property of the yen.
2.7 CONCLUSIONS
This article proposes variance risk as a new risk factor in international finance. We proxy
variance risk by the tradable return on a variance swap on the S&P500. We then consider the
exposures of three asset classes, country-level equities, bonds, and currencies to this new risk fac-
tor, while controlling for equity risk, proxied by the return on the U.S. equity market, and bond
risk, proxied by the return on a U.S. bond index. We cast a wide net geographically investigating
returns worldwide, including in emerging markets. To keep the analysis manageable, our results
focus primarily on regional returns, decomposing emerging markets in three regions (Emerging
Asia, Latin-America, and Emerging EMEA), whereas we consider the developed (Non-U.S.) mar-
kets mostly as one group, or split them up into four groups (DM Commodities, Developed Asia,
EU Euro, EU Non-Euro).
We find almost uniformly negative exposures of returns to variance risk across all asset classes
and all regions, including emerging markets. Whereas the equity and bond exposures are logi-
cally quite different across the three asset classes, the variance risk betas are rather similar across
asset classes. It consequently appears difficult to escape variance risk exposure. Economically,
the variance risk factor contributes significantly to global risk premiums, with its contribution
hovering in the 40-60% range of the total premium for most portfolios we consider. Because
our sample is relatively small, average realized returns are not very informative about differential
risks across different assets. Accounting for variance risk matters substantially, and a two-factor
model that ignores variance risk would typically assign lower risk premiums to most of the assets
we consider. Statistical tests on alphas, though, cannot distinguish the two models over a sample
period this short.
We also investigate how much of the comovement of international returns can be captured
by our three-factor model, both within an asset class and across asset classes. The global fac-
tor model also accounts for a substantive fraction of international and cross-asset comovements
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in returns. The model is more successful in fitting equity return comovements than it is in fit-
ting bond and foreign currency return comovements. Interestingly, for the latter, it is especially
the comovements among developed market countries that is sub-par, whereas the fit for regional
portfolios is still satisfactory, especially for bond returns. The extant literature has documented
that local and regional factors may still matter, but here we demonstrate that a very simple model
captures a non-negligible fraction of international asset return comovements. We also examine
cross-asset return comovements, and here, the three-factor model does best for the correlations
between equity returns and bond returns, capturing on average 47% of the positive correlations,
while capturing only 41% of the equity return-foreign currency return correlations and 34% of
the bond return-foreign currency return correlations. Yet, overall, our three-factor model always
fits comovements of returns better than the two-factor model that ignores variance risk exposure.




Figure 2.1: The V IX and the Variance Swap Return
This figure shows time-series plots of the V IX and the variance swap return, which measures



























1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1 2015m1 2020m1
date
VIX Variance Swap Return
Figure 2.2: Excess equity returns and global variance by region
The bars show the sample means of annualized excess equity returns for regional portfolios
conditional on contemporaneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile
(No. 1) to the highest quartile (No. 4) of their sample distributions. The regional portfolio returns
are an equally weighted averages across countries. The sample period is monthly data from
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Figure 2.3: Excess bond returns and global variance by region
The bars show sample mean excess bond returns for regional portfolios conditional on contempo-
raneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile (No. 1) to the highest quar-
tile (No. 4) of their sample distributions. The regional portfolio returns are an equally weighted
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Figure 2.4: Excess foreign currency returns and global variance by region
The bars show sample mean excess foreign currency returns for regional portfolios conditional
on contemporaneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile (No. 1) to the
highest quartile (No. 4) of their sample distributions. The regional portfolio returns are an equally
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Figure 2.5: Excess equity returns and global variance by region and global equity market state
The bars show sample mean excess equity returns for regional portfolios conditional on contem-
poraneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile (No. 1) to the highest
quartile (No. 4) of their sample distributions after having sorted on down (first panel) versus
up (second panel) global equity market returns. The regional portfolio returns are an equally
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Figure 2.6: Excess bond returns and global variance by region and global equity market state
The bars show sample mean excess bond returns for regional portfolios conditional on contem-
poraneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile (No. 1) to the highest
quartile (No. 4) of their sample distributions after having sorted on down (first panel) versus
up (second panel) global equity market returns. The regional portfolio returns are an equally
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Figure 2.7: Excess foreign currency returns and global variance by region and global equity
market state
The bars show sample mean excess foreign currency returns for regional portfolios conditional
on contemporaneous global variance innovations being within the lowest quartile (No. 1) to the
highest quartile (No. 4) of their sample distributions after having sorted on down (first panel)
versus up (second panel) global equity market returns. The regional portfolio returns are an
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Figure 2.8: Variance Betas: Dollar versus Local Currency
The bars represent betas from regressions with equity returns in dollars, while the diamonds are
the betas from regressions with equity returns in local currency. The beta from exchange rate
regressions is, approximately, the difference between the diamond and the bar. Diamonds that
are filled in are significant at the 10% level. Bars are shaded to denote the country’s region within
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - Regional Index Returns
The summary statistics are the mean, median, and standard deviation (SD) of the excess returns
on regional portfolios that are equally weighted country returns. The sample period is monthly
data from January 1995 to November 2018.
N Mean Median SD
Panel A: Excess Equity Returns
Developed Comm 287 5.54 8.77 18.51
Developed Asia 287 2.02 7.09 19.21
EU, Euro 287 2.23 7.76 20.73
EU, Non-Euro 287 6.20 12.77 18.20
Emerging Asia 287 1.35 7.89 22.74
Emerging EMEA 287 5.05 11.76 21.56
Latin America 287 5.48 13.35 24.67
Panel B: Excess Bond Returns
DM Comm 287 4.06 5.76 9.94
Developed Asia 287 -0.07 1.63 11.49
EU, Euro 287 3.08 4.76 10.34
EU, Non-Euro 287 2.63 1.25 8.87
Emerging Asia 265 4.84 5.87 7.01
Emerging EMEA 266 3.52 7.43 14.1
Latin America 287 7.34 11.31 15.42
Panel C: Excess Foreign Currency Returns
DM Comm 287 1.89
Developed Asia 287 -0.95
EU, Euro 287 -0.61
EU, Non-Euro 287 -0.23
Emerging Asia 287 0.50
Emerging EMEA 287 2.36
Latin America 287 1.55
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Risk Factors
The table presents the summary statistics for the three risk factors: the excess return on the S&P
500 equity index, the excess return on the U.S. bond index, and the return on the variance swap.
Panel A presents the mean, median, and standard deviation, Panel B presents the correlations.
The sample period is January 1995 to November 2018.
Panel A: Excess Returns
N Mean Median SD
reUS 287 5.20 10.49 14.61
rbUS 287 2.61 2.39 4.24









rvsUS,t -0.53 0.15 1.00
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Table 2.3: Global Equity Market Returns Priced by Their Exposures to U.S. Equity Market,
Bond Market, and Variance Risks
The Table reports regressions of excess equity returns denominated in U.S. dollars on the risk factors from the U.S.
equity, bond, and variance markets:







Panel A presents results for equally weighted regional portfolios in which the N column lists the number of months.
Panel B lists summary statistics of the individual country-level regressions: the mean, the percent significant at the 10%
level (% signif.), and the 10-th percentile and the 90-th percentile (p10 / p90) of the coefficient estimates. The N column





US,t Constant N Adj R2
Panel A: Regional Regressions
DM Commodities coef 0.85*** 0.18 -3.23*** -0.031 287 0.637
t-stat [14.1] [1.16] [-6.41] [-1.36]
Developed Asia coef 0.80*** 0.011 -2.99*** -0.056** 287 0.527
t-stat [13.4] [0.061] [-4.35] [-2.10]
EU Euro coef 0.95*** -0.27 -3.65*** -0.062*** 287 0.662
t-stat [14.5] [-1.52] [-6.10] [-2.66]
EU Non-Euro coef 0.84*** -0.28* -3.41*** -0.013 287 0.692
t-stat [16.2] [-1.80] [-5.31] [-0.63]
Emerging Asia coef 0.83*** -0.078 -3.16*** -0.064* 287 0.409
t-stat [9.03] [-0.36] [-3.79] [-1.87]
Emerging EMEA coef 0.84*** -0.14 -3.90*** -0.034 287 0.508
t-stat [8.97] [-0.62] [-5.38] [-1.11]
Latin America coef 0.80*** -0.20 -5.19*** -0.041 287 0.425
t-stat [7.22] [-0.71] [-5.41] [-1.03]
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Country-Level Regressions
Developed mean 0.89 -0.17 -3.45 -0.05 22 0.50
% signif. 1.00 0.23 0.91 0.36
p10 / p90 0.73 / 1.11 -0.59 / 0.29 -6.39 / -1.38 -0.08 / -0.00 0.33 / 0.65
Emerging Asia mean 0.83 -0.08 -3.16 -0.06 9 0.22
% signif. 1.00 0.22 0.78 0.11
p10 / p90 0.41 / 1.12 -0.64 / 0.82 -5.95 / 0.98 -0.13 / 0.01 0.02 / 0.34
Emerging EMEA mean 0.84 -0.14 -3.90 -0.03 10 0.24
% signif. 0.80 0.10 0.90 0.00
p10 / p90 0.08 / 1.44 -0.97 / 0.55 -5.78 / -2.18 -0.07 / 0.00 0.06 / 0.38
Latin America mean 0.80 -0.20 -5.19 -0.04 6 0.28
% signif. 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
p10 / p90 0.49 / 1.20 -0.71 / 0.58 -7.80 / -3.47 -0.10 / -0.01 0.13 / 0.45
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Table 2.4: Global Bond Market Returns Priced by Their Exposures to U.S. Equity Market, Bond
Market, and Variance Risks
The Table reports regressions of excess bond market returns denominated in U.S. dollars on the risk factors from the
U.S. equity, bond, and variance markets:







Panel A presents results for equally weighted regional portfolios in which the N column lists the number of months.
Panel B lists summary statistics of the individual country-level regressions: the mean, the percent significant at the 10%
level (% signif.), and the 10-th percentile and the 90-th percentile (p10 / p90) of the coefficient estimates. The N column





US,t Constant N Adj R2
Panel A: Regional Regressions
DM Commodities coef 0.29*** 0.91*** -2.10*** -0.022 287 0.403
t-stat [7.03] [8.13] [-5.68] [-1.41]
Developed Asia coef 0.068 0.92*** 1.23 -0.014 287 0.120
t-stat [1.22] [5.93] [1.48] [-0.62]
EU Euro coef 0.13** 0.99*** -1.33*** -0.017 287 0.192
t-stat [2.40] [6.58] [-2.87] [-0.91]
EU Non-Euro coef 0.11*** 0.91*** -1.56*** -0.021 287 0.241
t-stat [2.71] [7.87] [-4.78] [-1.38]
Emerging Asia coef 0.13** 0.82*** -1.78*** 0.0027 265 0.402
t-stat [2.36] [7.70] [-4.13] [0.21]
Emerging EMEA coef 0.32** 0.51*** -1.52*** -0.0083 266 0.164
t-stat [2.29] [3.29] [-2.66] [-0.30]
Latin America coef 0.40*** 0.74*** -4.98*** -0.024 287 0.442
t-stat [4.02] [3.56] [-6.81] [-0.93]
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Country-Level Regressions
Developed mean 0.16 0.93 -1.34 -0.02 22 0.23
% signif. 0.86 1.00 0.77 0.05
p10 / p90 0.07 / 0.31 0.76 / 1.05 -2.09 / -0.50 -0.03 / 0.00 0.12 / 0.40
Emerging Asia mean 0.15 0.84 -2.61 -0.00 4 0.32
% signif. 0.75 0.75 1.00 0.00
p10 / p90 0.06 / 0.21 0.61 / 0.98 -5.14 / -1.24 -0.02 / 0.02 0.20 / 0.57
Emerging EMEA mean 0.29 0.54 -1.76 0.01 11 0.17
% signif. 0.73 0.55 0.55 0.09
p10 / p90 0.10 / 0.74 0.18 / 0.95 -2.88 / 0.29 -0.01 / 0.03 0.02 / 0.33
Latin America mean 0.32 0.84 -4.79 -0.02 12 0.35
% signif. 0.92 0.67 0.92 0.08
p10 / p90 0.09 / 0.53 0.43 / 1.13 -9.06 / -1.60 -0.10 / 0.02 0.24 / 0.43
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Table 2.5: Global Foreign Exchange Market Returns Priced by Their Exposures to U.S. Equity
Market, Bond Market, and Variance Risks
The Table reports regressions of excess foreign exchange market returns denominated in U.S. dollars on the risk factors
from the U.S. equity, bond, and variance markets:







Panel A presents results for equally weighted regional portfolios in which the N column lists the number of months.
Panel B lists summary statistics of the individual country-level regressions: the mean, the percent significant at the 10%
level (% signif.), and the 10-th percentile and the 90-th percentile (p10 / p90) of the coefficient estimates. The N column





US,t Constant N Adj R2
Panel A: Regional Regressions
DM Commodities coef 0.29*** 0.27** -2.04*** -0.026 287 0.335
t-stat [6.57] [2.20] [-4.98] [-1.60]
Developed Asia coef 0.078*** 0.33*** 0.37 -0.018* 287 0.092
t-stat [3.28] [4.77] [1.13] [-1.93]
EU Euro coef 0.098* 0.43*** -1.50*** -0.039** 286 0.085
t-stat [1.81] [2.76] [-3.28] [-2.11]
EU Non-Euro coef 0.11** 0.31*** -1.56*** -0.034** 287 0.113
t-stat [2.37] [2.62] [-4.34] [-2.09]
Emerging Asia coef 0.16*** 0.065 -0.57* -0.011 287 0.128
t-stat [4.62] [0.73] [-1.72] [-0.95]
Emerging EMEA coef 0.19*** 0.23* -1.19*** -0.0056 287 0.231
t-stat [4.61] [1.86] [-3.98] [-0.39]
Latin America coef 0.18*** 0.054 -1.64*** -0.014 287 0.238
t-stat [5.39] [0.59] [-5.74] [-0.98]
Panel B: Country-Level Regressions
Developed mean 0.13 0.37 -1.33 -0.03 22 0.12
% signif. 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.73
p10 / p90 0.07 / 0.25 0.06 / 0.45 -2.01 / -0.21 -0.04 / -0.02 0.06 / 0.23
Emerging Asia mean 0.15 0.06 -0.53 -0.01 8 0.06
% signif. 0.88 0.00 0.38 0.12
p10 / p90 0.03 / 0.37 -0.03 / 0.23 -2.29 / 0.11 -0.03 / 0.02 0.01 / 0.15
Emerging EMEA mean 0.19 0.23 -1.19 -0.01 10 0.10
% signif. 0.80 0.40 0.60 0.10
p10 / p90 0.02 / 0.32 -0.19 / 0.48 -2.58 / 0.28 -0.03 / 0.02 0.00 / 0.19
Latin America mean 0.18 0.05 -1.64 -0.01 6 0.13
% signif. 0.83 0.00 0.83 0.17
p10 / p90 0.01 / 0.31 -0.16 / 0.19 -2.60 / -0.54 -0.06 / 0.03 -0.01 / 0.25
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Table 2.6: Regional Risk Premiums: Does Global Volatility Matter?
The sample mean excess return is ri. The implied expected excess return from the two factor
model with excess returns on the U.S. equity and bond markets as risk factors is E(rModel1). The
implied expected excess return from the three factor model that adds the return on the variance
swap as an additional risk factor isE(rModel2). The implied expected excess returns are calculated
using the long-run means for the excess returns on U.S. equities, bonds, and the variance swap,
which are 5.20%, 2.61%, and -1.14%, respectively. The proportion of the implied expected return
from Model 2 that is due to the variance swap return is β3V SP/E(rModel2). Standard errors (SE)
for the proportions are in the last column. The sample period is January 1995 to November 2018.




Equities DM Commodities 5.54 5.05 8.41 46.56 4.64
Developed Asia 2.02 4.23 7.34 49.38 5.26
EU Euro 2.23 4.13 7.92 55.71 8.79
EU Non-Euro 6.20 3.56 7.10 58.16 9.62
Emerging Asia 1.35 4.11 7.39 51.74 6.28
Emerging EMEA 5.05 4.08 8.12 58.05 7.22
Latin America 5.48 3.92 9.31 67.42 8.02
Bonds DM Commodities 4.06 4.50 6.68 38.05 14.31
Developed Asia -0.07 2.97 1.69 -88.13 189.10
EU Euro 3.08 3.89 5.27 30.57 17.49
EU Non-Euro 2.63 3.61 5.23 36.06 18.97
Emerging Asia 4.84 3.48 5.31 40.57 22.37
Emerging EMEA 3.52 3.32 4.88 37.75 12.59
Latin America 7.34 5.01 10.18 59.19 11.23
Exchange Rates DM Commodities 1.89 2.52 4.63 53.23 7.85
Developed Asia -0.95 1.31 0.92 -48.08 51.21
EU Euro -0.61 2.04 3.59 50.39 17.34
EU Non-Euro -0.23 1.73 3.34 56.35 14.23
Emerging Asia 0.50 1.02 1.61 42.66 4.96
Emerging EMEA 2.36 1.77 3.00 47.90 9.13
Latin America 1.55 1.28 2.98 66.58 4.53
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Table 2.7: Pricing Errors
The Table reports the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) (GRS) joint test of the significance of the
pricing errors for Model 1, the two-factor risk model, and Model 2, the three-factor risk model, as






The GMM test is
αˆ′var (αˆ)−1 αˆ ∼ χ2N
Regional EM DM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
GRS Equities 11.6 13.74 9.11 12.23 23.79 35.32
[0.11] [0.06] [1.00] [0.98] [0.36] [0.04]
Bonds 5.46 6.9 23.39 21.4 8.32 11.32
[0.60] [0.44] [0.22] [0.32] [0.98] [0.91]
FX 10.16 9.23 165.04 170.67 56.78 51.04
[0.18] [0.24] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
GMM Equities 11.21 14.68 15.13 17.75 35.05 40.74
[0.13] [0.04] [0.94] [0.85] [0.04] [0.01]
Bonds 5.65 7.44 24.5 28 10.24 15.05
[0.58] [0.38] [0.18] [0.08] [0.95] [0.72]
FX 10.29 11.93 130.83 128.49 21.96 19.93
[0.17] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.46] [0.59]
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Table 2.8: Model-Implied Relative to Realized Regional Correlations for Equity, Bond and For-
eign Currency Markets
The Table reports the ratio of model implied correlations to sample correlations for excess returns
on regional equities, bonds and exchange rates. The implied excess returns are the fitted values
from the regression of regional excess returns on the excess returns on U.S. equity, bond, and
variance swap markets. The sample period is January 1995 to November 2018.
Asset Class Region DM Comm. Dev. Asia Euro Non-Euro Em. Asia EMEA
Equities Developed Asia 0.72
EU Euro 0.81 0.88
EU Non-Euro 0.79 0.83 0.74
Emerging Asia 0.69 0.57 0.87 0.83
Emerging EMEA 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.63
Latin America 0.69 0.67 0.79 0.77 0.59 0.58
Bonds Developed Asia 0.29
EU Euro 0.39 0.41
EU Non-Euro 0.41 0.36 0.26
Emerging Asia 0.73 1.17 0.97 0.90
Emerging EMEA 0.69 1.20 1.02 0.96 0.34
Latin America 0.74 -0.43 0.89 0.88 0.54 0.43
FX Developed Asia 0.19
EU Euro 0.25 0.13
EU Non-Euro 0.28 0.12 0.11
Emerging Asia 0.42 0.10 0.25 0.28
Emerging EMEA 0.38 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.41
Latin America 0.51 0.21 0.39 0.42 0.46 0.40
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Table 2.9: Correlations of Regional Equity, Bond and Foreign Exchange Markets
The Table reports the sample correlations for excess returns across regional equity, bond, and foreign currency markets.
The sample period is January 1995 to November 2018.
Asset Class Region DM Comm. Dev. Asia Euro Non-Euro Em. Asia EMEA
Equities Developed Asia 0.80
EU Euro 0.80 0.68
EU Non-Euro 0.84 0.73 0.92
Emerging Asia 0.75 0.83 0.61 0.65
Emerging EMEA 0.80 0.71 0.78 0.80 0.73
Latin America 0.76 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.80
Bonds Developed Asia 0.29
EU Euro 0.69 0.30
EU Non-Euro 0.76 0.36 0.91
Emerging Asia 0.55 0.10 0.30 0.36
Emerging EMEA 0.37 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.67
Latin America 0.57 0.03 0.25 0.30 0.70 0.66
FX Developed Asia 0.42
EU Euro 0.64 0.48
EU Non-Euro 0.70 0.49 0.94
Emerging Asia 0.51 0.46 0.37 0.42
Emerging EMEA 0.75 0.40 0.75 0.76 0.43
Latin America 0.56 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.39 0.59
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Table 2.10: Correlations for Equities, Bonds, and Foreign Exchange within Regions
The Table reports the ratio of model-implied correlations to sample correlations and the sample
correlations for excess returns within regions for equity returns and bond returns, equity returns
and foreign exchange returns, and bond returns and foreign exchange returns. The implied excess
returns are the fitted values from the regression of regional excess returns on the excess returns on
U.S. equity, bond, and variance swap markets. The sample period is January 1995 to November
2018.
Region Corr(Eq,Bond) Corr(Eq,FX) Corr(Bond,FX)
Model-Implied/Realized DM Commodities 0.55 0.56 0.36
Developed Asia -0.54 0.20 0.11
EU Euro 0.30 0.35 0.13
EU Non-Euro 0.39 0.44 0.16
Emerging Asia 0.50 0.36 0.48
Emerging EMEA 0.56 0.49 0.61
Latin America 0.53 0.45 0.55
Sample Correlations DM Commodities 0.78 0.83 0.93
Developed Asia 0.11 0.36 0.89
EU Euro 0.45 0.50 0.92
EU Non-Euro 0.44 0.54 0.92
Emerging Asia 0.50 0.66 0.34
Emerging EMEA 0.51 0.69 0.32
Latin America 0.77 0.70 0.58
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Table 2.11: Model Fit: Root Mean Square Error
This table reports the RMSE for two models. Model 1 refers to a two factor model with excess
returns on the U.S. equity and bond market as risk factors, while Model 2 refers to a three factor
model that adds the return on the variance swap as an additional risk factor. The RMSE measure








[corrs(ri,t, rj,t)− corrm(ri,t, rj,t)]2 (2.6)
where corrs is the sample correlation, corrm is the model-implied correlation and N is the number
of portfolios. Panel A shows the results for the correlations across countries (within asset class),
and Panel B shows the results for the correlations within countries (across asset classes).
Regional EM DM
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: Across countries, within asset class
Equities 0.061 0.046 0.084 0.076 0.060 0.050
Bonds 0.083 0.070 0.108 0.080 0.292 0.273
Exchange Rates 0.184 0.170 0.105 0.100 0.468 0.443
Panel B: Within countries, across asset classes
All asset classes 0.202 0.179 0.127 0.114 0.261 0.240
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Chapter 3




The cost of capital is notoriously difficult to measure, and can be even more complicated in
emerging markets, where the cost of capital changes as markets integrate with the world. The
link between changes in market integration and expected returns has been extensively studied
to explain why different countries command different risk premiums. As markets integrate, the
dependence on the world factor should presumably increase. Meanwhile expected returns in
completely segmented markets should have little to no covariance with global market returns,
with different (idiosyncratic) sources of risk.
A large body of literature assumes that countries face a one-time permanent integration shock,
such that countries can become more integrated to the world and do not go back to segmentation.
Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Han Kim and Singal (2000), Martell and Stulz (2003), and Bekaert,
Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002) use equity market liberalizations and the removal of capital con-
trols in emerging markets (mostly in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s) to back out the
effects of integration on asset prices, mostly relying on event-study type methodologies. They find
that liberalizations tend to increase correlations with global market returns. While the integration
we saw over this period could be seen as a structural change, it is not necessarily the case that
integration is a permanent one-way street. Bekaert, Harvey, Kiguel, and Wang (2016) show that
correlations and betas across countries in equity market returns effectively increased throughout
the 1990s and early 2000s, but have since then stabilized and even fell in the period following
the Global Financial Crisis. We have also recently seen that even develop markets can become
more segmented, with Greece getting demoted from a developed market to an emerging market
and Trump’s and other developed market’s policies shifting towards more protectionist policies.
Furthermore, in emerging markets it is common to have constant shocks to integration, especially
as political regimes change. Thus, integration is time-varying and, while regimes can be sticky,
markets do not always shift smoothly and permanently from segmentation to integration.
Using average returns to measure the cost of capital can be difficult, and thus dividend yields
may be a more powerful tool, as these tend to be less variable in short time series (e.g. Bekaert
and Harvey (2000), Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011)). While the literature which pa-
rameterizes betas as a function of various integration indicators in the returns space is large (e.g.
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Harvey (1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1997), Fratzscher (2002), Bekaert, Harvey, and Ng (2005),
Baele and Inghelbrecht (2010)), little has been done with dividend yields. Constant discount rates
and cash flow growth are not reasonable assumptions in emerging markets. As the degree of
integration varies over time, agents should anticipate such variation and it should be reflected in
valuations. Integration can be incorporated into valuation models in a linear fashion, such that the
degree of integration directly impacts discount rates and growth opportunities. However, theory
and evidence suggest that the dependence on global factors should increase as markets integra-
tion. This gives rise to a quadratic term in the pricing equation, and thus changes in integration
with dynamic effects are difficult to accommodate in valuation models.
In this paper, we develop a novel present value model to value cash flows with time-varying
expected returns building on the model developed by Ang and Liu (2004), but in our case market
integration affect the cost of capital in a time-varying fashion. Integration has a direct impact on
valuations, along with an indirect impact through the time-varying nature of the betas with, for
example, global discount rates. These two effects lead to an interaction term between the model’s
state variables (e.g. financial integration with a global risk factor), generating a quadratic Gaus-
sian structure in the pricing equation. This framework prices expectations about future integra-
tion, with integration modeled as a mean-reverting process which goes back to the unconditional
mean. We use the model to attempt to quantify price effects of changes in de jure integration and
predict future integration dynamics. We use Argentina as a case study, and calibrate the model to
fit a segmentation shock in 2011. We find that the model is able to capture part of the increase in
dividend yields as markets became more segmented; however, it falls short of modeling the full
impact. To model the full extent of the change in dividends, we need to assume that investors per-
ceive the shock as permanent and thus price lower mean integration following the segmentation
shock.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model for valuing
cash flows with time-varying expected returns. We also show some special cases of the model to
better understand the financial integration dynamics. Section 3.3 outlines the data we use for the
calibration exercise. Section 3.4 describes our Argentina case study, showing how integration has
varied over time and describing the 2011 segmentation shock in detail, while Section 3.5 shows
the calibration parameters and results. We conclude in Section 3.6.
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3.2 DIVIDEND YIELDS AND INTEGRATION
In this section, we develop a novel analytical methodology to price an emerging market se-
curity. This framework considers a present value model to value cash flows with time-varying
expected returns, where market integration affects the cost of capital in a time-varying fashion.
We develop a model based on the closed-form methodology developed by Ang and Liu (2004).










where Di,t are the dividends of country i, µi,t is the log expected return of country i, and assum-
ing that rational expectations and the transversality condition hold. A standard Gordon model
assumes that both expected returns and expected cash flow growth are constant (i.e. µt = µ¯ and





exp(µ¯− g¯)− 1 . (3.2)
However, empirical studies in emerging markets suggest that local expected returns and cash flow
growth rates vary over time; therefore, the Gordon model is not a realistic model and a process
must be specified for each variable in order to directly evaluate equation 3.1.
We define the discount rate in country i in the spirit of Bekaert and Harvey (1995), who develop
a framework with time-varying integration which allows conditionally expected returns in any
country to be affected by their covariance with a world benchmark portfolio and by the variance
of country returns. In their specification, as economies become more financially integrated, the
global component becomes more relevant; while under complete segmentation, the variance term
is the only source of market risk. The idea behind this is that, as countries integrate, their asset
prices should converge (as projects of similar risk command a similar price per unit of cash flow
in integrated countries) and there should be higher comovement of returns across countries. In
contrast to their specification, where the time-varying integration measure is inferred from the
113
data, we use an explicit measure of financial integration.1
Consider a conditional log expected return, µi,t, specified by an international conditional CAPM:
µi,t = rf,t + θi,t + βi,tµw,t + λi,tEt(RVi,t+1). (3.3)
Discount rates are affected by the global discount rate, µw,t, and by the conditional variance of
country returns, Et(RVi,t+1). We take the perspective of a global investor and thus rf,t is a global
risk-free rate, which arises because discount rates are total, not excess, rates. Furthermore, we
assume that the constant term, θi,t, and the sensitivities of discount rates in country i to global
discount rates and local variance, measured by βi,t and δi,t, are modeled as
zi,t = z0 + z1FIi,t, (3.4)
where z = {θi,t, βi,t, λi,t} and FIi,t is a measure of financial integration. This model nests the
nulls of full integration and full segmentation. In completely segmented markets (β0 and β1 are
equal to zero), then the CAPM holds. In this case, the λi,t is the local price of risk and measures
the representative investor’s relative risk aversion (Merton (1980)). Meanwhile, in completely
integrated markets (λ0 and λ1 are equal to zero), the conditionally expected return in country i is
determined by the the country’s world risk exposure (as in Harvey (1991)), where βi,t is the world
price of risk.
Log dividend growth in country i, ∆di,t+1, is affected by global dividend growth, ∆dw,t+1 and
a local component, LFi,t:
∆di,t+1 = κi,t + γi,t∆dw,t+1 + ϕi,tLFi,t + ε
d
i,t+1. (3.5)
Global dividend growth is defined as
∆dw,t+1 = gw,t + ε
d
w,t+1, (3.6)
where gw,t is the expected cash flow growth at time t and εdw,t+1 ∼ N(0, σ2w,d). That is, like expected
1In addition to financial integration, it is easy to add political risk as a second segmenting factor in the setup.
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returns, cash flow growth varies over time with a global and local factor, but with respect to
economic integration. As economies become more economically integrated, local cash flows are
expected to vary more with global cash flows; while under complete segmentation, the local factor
is the only source of risk. I assume that the constant term, κi,t, and the global dividend growth
and local factor coefficients, γi,t and φi,t, vary over time with measures of economic openness and
political risk:
zi,t = z0 + z1TIi,t, (3.7)
where z = {κi,t, γi,t, φi,t}, and TIi,t is a measure of trade integration.
To take the expectation of the pricing equation, I also need to know the evolution of the
state variables defined in the previous systems. Assume Xw,t = (gw,t µw,t rf,t)′ and Xi,t =
(TIi,t FIi,t V Ri,t LFi,t)
′, where Xt = (X ′w,tX ′i,t)
′ follows a VAR(1):
Xt+1 = c+ ΦXt + t+1 (3.8)
with t ∼ iid N(0,Σ). For simplicity, I assume that global variables only predict global variables
and local variables only predict local variables (this can be easily extended for global variables to
















Assume also that idiosyncratic shocks of the United States and country i are uncorrelated.
The following proposition shows how to calculate the valuation of country i under the model
specified above.
Proposition 1: Let Xt = (X ′w,tX ′i,t)
′, with dimentions Kx1, follow the process in equation (3.8). Suppose
cash flow growth, ∆di,t+1, and expected log returns, µi,t, each follow a quadratic Gaussian structure given
by
















where α1 and α2 are constants, ξ1 and ξ2 are Kx1 vectors, Ω1 and Ω2 are symmetric KxK matrices, Γ′1 is
a 2x1 vector, Λ1 is a Kx2 matrix, and νt+1 is an error vector, (εdw,t+1 ε
d
i,t+1)
′, with νi,t+1 ∼ N(0,Σν). The
vectors ξ and the matrices Ω map cash flows and expected returns to Xt, while Γ and Λ map the noise terms



















a(n) + b(n)′Xt +X ′tH(n)Xt
)
(3.13)
where a(n) is a scalar, b(n) is a Kx1 vector, and H(n) is a KxK symmetric matrix. The coefficients a(n),
b(n) and H(n) are given by the following recursions:




































where the initial conditions are given by:
a(1) = α1 − α2 + 1
2
Γ′1ΣνΓ1
b(1) = ξ1 − ξ2 + Λ1ΣνΓ1






Note that the quadratic Gaussian structure in this model comes from modeling the interaction of
the integration variables with the global and local factors. The pricing formula in equation 3.13
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is analytic, given that the coefficients a(n), b(n) and H(n) are known functions and stay constant
over time.
3.2.1 The role of financial integration
To better understand the role of the different parameters in the model, we consider a few special
cases. First, it is worth noting that the framework can be reduced to a standard Gordon growth
model. That is, we can assume that the discount rate and expected cash flows are constant over
time by setting ξ1 = ξ2 = Ω1 = Ω2 = Γ1 = Λ1 = 0 such that ∆di,t+1 = α1 and µi,t = α2 with
α1 > α2 > 0. While this case is fairly trivial, it shows that the α′s in the model represent the
unconditional means of the discount rate and expected cash flows.
Second, to gain intuition on the model, we assume that cash flows follow an autoregressive
process (and thus are another state variable in the model) and focus on the discount rate effect.
In these specifications, prices move either because of changes in cash flow growth or because
state variables affecting expected returns change in Xt. This narrows the state variables down to
Xt = (µw,t rf,t gi,t FIi,t Et(V Ri,t+1)), and we further assume that each state variable follows an
AR(1) process rather than the VAR(1) specified above. Under these assumptions, we study three
cases: (i) betas are constant over time, but factors are time-varying, (ii) betas vary over time with
financial integration, but factor risk premia are constant, and (iii) both betas and factors vary over
time.
We start by considering the case where betas are constant over time, but global discount rates
and local expected variance risk are time-varying. Financial integration still is included as a factor
which explains expected returns, but there are no interaction terms. Thus, equation 3.3 reduces to:
µi,t = rf,t + θ0 + θ1FIi,t + β0µw,t + λ0Et(RVi,t+1), (3.18)
where α2 = θ0, ξ2 = (e2 + θ1e4 + β0e1 + λ0e5), and ei is a vector of zeros with a one in row i.













where Xt = (µw,t rf,t gi,t FIi,t Et(V Ri,t+1)), a(n) is a scalar, b(n) is a Kx1 vector, and these are
given by the following recursions and initial conditions:









b(n+ 1) = −ξ2 + Φ′(e3 + b(n))





b(1) = −ξ2 + Φ′e3.
(3.20)
In this case, it is relatively straightforward to evaluate the impact of financial integration on valu-
ations. Assume financial integration increases to 1 at time t (reflected in Xt). The level of financial
integration does not affect the constant term, a(n+ 1), which depends on this variable through its
mean and variance terms (i.e. the terms e′4b(n)cFI and 0.5b(n)′e4σ2FIe
′
4b(n)). Thus, the direct effect
will be reflected in b(n). Iterating over n at time t, it is easy to show that this change directly im-
pacts valuations by −θ1FIi,t in the first period, and that this effect fades as we iterate forward, as
we would expect from the mean reverting nature of the AR(1) process (i.e. −θ1(1+φFI)FIi,t in the
second iteration, −θ1(1 + φFI + φ2FI)FIi,t in the third iteration, and so on). Thus, we can see that
higher levels of financial integration leads to lower discount rates, and thus higher price-dividend
ratios/lower dividend yields (assuming θ1 < 0, as theory suggests, and φFI > 0).
Alternatively, we could assume that betas vary over time with financial integration, but global
expected returns and local expected variance risk are constant (we allow the risk-free rate to vary
in this scenario). In this case, equation 3.3 reduces to:
µi,t = rf,t + θ0 + θ1FIi,t + (β0 + β1FIi,t)µw + (λ0 + λ1FIi,t)Et(RVi), (3.21)
where µw and Et(RVi) are mean global discount rates and local expected returns, respectively,
α2 = θ0 + β0µw + λ0Et(RVi), ξ2 = (e2 + [θ1 + β1µw + λ1Et(RVi)]e4) and ei is a vector of zeros
with a one in row i. Again, this eliminates the quadratic term in equation 3.13 and Proposition 1
simplifies as in equations 3.19 and 3.20, withXt = (rf,t gi,t FIi,t). We repeat the exercise above and
assume financial integration increases to 1 at time t. Here, in addition to the direct impact on local
discount rates, financial integration also indirectly impacts these by changing the betas on global
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discount rates and expected variance risk, reflected in the term b(n). Iterating this term over n at
time t, we again find that the change in financial directly impacts valuations by−θ1FIi,t in the first
period. However, this time there is also an indirect effect via (−β1µw − λ1Et(RVi))FIi,t; the idea
being that greater financial increases the loading on the global factor (we would expect β1 to be
greater than zero) and decreases the loading on the local factor (λ1 < 0). Both the direct and indi-
rect effects fade in line with φFI as we iterate forward (i.e. −[θ1 +β1µw +λ1Et(RVi)](1 +φFI)FIi,t
in the second iteration, −[θ1 + β1µw + λ1Et(RVi)](1 +φFI +φ2FI)FIi,t in the third iteration, and so
on). Thus, the impact on the discount rate, and thus dividend yields, depends on the combined
effect. If the direct effect dominates the combined indirect effects, then discount rates should fall
when financial integration rises, leading to higher price-dividend rates/lower dividend yields.
Also, as in the case of constant betas, note that the level of financial integration does not affect
the constant term a(n + 1), which depends only on the mean and variance terms (although here
the coefficients on these terms depend on the loadings on global discount rates and local variance
risk, in addition to impact through the theta’s). Furthermore, note that the same conclusions for
these two cases can be extracted by working with expected cash flows, as in equation 3.10, rather
than assuming they follow an autoregressive process.
Finally, we study the case where betas vary over time with financial integration and factors
are time-varying as well. We add two simplifying assumptions to reduce the number of parame-
ters in the calibration and focus on the roles of financial integration and the quadratic effects on
valuations:
1. We assume each state variable follows an AR(1) and that the variables are demeaned, such
that:
X˜t = ΦX˜t−1 + t+1, (3.22)
where X˜t = Xt −X are the demeaned state variables, X˜t = (µ˜w,t r˜f,t g˜i,t F˜ Ii,t Et( ˜V Ri,t+1)),
Φ is a KxK matrix with the AR(1) coefficients on the diagonal and zeros on the off-diagonal
elements, and t ∼ N(0,Σ) with Σ a KxK matrix with the individual regression σ’s on the
diagonal and zeros on the off-diagonal.
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2. Expected log returns, µi,t, follow a quadratic Gaussian structure given by





such that α2 captures the mean local discount rate.
The following proposition shows how to calculate the valuation of country i under the model
specified above.
Proposition 2: Let X˜t, with dimentions Kx1, follow the process in equation 3.22. Suppose expected log
returns, µi,t, follow a quadratic Gaussian structure given by equation 3.23, where α2 is a constant, ξ2 is a
Kx1 vector and Ω2 is a symmetric KxK matrix. The vectors ξ and the matrices Ω map expected returns to



















a(n) + b(n)′X˜t + X˜ ′tH(n)X˜t
)
(3.25)
where a(n) is a scalar, b(n) is a Kx1 vector, and H(n) is a KxK symmetric matrix. The coefficients a(n),
b(n) and H(n) are given by the following recursions:
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where the initial conditions are given by:
a(1) = α1 − α2 + 1
2
e′3Σe3
b(1) = −ξ2 + Φ′e3
H(1) = −Ω2.
(3.27)
This model essentially combines the two cases we just studied, where we have a direct impact
of financial integration on valuations and an indirect impact through the time-varying nature of
the betas. However, having both effects together leads to an interaction between the model’s state
variables (i.e. financial integration with global discount rates and with local expected variance
risk), generating a quadratic Gaussian structure in the local discount rate, µi,t, and by extension
the pricing equation. Tracing out the effects of financial integration on valuations analytically is
much more involved here, as the quadratic term, H(n), feeds into the constant and linear terms,
a(n) and b(n), respectively. We leave this analysis for our case study in the following sections.
For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on this simplified model which only captures the
discount rate effect. The full model turns out to be very difficult to apply to gain intuition, given
the large amount of parameters in the estimate and the many effects which interact.
3.3 DATA
This section describes the country-level returns and financial data, as well as the global com-
ponents and the openness variables. All variables are nominal and denominated in dollars.
To construct annualized monthly equity returns, I start with the country-level MSCI total re-
turns index and calculate the total return of the stock market index, 1 +Rmi,t+1, where R
m
i,t+1 is the
return obtained in country i from month t to month t + 1. I then compute monthly log rates of
return on the index from month t to month t + 1, rmi,t+1 = ln(1 + R
m
i,t+1), and aggregate over 12





For each month, I also construct annualized monthly risk-free returns in order to calculate
excess returns. I consider the perspective of a representative global investor and consequently use
the monthly return on the one-month Treasury bill from Ibboston Asociates as the risk-free rate,
121





annualized monthly excess returns are calculated as rei,t = ri,t − rf,t.
Dividend yields (DY) come from MSCI for the Argentina example, which calculates the country
ratio as the average of the individual yields weighted by the market value. Market capitalization
and cash flow growth (based on dividends, ∆di,t) all refer to the MSCI Country Index. Note that,
following the literature, we use the 12-month moving average of dividends to calculate cash flow
growth and dividend yields, to smooth out jumps. The data limits the starting point of our sample
to June 2004.
With respect to global variables, global expected discount rates (µw,t) and expected cash flow
growth (gw,t) are empirically estimated following the sum-of-the-parts (SOP) approach outlined in
Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011). The SOP method proposes decomposing log stock market returns
into three components: growth in the price-dividends ratio (∆pdw), growth in dividends (∆dw)
and the dividend-price ratio (dpw).2 Each of these components can then be forecast separately to
predict the conditional expected return µw,s = Es(rw,s+1); that is
µˆw,s = µˆ
∆pd
w,s + gˆw,s + µˆ
dp
w,s. (3.28)
In line with Ferreira and Santa Clara, the global components are estimated as follows: (i) expected
dividends growth, gˆw,s, is estimated using a 20-year moving average of growth in dividends up to
time s; (ii) the expected dividend-price ratio µˆdpw,s is estimated by the current dividend-price ratio,
dps (the logarithm of one plus the current dividend-price ratio), and (iii) expected growth of the
price dividend ratio µˆ∆pdw,s is assumed to be zero.
Global components are proxied by US data extending from January 1966 to December 2014.
The world market return is proxied by the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 index return including
dividends, with dividend growth and the dividend-price ratio also referring to the S&P 500 In-














































dex. Note that the forecast period starts in January 1987 because expected dividends growth is
estimated using a 20-year moving average.
We need a forward looking measure of variance risk, and thus estimate expected country vari-
ance risk by forecasting the annual realized variance in country i in the spirit of Bekaert and
Hoerova (2014) as follows:




i,t−1 + β3ri,t−1 + β4rus,t−1 + i,t (3.29)
where RV ai,t−1 and RV
a
i,t−1 are local lagged annual and monthly realized variance and ri,t−1 and
rus,t−1 represent lagged local and foreign equity returns. Realized variances are constructed based
on daily data, and calculated from squared daily returns over 22 days for the monthly frequency
and over 264 days for the annual frequency. For Argentina, we use the MSCI index in dollars,
while realized variance in the US is based on the S&P500.
Openness variables fall into two categories: economic and financial integration. In the sim-
plified version of the model, cash flows simply follow an AR(1), so we focus on the financial
indicator. To measure financial openness, we use a capital account openness index compiled by
Fernandez, Klein, Rebucci, Schindler, and Uribe (2016) based on a coding of the IMF’s Annual Re-
port on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) narrative description. The
categories are broken down such that 1 represents the presence of a restriction and 0 represents
no restrictions. The aggregate index, S_ka, considers transaction level regulations for 10 types of
investment (among them, equities, bonds, money market instruments, and derivatives). In this
paper, we use one minus the index, such that higher scores indicate less restrictions in place/more
openness. The dataset’s coverage is from 1995 to 2015, but we extend it back to 1980 as in Bekaert,
Harvey, Kiguel, and Wang (2016).3
3The Schindler measure starts in 1995, however, it can be extended back to 1980 using other de jure measure to
predict what the value would have been. We use the de jure current and capital account measures complied by Quinn
and Toyoda (2008),QT_Cur100 andQT_Cap100, and the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account measure,CI_KA_Open,
to predict the Schindler indicators from 1980 to 1994. We estimate the value based on the following panel regressions:
S_ka = α+ β1CI_KA_Open+ β2QT_Cur100 + β3QT_Cap100
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3.4 CASE STUDY: ARGENTINA 2011
Argentina is a great example of the importance of incorporating time-varying integration into
financial models. While long-term average integration is 0.45, this measure has fluctuated consid-
erably over different political regimes. Markets were fairly segmented between 1980 and 1991,
with average integration at 0.4; and then, with the adoption of the Convertibility Plan under
President Menem, along with other market-friendly measures such as massive privatizations and
deregulation of labor laws, financial integration increased to an average of 0.80 between 1992 and
2001. Later, following the default and the beginning of populist governments under the Kirchners,
integration fell to an average of 0.26 between 2002 and 2015. In December 2015, market-friendly
candidate Mauricio Macri was elected president, and worked hard to re-integrate Argentina to the
world.
We use Argentina to illustrate a practical application of the framework outlined above by work-
ing with an example of market segmentation in 2011. As capital outflows increased significantly
in 2011, Cristina Kirchner’s government implemented the Cepo Cambiario, a set of capital con-
trols in the exchange rate market intended to stem the capital flight. In October 2011, right after
Kirchner was re-elected as president, the federal tax agency, Administración Federal de Ingresos
Públicos (AFIP), unexpectedly announced that it would begin to regulate who could purchase for-
eign currency and how many dollars they could buy (both at the individual and corporate level).
The measures gradually became tighter over time as dollars became scarcer and international re-
serves continued to fall, and lasted until Macri took office in December 2015. Figure 3.1a shows
the monthly net foreign asset formation by the non-financial private sector, where negative (pos-
itive) numbers indicate foreign asset purchases (sales). Here we can see that official foreign asset
purchases increased greatly throughout 2011, and then suddenly halted with the implementation
of the restrictions. Foreign asset purchases remained low until Macri announced the end of the
cepo five days after starting his presidency (December 15, 2015), seen in the sudden spike down
in December 2015. It is worth noting that, in this period, most dollar purchases took place in the
parallel exchange rate market, where the gap between the official exchange rate and the parallel
rate averaged 46%, peaking at 100% in 2013. This gap closed as soon as the end of the cepo was
announced (Figure 3.1b). We focus on this example for the remainder of the paper.
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While de facto financial integration measures are able to capture trends in financial integration
over time, these measures are annual and miss the exact timing of the changes in integration when
studying data at a monthly level. This is especially relevant here, since we focus on a segmenta-
tion shock in October 2011 and follow this one-year out in our case study. We use a modified
version Schindler’s financial integration measure in this analysis (see Data section for details on
the original measure). The idea is to use the cepo chronology to pinpoint the timing of the de-
terioration in financial integration more accurately. This way, rather than saying capital controls
were imposed in 2011 and linearly interpolating the annual data to obtain a monthly series, we
can identify exactly when the initial shock took place and how the restrictions gradually became
tighter. For example, in the original restrictions implemented in October 2011, individuals could
theoretically convert up to 40% of their salary from pesos to foreign currency, while in May 2012
this number was officially reduced to 25% (although it is true that in practice the limits were more
obscure and at the government’s discretion). On the corporate side, when the cepo first started,
firms were allowed to buy up to USD500mn daily without authorization from the Central Bank
(BCRA), and this limit fell to USD50mn over time.
3.5 CALIBRATION
3.5.1 Parameters
Ideally, we would like to estimate the pricing model in one step. However, it turns out that
the estimation is too sensitive and the model easily explodes given all the parameters. Thus, to
analyze the effects of financial integration, we work with the simplified model specified in Propo-
sition 2 and calibrate our practical application of the framework. We calibrate the parameters to
loosly target the coefficients of the following regression: (1) we regress realized returns on global
returns and variance risk to estimate the time-varying coefficients that will be used in the discount
rate equation, and (2) we run AR(1) regressions for each state variable to estimate their evolution.
We then use these parameters to calibrate the pricing equation.
To calibrate the discount rate in equation 3.23, we first estimate the time-varying coefficients
that will be used discount rates equation by using realized returns data (rei,t+1) for Argentina;
specifically we run the following regression:
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rei,t+1 = θt + βtr
e
w,t+1 + λtEt(V Ri,t+1) + ε
r
i,t+1. (3.30)
where rew,t+1 is the U.S. equity market return in excess of the risk-free rate, Et(V Ri,t+1) represents
expected country variance risk, and the coefficients vary over time with financial integration (xt =
x0 + x1FIi,t for xt = {θi,t, βi,t, λi,t} and FIi,t financial integration). The right hand side variables
are demeaned so that the constant (θ0) approaches mean returns, in line with α2 in equation 3.26
in Proposition 2. The sample ranges from January 1995 to December 2014. Note that the constant
is not exactly equal to mean returns given that we include quadratic terms in the regression, but
it is much closer than with level variables. Theoretically, expected returns should fall as markets
become more integrated (thus we would expected θ1 < 0), local returns should move positively
with global returns (β0 > 0), and expected variance risk (which can be thought of as a risk aversion
indicator) should also vary positively with expected returns (λ0 > 0). The regression yields the
expected signs for financial integration and global expected returns (with θ0 = −0.35 and β0 =
1.46), but not for expected variance risk, which yields a negative coefficient. For this case, we use
a coefficient of 1.1 instead. With respect to the interaction terms, local expected returns should
load more on global factors when integration increases (thus β1 > 0), but greater integration
should decrease the exposure to local risks (λ1 < 0). While the regression targets the right sign
for variance risk (λ1 = −1.9), we find the wrong sign for global expected returns and thus base
the calibration on the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval (β1 = 0.24). The calibration
coefficients are summarized in Panel A of Table 3.2.
Next, we estimate the evolution of the state variables as in equation 3.22, assuming all state
variables follow an autoregressive process with homoscedastic innovations (all errors are inde-
pendent, zero mean, with variance sigma) and are demeaned such that there are no constant terms
in the calibration (i.e. X˜t ≡ Xt − X¯). Note, however, that mean cash flows are captured by α1 in
equation 3.26. We base our calibration coefficients of Φ and Σ on these regressions (Table 3.2, Panel
B). We tone down the persistence of cash flow grown (to 0.02 from 0.2, in line with the coefficient
we would get if we extend the sample through December 2018), and financial integration (to 0.75
from 0.86, within the confidence interval) to improve the fit the data at the time of the shock. Also
recall that σgd is modified, such that the variance is a weighted average of GDP growth and cash
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flow growth (to 0.005).
Finally, in the third stage, we calibrate the dividend yields using Proposition 2, along with the
parameters estimated in the first two steps. To complete this exercise, we still need to specify the
mean parameters, α1 and α2. It is worth noting that when mean expected cash flows are greater
than mean expected returns, the system will not converge. In emerging economies, it is often the
case the cash flow growth is very high and volatile. Thus, we adjust mean cash flow growth (α1 in
the calibration) such that it mean reverts to GDP growth in cases where historical dividend growth
is very high, as dividends cannot grow so much faster than GDP indefinitely.4 In the Argentina
example, we proxy long term GDP growth with average GDP between 1990 and 2018, which
reached 2.9%. The weighted average of this and the mean cash flow growth of 12% in our sample
result in α1 = 3.5%. Meanwhile, we assume that the long term discount rate can be proxied by
the sum of the expected global discount rate (6.6%) and the expected long-term country risk (we
assume this is around 500bp based on the average EMBI, excluding the default period).
3.5.2 Results
We start by measuring how sensitive the dividend yield in the model is to different values of
financial integration, leaving all else equal. For illustrative purposes, we calibrate the dividend
yield at the time of the shock (October 2011), using the parameters specified above. At this point
in time (which we will refer to as t0), the financial integration measure was at 0.18, suggesting
markets were already fairly segmented, even relative to the country’s own history. Table 3.3 shows
we are to match the dividend yields quite well (6.79 actual, 6.74 calibrated). We then study what
happens to the dividend yield if we use the long-term mean of financial integration (0.45), the 5th
4We run the following regression to estimate the weight that should used on mean GDP:
(∆di,t+1 − cyclei,t+1) = φ(∆di,t − cyclei,t) + i,t+1,
and thus,
E [∆di,t+1] = (1− φ)cyclei,t + φ∆di,t.
We estimate this for a panel of Latin American countries, to have a sense of potential long-term dividend growth. The
empirical results yield φ = 0.06, which tells us to put 94% weight on GDP growth and 6% weight on dividend growth.
The weighted average of these time series gives us a proxy for long-term dividend growth in the region. I make this
same adjustment to σgd :
var [∆di,t+1] = (1− φ)2var(cyclei,t) + φ2var(∆di,t) + 2φ(1− φ)cov(cyclei,t,∆di,t),
This value replaces the variance of cash flow growth in the calibration.
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percentile (0.01) and the 95th percentile (0.91). We find that dividend yields decrease to 4.98 from
6.78 when financial integration increases to 0.45 from 0.18. The more extreme values of financial
integration bring dividend yields to 8.10 and 2.93 in the 5th and 95th percentiles, respectively.
While these ranges are wide and the model is able to generate meaningful changes in dividend
yields, we acknowledge that it is not capable of replicating the full range of dividend yields we
see in the data, suggesting that changes in the level financial integration are not the only factor
behind changes in dividend yields.
Next, we study symmetric changes in financial integration with respect to the sample mean
(0.2). Here, we consider increases and decreases in financial integration of 0.1 and 0.2 versus the
mean. We run this analysis for two cases: (i) the full model with the quadratic Gaussian struc-
ture, and (ii) a model where betas are constant over time, as described in Section 3.1 (i.e. there
is no quadratic). The bottom panel of Table 3.3 shows these results. Here we can see that divi-
dend yields evaluated at mean financial integration increase by 1.12bp when the quadratic term
is included in the model. We can also see that that including the quadratic term drags dividend
yields in the wrong direction; that is, including a quadratic term leads to higher dividend yields
with respect to an affine model as integration increases, and decreases the ratio when integration
decreases. With respect to the magnitudes, we actually find that segmentation shocks decrease
discount rates more than integration shocks increase them. This can be seen as dividend yields
increase by 4.14bp and 7.00bp as deviations in financial integration from the mean increase from 0
to 0.1 and 0.2, respectively, but decrease by 3.57bp and 8.00bp as integration increases by 0.1 and
0.2, respectively. This is likely associated with the relative importance of the interaction terms in
our calibration. That said, these results show that the quadratic effects are second order, with the
majority of the change in dividend yields coming from the linear terms.
We next focus on our most relevant calibration exercise. We use the calibration at the time the
cepo started, look through the integration shock and calibrate the dividend yields a year later. Es-
sentially, we want to see how the change in financial integration affects pricing, i.e. is the reaction
more consistent with a permanent or temporary shock to financial integration? If investors expect
financial integration to increase in the future, as Cristina Kirchner is unlikely to govern forever,
then the shock should be temporary in nature and this would be captured by the mean-reverting
nature of our model. This should also give us a sense of whether magnitudes of the changes in
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Table 3.3 are meaningful enough. However, if investors perceive the shock as permanent, then it
will not be captured by the model as they are essentially pricing a change in the mean.
In this analysis, we first run the model with the initial t0 calibration parameters to see how
well the system fits a temporary shock, assuming only a decrease in financial integration. If the
model specified above (which assumes stationarity) is correct, then we should see the variables
mean revert to the unconditional mean (i.e. the shock is temporary) and this should be enough
to, at least partially, fit the dividend yields. The columns "Temporary - FI" and "Permanent - FI"
of Table 3.4 show how dividend yield change when financial integration falls to 0.07 from 0.18
over one year, all else equal. The model alone is able to capture an 86bp increase in dividend
yields to 7.60 from 6.74; however, it is true that this falls quite a bit short of the actual 7.1pp
rise in dividend yields (to 13.9 from 6.79). Thus, we consider a scenario where investors expect
a more permanent change in financial integration, i.e. a change in the mean (or a time-varying
drift), which is not captured by the model, to improve the dividend yield fit. Note that as we
are working with demeaned variables, this requires adjusting α2 by θ0 + θ1FIi + λ1E(RV i), in
addition to changing the mean which is subtracted from the variable at time t. By assuming that
mean financial integration falls form 0.22 to 0.12 after the shock, we are able to generate a change
in the discount rate large enough to match the increase in dividend yields (13.8 model, 13.9 actual).
This suggests that investors consider this change in financial integration as permanent. It is true
that the discount rate associated with this move is quite large (it increases from 11.5% to 18%);
however, we note it is an upper bound to the rate, as all other variables remain constant.
Next, we allow cash flow growth to change as well to see if that helps us get closer to ac-
tual dividend yields. Including this change only helps us explain another 14bp of the change in
dividend yields (the calibrated value increases to 7.74 from 7.60 with only financial integration,
column five). That said, if we also allow expected variance risk to change, then we do get a more
meaningful change in dividend yields, which increase another 75bp to 8.51. In this case, we are
able to match the actual dividend yields (13.9) by assuming that financial integration falls from
0.22 to 0.141 (discount rates increase to 16.7%). This still suggests that investors consider the seg-
mentation shock to be relatively permanent, as financial integration reverts to a much lower level.
That said, there are likely other factors which help capture the change in dividend yields, which
are no included in the simplified version of this month (e.g. political risk and variables which
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capture the economic cycle).
3.6 CONCLUSION
Most would agree that the degree of financial market integration changes over time, especially
in emerging economies which are faced with shocks. However, nearly all previous research has
either assumed that markets only go from segmentation to integration, or has analyzed time-
varying betas in the returns space. In this paper, we provide a framework which allows for time-
varying integration in a present value model. Argentina is a great example where integration
follows a mean-reverting process, justifying modeling it as an AR(1) process rather than a jump
process. In this article, we focus on the discount rate channel to study the relative importance of
the direct effect of an integration shock versus the indirect effects through the interaction terms of
integration with risk factors. Using a case study based on a segmentation shock in Argentina in
2011, we find that the model is able to generate meaningful changes in dividend yields, and the
direct effect of the shock is dominant in valuations while the quadratic terms play a smaller role.
It is true that with these factors, we are not able to fully capture the change in dividend yields.
However, the model could be extended to incorporate other factors in order to improve the re-
sults. For example, in addition to financial integration, political risk likely has a significant roll in
explaining the time-variation in the coefficients and the two variables complement one another. It
could be incorporated into the model by adding a second interaction term, where local discount
rates load more on global discount rates and less on local expected variance risk when political
risk is perceived to fall, and would thus be another state variable in the system. We could also
incorporate the analysis of time-varying integration on cash flows. Through this channel, factors
related to the economic cycle would impact the pricing equation. We leave this for future research.
Another interesting issue which stems from this analysis is related to valuation measures. Tra-
ditionally it has been argued that price-dividend ratios may be a better measure of valuations in
short samples, as they tend to be more stable than returns. However, this may not necessarily be
the case in emerging markets. We have found that cash flow growth is actually fairly noisy. In fact,
in developed markets, most analysis is based on dividends yields which are smoothed over many
years. Given the shorter samples we have to work with in emerging economies, we would lose
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many observations if we were to take this approach. Thus, while it is true that returns are very
noisy, it is not clear that dividend yields are the best metric for valuing emerging market assets.
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Table 3.1: Argentina 2011-2105 Capital Controls Timeline
The table presents a timeline of the exchange rate controls imposed in Argentina between 2011 and 2015, known as
the cepo cambiario. The controls gradually became tighter over time as dollars became scarcer, thus we build a measure
based on the number of restrictions imposed each month. The dates below correspond to the implementation date of a
measure; if the control is implemented on a date different from the announcement date, then announcement date is in
parenthesis. La Nación (2015), Cronista (2015), Infobae (2015)
.
Date Description
Oct 31, 2011 (Oct 28) The Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA) announced the Program for Ex-
change Rate Operation Consultations (Communication A5329), i.e. the beginning of the
cepo cambiario. Under this program, the federal tax agency (Administración Federal de
Ingresos Públicos, AFIP) must authorize individuals and corporates to buy foreign ex-
change (Resolution 3210/11). In theory, individuals could convert up to 40% of their
salary to foreign currency, but in practice the limits were more obscure and at the gov-
ernment’s discretion.
Dec 13, 2011 The BCRA announced that banks must give 10 days notice to buy dollars for clients.
Feb 1, 2012 (Jan 5) The AFIP created the Declaración Juridica Anticipada de Importación (DJAI) with Resolu-
tion 3252, meaning that importers must now declare what goods they import, along
with quantities and prices.
Feb 9, 2012 Corporates need the BCRA’s approval to transfer dollars abroad, either to pay for im-
ports or transfer profits. The main novelty here was in dividend payments, which
especially affected multilateral corporations.
Apr 3, 2012 (Mar 9) The BCRA established that cash withdrawals made with local debit cards from ATMs
abroad could only be done from hard currency accounts going forward (Communica-
tion A5294). No limits were imposed on how much could be taken out. Individuals
could no longer travel abroad and draw USD from ARS accounts.
May 9, 2012 The AFIP reduced the limit on foreign currency purchases by individuals to 25% of
their salary from 40%.
May 28, 2012 (May 23) - The BCRA eliminated exceptions from Communication A5249 and extends restric-
tions to mortgages (Communication A5309). Those with access to financing to buy
properties now need permission from the AFIP to buy USD with the ARS provided by
the bank.
- The AFIP implemented restrictions on dollars for tourism (Resolution 3333). This
was aimed at closing loopholes from individuals buying tourist packages from travel
agents, who had unlimited access to the official exchange rate.
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Jun 13, 2012 The AFIP eliminated invoices in foreign currency, which especially affected big agri-
cultural companies and importers
Jun 15, 2012 - The AFIP eliminated the possibility of buying USD for savings purposes (this was
implemented by the AFIP in June, but the BCRA officially banned it on July 5 in Com-
munication A5318). Authorities limited the purchase of USD to: travel abroad, real
estate/some mortgages/some types of rent, to pay for merchandise purchased abroad
with a credit card, some services, companies authorized to transfer profits and divi-
dends, and donations to organizations and the government.
- The BCRA prohibits banks from buying USD bonds locally and paying them out
offshore (since 2005, they were allowed to transfer 1% of their equity
Jul 2012 Authorities limit foreign exchange transaction to money in bank accounts.
Aug 8, 2012 Foreign currency may only be purchased up to 7 days before travel and only in the
currency of the destination country (e.g. when traveling to Uruguay, only Uruguayan
pesos can be purchased; you can no longer buy USD).
Aug 21, 2012 Banks and credit cards can no longer accept pre-payment in USD.
Sep 1, 2012 (Aug 31) The AFIP announced that all purchases abroad made with credit or debit cards, includ-
ing online shopping and tourist packages, would now be subject to a 15% surcharge
(Resolution 3378).
Sep 7, 2012 The BCRA bans banks and exchange houses from selling dollars at airports and ports.
Only public banks can operate in these places going forward.
Oct 31, 2012 (Nov 1) The BCRA bans the possibility of using ARS mortgages to buy USD.
Mar 15, 2013 Can no longer use local credit cards to buy casino chips abroad.
Mar 18, 2013 The AFIP announced that all purchases abroad made with credit or debit cards, includ-
ing online shopping and tourist packages, would now be subject to a 20% surcharge
Dec 3, 2013 The AFIP increased the credit and debit card surcharges on purchases abroad to 35%
from 20%.
Jan 22, 2014 Locals may only purchase goods two times a year online, up to USD25 per year. Pur-
chases greater than USD25 will be subject to a 50% tax.
Jan 27, 2014 The limit on individual USD purchases decreased to 20% of the salary, up to a maxi-
mum of USD2000 monthly.
Oct 27, 2015 - The BCRA increased restrictions for companies: USD which they could purchase
"semi-automatically" according to the DJAI fell USD75mn from USD150mn.
- Authorities force insurance companies to sell USD bonds.
- The cepo is tightened for travel agencies.
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Table 3.2: Calibration parameters
Panel A of this table presents the calibration coefficients based on the country return regressions on US returns and
expected local variance, with the following specification:




us,t+1FIi,t + δ0Et(V Ri,t+1) + δ1ervi,tFIi,t + εi,t+1,
where reus,t is the U.S. equity market return in excess of the risk-free rate, Et(V Ri,t+1) represents expected country
variance risk, FIi,t is financial integration. The sample ranges from January 1995 to December 2014. Panel b of this
table presents the calibration parameters based on the first order autoregressive coefficients and the variances for the
state variables during our sample period.
Xt+1 = φXt + σxt+1,
where X is each demeaned state variables: µus, expected U.S. discount rates; rfus, the risk-free rate; gi local cash flow
growth; FIi, financial integration in country i; and Et(V Ri,t+1) represents expected country variance risk. The sample
ranges from June 2005 to December 2014. Given the overlapping observations, we correct the standard errors with
Newey and West (1986).
Panel A: Discount Rate parameters
θ0 0.115 θ1 -0.35
β0 1.46 β1 0.24
λ0 1.1 θ1 -1.9
Panel B: Autoregressive parameters
φµ 0.47 σ2µ 0.0001
φrf 0.77 σ2rf 0.0002
φd 0.02 σ2d 0.005
φfi 0.75 σ2fi 0.009
φevr -0.17 σ2evr 0.003
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Table 3.3: Dividend yields under different values of financial integration
This table presents the calibrated dividend yields under different values of financial integration (actual dividend yields
were 6.79 in October 2011). We look at financial integration at the time of the segmentation shock, at the long term
average, and the 5th and 95th percentiles. We also study deviations from the sample mean by looking at 0.1 and
0.2 increases and decreases in financial integration to understand the implications of symmetric shocks. The column
labeled "with quad" refers to the full model with quadratic Gaussian terms, while the column labeled "no quad" assumes
the betas are constant over time, as described in Section 2.1. Dividend yields are presented in percentage points, while
changes in dividends yields (quadratic - no quadratic) are reported in basis points.
FI DY (with quad) DY (no quad) change (bp)
FIt=0 0.18 6.74 6.75
FILTmean 0.45 4.98 4.91
FIp5 0.01 8.10 8.19
FIp95 0.91 2.93 2.81
FImean + 0.2 0.42 5.15 5.07 7.00
FImean + 0.1 0.32 5.75 5.71 4.14
FImean 0.22 6.43 6.42 1.12
FImean − 0.1 0.12 7.18 7.22 -3.57
FImean − 0.2 0.02 8.02 8.10 -9.12
Table 3.4: The Cepo Shock: Permanent versus Temporary Changes in Financial Integration
This table presents the calibrated dividend yields at the time of the shock (October 2011), and then one year after the
shock. The "temporary" columns assumes that that the change in financial integration is temporary and fades over
time with the Φ parameters specified above. Meanwhile, the "permanent" columns refer to the case where the shock
is perceived as permanent, leading to a change in mean financial integration. The columns labeled FI assume that
only financial integration changes from the t0 value to the t1 value, those labeled FI,CF assume that both financial
integration and cash flows change between periods, and FI,CF,ERV assume financial integration, cash flows and
expected variance risk all change between periods.. Dividend yields are presented in percentage points.
Initial in 1 year
Shock Temporary Permanent
FI FI, CF FI, CF, ERV FI FI, CF FI, CF, ERV
DY actual 6.79 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9 13.9
DY fit 6.74 7.60 7.74 8.51 13.8 13.7 13.9
FIi,t 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
FIi 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.12 0.125 0.141
α1 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3%
α2 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 18.1% 17.7% 16.7%
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Figure 3.1: Capital Controls 2011
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Appendix
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
Table A.1: Data Description
The following table describes the variables used in this paper. Note that all variables with a quar-
terly or annual frequency are turned into monthly variables using the weighted average of the
quarterly or annual variable in the current quarter/year and last quarter/year. That is, in cases








where Xi,s,a is the variable in the current year, Xi,s−1,a is the variable in the previous year, and m








where Xi,s,q is the variable in the current quarter, Xi,s−1,q is the variable in the previous quarter,





Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
rei,t Local excess log equity returns are constructed using country-level stock market
total returns indices in U.S. dollars. Returns are in excess of the one-month U.S.
Treasury bill from Ibbotson Associates. Frequency: Monthly. Source: MSCI (and
Datastream for Venezuela and Romania).
rbi,t Local excess log bond returns are constructed using country-level bond market to-
tal returns indices in U.S. dollars. Returns are in excess of the one-month U.S.
Treasury bill from Ibbotson Associates. In emerging markets, we use external
debt indices, while in developed markets we use local currency bond indices.
Frequency: Monthly. Source: JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI),
Barclays Emerging Markets Aggregate Index, Citibank World Global Bond Index
(WGBI).
rfxi,t Local log excess currency returns are constructed using country-level spot rates and
one-month forward rates (appreciation is positive): rsi,t+1 = ii,t − ius,t + ∆si,t+1 ≈
si,t+1 − fi,t. Frequency: Monthly. Source: Bloomberg.
re,LCi,t Local net log equity returns in local currency are constructed using country-level
stock market total returns indices in local currency. Frequency: Monthly. Source:
MSCI (and Datastream for Venezuela and Romania).
rb,LCi,t Local net log bond returns in local currency are constructed using country-level
bond market total returns indices in dollars and local log currency returns. Fre-
quency: Monthly. Source: JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI),
Barclays Emerging Markets Aggregate Index, Citibank World Global Bond Index
(WGBI), International Financial Statistics, Bloomberg.
iSi,t Nominal short-term interest rate in local currency (3-month Treasury bill, 3 month
interbank rate or money market rate). Rates are annualized. Frequency: Monthly.
Source: Global Financial Data, Datastream, International Financial Statistics.
DYi,t Dividend yield for country i. Frequency: Monthly. Source: Datastream.
continued
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Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
Global Financial Data:
rew,t Global excess log equity returns are constructed as the GDP weighted average of
G7 country-level stock market total returns indices in U.S. dollars. Returns are in
excess of the one-month U.S. Treasury bill from Ibbotson Associates. Frequency:
Monthly. Source: MSCI, International Financial Statistics.
rbw,t Global excess log bond returns are constructed as the GDP weighted average of
G7 country-level bond market total returns indices in U.S. dollars. Returns are in
excess of the one-month U.S. Treasury bill from Ibbotson Associates. Frequency:
Monthly. Source: Citibank World Global Bond Index (WGBI), International Finan-
cial Statistics.
rfxw,t Global log excess currency returns are constructed as the GDP weighted aver-
age of G7 country-level excess currency returns (appreciation is positive). Note
that for countries that adopted the Euro (Germany, France and Italy), we use the
Deutsche Mark total returns before 1999 and subsequently the Euro. All currencies
are based against the U.S. dollar so the currency basket has six currencies. Fre-
quency: Monthly. Source: Bloomberg, International Financial Statistics.
RVw,t Global realized variance is constructed as the GDP weighted average of G7
country-level local realized variance. More specifically, we use daily log equity












where Ndays represents the number of trading days in a month and Pt+1,d is the
value of the MSCI index on day d of month t + 1. Source: MSCI, International
Financial Statistics.
De jure Integration Measures:
continued
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Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
FISeqi,t Measure of equity market openness, compiled originally by Schindler (2009) and
then extended by Fernández et al. (2015), based on a coding of the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) narra-
tive description. This index refers to restrictions on equity shares or other equity
securities, excluding those investments for the purpose of acquiring a lasting eco-
nomic interesting. We use one minus the index, which is between zero and one,
so that higher scores indicate less restrictions in place and thus more openness.
The dataset’s coverage is from 1995 to 2013. We extend the index back to 1980
using other de jure measures to predict the value.5 Frequency: Annual. Source:
Fernández et al. (2015), Quinn and Toyoda (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008).
FISboi,t Measure of bond market openness, compiled originally by Schindler (2009) and
then extended by Fernández et al. (2015), based on a coding of the IMF’s AREAER
narrative description. Specifically, this index accounts for restrictions on bonds or
other debt securities with an original maturity of more than one year. We use one
minus the index, which is between zero and one, so that higher scores indicate less
restrictions in place and thus more openness. The dataset’s coverage is from 1997
to 2013, therefore, we extend the index back to 1980 using other de jure measures to
predict the value.5 Frequency: Annual. Source: Fernández et al. (2015), Quinn and
Toyoda (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008).
continued
5 The Schindler el al (2015) measure starts in 1995 for equity and money markets and in 1997 for bond markets;
therefore, we use the de jure measures complied by Quinn and Toyoda (2008), QT_Cur100 and QT_Cap100, and Chinn
and Ito (2008), CI_KA_Open, to predict the Schindler indicators from 1980 to 1994 (1996 for bonds). We predict the
value based on the following panel regressions:
Sji,t = αi,t + β1CI_KA_Openi,t + β2QT_Cur100i,t + β3QT_Cap100i,t + εi,t
for j = {eq, bo, mm}.
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Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
FISmmi,t Measure of money market openness, compiled originally by Schindler (2009) and
then extended by Fernández et al. (2015), based on a coding of the IMF’s AREAER
narrative description. Specifically, this category refers to restrictions on money
market instruments, which includes securities with an original maturity of one year
or less, in addition to short-term instruments such as certificates of deposit, among
others. We use one minus the index, which is between zero and one, so that higher
scores indicate less restrictions in place and thus more openness. The dataset’s cov-
erage is from 1995 to 2013. We extend the index back to 1980 using other de jure
measures to predict the value. 5 Frequency: Annual. Source: Fernández et al.
(2015), Quinn and Toyoda (2008), Chinn and Ito (2008).
FIQTi,t The Quinn and Toyoda (2008) capital account openness measure is a 0 to 4 indica-
tor, in half integer units, with 4 representing an economy with fully open capital
flows. It covers (a) restrictions on capital outflows by residents, and (b) restric-
tions on capital inflows by non-residents. The measure is rescaled from 0 to 1, with
higher scores indicating greater openness. The data series ends in 2011, therefore
we predict this data through 2014 using a regression with all ten Schindler capital
account subcategories as explanatory variables (see Schindler et al (2015) for de-
tails on all ten categories). Frequency: Annual. Source: Quinn and Toyoda (2008),
Fernández et al. (2015).
continued
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Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
TIQTi,t The Quinn and Toyoda (2008) current account openness measure is a 0 to 8 indi-
cator, with 8 indicating the government’s full compliance with the IMF’s Article
VIII obligations to free the proceeds from international trade of goods and services
from government restriction. It is the sum of two components: trade (exports and
imports) and invisibles (payments and receipts for financial and other services)).
The measure is rescaled from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicate greater openness.
The data ends in 2011, therefore we predict this data through 2014 using a regres-
sion with trade openness, measured as exports plus imports over GDP, and the
Schindler et al (2015) capital account measure as explanatory variables. Frequency:
Annual. Source: Quinn and Toyoda (2008), Fernández et al. (2015), International
Financial Statistics.
De facto Integration Measures:
TIdfi,t Measure of de facto trade openness defined as exports plus imports divided by GDP.
Frequency: Monthly. Soruce: International Financial Statistics.
FIdf,eqi,t This ratio is defined using Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s Net Foreign Assets database:
Equity Assets + Liabilities / GDP. In this database, portfolio equities holdings mea-
sure ownership of shares of companies and mutual funds below the 10% threshold
that distinughes portfolio from direct investment. Frequency: Annual. Source:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
FIdf,debti,t This ratio is defined using Lane and Milesi-Ferretti’s Net Foreign Assets database:
Debt Assets + Liabilities / GDP. In this database, portfolio debt securities are de-
fined to include both long and short-term debt, including money markets. We use
this indicator for both bond and currency markets. Frequency: Annual. Source:




Table A.1 – Continued
Variable Description
PRi,t The political risk rating indicator for country i, which ranges between 0 (high risk)
and 1 (low risk) Frequency: Monthly. Source: International Country Risk Guide.
CorpGovi,t This measure of quality of institutions is a combination of three subcomponents of
the political risk indicator: corruption, bureaucracy, and law and order. This index
was rescaled to range between 0 (high risk) and 1 (low risk) Frequency: Monthly.
Source: International Country Risk Guide.
Cyclei,t This country-specific business cycle variables is calculated as the difference be-
tween current GDP growth and a moving average of past GDP. Year-over-year GDP
growth is in real terms. Frequency: Quarterly (annual for countries where quarterly
data is not available). Source: International Financial Statistics and OECD.
Cyclew,t This global business cycle variables is calculated asthe GDP-weighted average of
G7 country-specific business cycles (i.e. Cyclei,t). GDP growth is in real terms.
Frequency: Quarterly (annual for countries where quarterly data is not available).
Source: International Financial Statistics and OECD.
Crisisi,t A measure by Reinhart and Rogoff which combines seven varieties of financial
crises: banking crises, currency crashes, currency conversions/debasement, default
on external debt, default on domestic debt, stock market crashes (if the country
has a stock market), and high inflation. The crisis variable is the average of these
seven components and takes values between 0 and 1. Frequency: Annual. Source:
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Cyclew,t This global crisis variables is calculated as the GDP-weighted average of G7
country-specific crises variables (i.e. Crisisi,t). GDP growth is in real terms. Fre-
quency: Annual. Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
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Table A.2: Country Start Dates and Classifications
Country Label ISO Code Region Equities Bonds FX
Argentina AR Emerging 1988m1 1994m1 1997m12
Austria AT Developed 1980m1 1992m11
Australia AU Developed 1980m1 1985m1 1989m1
Belgium BE Developed 1980m1 1991m2
Bulgaria BG Emerging 1997m2
Brazil BR Emerging 1988m1 1994m1 1999m3
Canada CA Developed 1980m1 1985m1 1989m1
Switzerland CH Developed 1981m1 1985m1 1989m1
Chile CL Emerging 1988m1 1999m6 1998m5
China: Mainland CN Emerging 1993m1 1994m4 1999m1
Colombia CO Emerging 1993m1 1997m3 1999m3
Czech Republic CZ Developed 1995m2 1997m1
Germany DE Developed 1980m1 1985m1
Denmark DK Developed 1980m1 1989m5
Dominican Republic DO Emerging 2001m12
Ecuador EC Emerging 1994m1
Egypt EG Emerging 1995m1 2001m8 2009m3
Spain ES Developed 1980m1 1991m2
Finland FI Developed 1988m1 1995m1
France FR Developed 1980m1 1985m1
United Kingdom GB Developed 1980m1 1985m1 1989m1
Greece GR Developed 1988m1 2000m5
Hong Kong HK Developed 1980m1 1989m1
Hungary HU Emerging 1995m1 1999m2 1998m8
Indonesia ID Emerging 1988m1 1997m2 2004m3
Ireland IE Developed 1988m1 1992m11
Israel IL Developed 1993m1 1998m8
India IN Emerging 1993m1 2004m6 1999m1
Italy IT Developed 1980m1 1985m2
Japan JP Developed 1980m1 1985m1 1989m1
Korea, South KR Developed 1988m1 1999m1
Lebanon LB Emerging 2008m2
Sri Lanka LK Emerging 2008m1
Latvia LV Developed 2011m7
Morocco MA Emerging 2002m2 2002m1
Mexico MX Emerging 1988m1 1994m1 1997m12
Malaysia MY Emerging 1988m1 1996m11 2005m5
Netherlands NL Developed 1981m2 1985m1
Norway NO Developed 1980m1 1995m1 1989m1
New Zealand NZ Developed 1988m1 1992m11 1989m1
Panama PA Emerging 1994m1
Peru PE Emerging 1993m1 1994m1 2000m8
Philippines PH Emerging 1988m1 1994m1 1999m1
Pakistan PK Emerging 1993m1 2004m5
Poland PL Emerging 1993m1 1994m1 1998m8
Portugal PT Developed 1988m1 1995m1
Romania RO Emerging 1997m1 2005m3
Russian Federation RU Emerging 1995m2 1997m2 2001m9
Sweden SE Developed 1980m1 1991m1 1989m1
Singapore SG Developed 1980m1 1989m1
El Salvador SV Emerging 2001m9
Thailand TH Emerging 1988m1 1997m12
Turkey TR Emerging 1988m1 1996m7 1997m12
Ukraine UA Emerging 2008m2
Uruguay UY Emerging 1997m2
Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de VE Emerging 1990m2 1994m1
Vietnam VN Emerging 2005m12 2005m11
South Africa ZA Emerging 1993m1 1995m1 1997m12
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Table A.3: Openness Measures Correlations
This table shows the correlations across correlations measures. Panel A calculates the correlation across variables over the whole panel, while Panel B calculates the correlation for each
variable at the country level, and then takes the average across countries. Note that this second calculation excludes countries with no variation in a pair of variables from the average.
TIQT FIQT FISeq FISbo FISmm PR Cycle Crisis TIdf FIdf,eq FIdf,debt
Panel A: Whole Sample
TIQT 1.00
FIQT 0.84 1.00
FISeq 0.68 0.80 1.00
FISbo 0.62 0.75 0.86 1.00
FISmm 0.64 0.77 0.84 0.80 1.00
PR 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.52 1.00
Cycle -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1.00
Crisis -0.28 -0.25 -0.18 -0.16 -0.10 -0.34 -0.13 1.00
TIdf 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.14 0.17 -0.01 -0.17 1.00
FIdf,eq 0.32 0.38 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.40 -0.00 -0.19 0.55 1.00
FIdf,debt 0.37 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.32 -0.04 -0.10 0.65 0.70 1.00
Panel B: Average Across Countries
TIQT 1.00
FIQT 0.67 1.00
FISeq 0.36 0.45 1.00
FISbo 0.32 0.42 0.64 1.00
FISmm 0.46 0.48 0.63 0.56 1.00
PR 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.15 1.00
Cycle -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 1.00
Crisis -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.22 -0.22 1.00
TIdf 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.04 -0.06 1.00
FIdf,eq 0.40 0.45 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.00 -0.25 0.54 1.00
FIdf,debt 0.09 0.22 0.15 0.19 0.20 -0.08 -0.01 0.23 0.31 0.31 1.00
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Table B.1: Countries and Assets
This Appendix lists the regional breakdown for the countries in the sample. For developed markets, the sample in-
cludes data for equities, bonds and currencies for all countries. In emerging markets, we do not have data on all asset
classes for all countries, and we specify the breakdown.
Developed Emerging
Region Country (ISO Code) Region Country (ISO Code) Equities Bonds FX
DM Commodities Australia (AU) Emerging Asia China (CN) X X X
Canada (CA) India (IN) X X
New Zealand (NZ) Indonesia (ID) X X
Developed Asia Hong Kong (HK) Malaysia (MY) X X X
Japan (JP) Philippines (PH) X X X
Singapore (SG) Pakistan (PK) X X X
EU Euro Austria (AT) South Korea (KR) X X
Belgium (BE) Taiwan (TW) X
Finland (FI) Thailand (TH) X X
France (FR) Emerging EMEA Bulgaria (BG) X
Germany (DE) Czech Republic (CZ) X X
Greece (GR) Cote d’Ivoire (CI) X
Iceland (IE) Croatia (HR) X
Italy (IT) Egypt (EG) X X X
Netherlands (NL) Hungary (HU) X X X
Portugal (PT) Israel (IL) X X
Spain (ES) Jordan (JO) X X
EU Non-Euro Denmark (DK) Lebanon (LB) X
Norway (NO) Morocco (MA) X X X
Sweden (SE) Nigeria (NG) X
Switzerland (CH) Poland (PL) X X X
United Kingdom (GB) Russia (RU) X X X
Turkey (TR) X X X
South Africa (ZA) X X X
Ukraine (UA) X
Latin America Argentina (AR) X X X
Brazil (BR) X X X
Chile (CL) X X X
Colombia (CO) X X X
Dominican Republic (DO) X
Ecuador (EC) X
El Salvador (SV) X
Mexico (MX) X X X
Panama (PA) X




A.2 Asymptotic Distribution of the Ratio Statistic
In order to calculate the importance of variance risk in the determination of expected returns,
we examined the ratio of the required return from the variance risk factor to the total required
return from the three-factor risk model. To examine standard errors for this statistic, we develop
a GMM (Hansen (1982)) system of orthogonality conditions used in estimating the underlying
parameters of the statistic which implies an asymptotic distribution of the underlying parameters.
We then use the delta method to get the standard error of the ratio.
The orthogonality conditions underlying the estimation of the fundamental parameters form a
just-identified system. These orthogonality conditions are the OLS orthogonality conditions from
each of the regions and the estimation of the unconditional means of the regressors. Analytically,
let εt be the vector of regression error terms associated with equation (2.2):
εt = rt − α− β1reUS,t − β2rbUS,t − β3rvsUS,t,
where rt is the vector of asset returns, ri,t; α is the vector of constants, αi; β1 is the vector of βi,1’s;
β2 is the vector of βi,2’s, and β3 is the vector of βi,3’s from the regional regressions. Also,let µ1, µ2,
and µ3 be the unconditional means of the three risk factors. Then, define the vector function of
data and parameters











and the orthogonality conditions are
E [gt(α, β, µ)] = 0.
The proportion of the expected return that is attributable to exposure to the variance risk is a
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non-linear function of the underlying β’s and µ’s. We calculate the standard errors of these pro-
portions by applying the delta method. That is, if θ is the vector of parameters, if Ω is the usual
GMM estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the parameters that allows for conditional
heteroskedasticity, and if H(θ) is the proportion of the expected return due to variance risk, then
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C1 Mapping Cash Flows and Expected Returns to State Variables
C1.1 Mapping Cash Flows and Expected Returns to Xt and νt+1
Assume Xwt = (gw,t µw,t rf,t)′ and Xit = (TIi,t FIi,t EV Ri,t LFi,t)′, with Xt = (X ′w,tX ′i,t)
′. Let
ei be a vector of zeros with a 1 in the ith place and let νt+1 = [εdw,t+1 ε
d
i,t+1]
′, with νi,t+1 ∼ N(0,Σν).
Cash flows can then be mapped to Xt and νt+1:































0 0 0 γ1/2 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ1/2 0 0 0 0 0 ϕ1/2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ϕ1/2 0 0 0

, (C2)
Γ1 = [γi,0 1]












Using the same notation, expected discount rates can be mapped to Xt:
µi,t = rf,t + θi,0 + θ1FIi,t + βi,0µw,t + β1FIi,tµw,t + λi,0V Ri,t + λ1FIi,tV Ri,t

















0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 β1/2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 β1/2 0 0 0 0 λ1/2
0 0 0 0 λ1/2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(C5)
C1.2 Mapping Expected Returns to Xt in Simplified Model
Assume Xt = ( µw,t rf,t ∆di,t FIi,t EV Ri,t)′, and let ei be a vector of zeros with a 1 in the ith
place. Expected discount rates can then be mapped to Xt:
µi,t = rf,t + θ0 + θ1FIi,t + β0µw,t + β1FIi,tµw,t + λ0V Ri,t + λ1FIi,tV Ri,t
















0 0 0 β1/2 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
β1/2 0 0 0 λ1/2




C2 The Pricing Equation
The price-dividend ratio of country i under the framework outlined in Section 3.2 and impos-















j=0 −µi,t+j + ∆di.t+j+1
)]
, such that Pi,tDi,t =
∑∞
i=1 vt(n). I conjecture
vt(n) = exp
(
a(n) + b(n)′Xt +X ′tH(n)Xt
)
.
To solve this expectation, I use the following lemma to take the expectation of a quadratic
Gaussian (proven in Ang and Liu (2004)). Lemma: let  be a Kx1 vector, where  ∼ N(0,Σ), A a
Kx1 vector and Ω a symmetric KxK matrix. If (Σ−1 − 2Ω) is strictly positive definite, then









For n = 1,




(−(α2 + ξ′2Xt +X ′tΩ2Xt) + (α1 + ξ′1Xt +X ′tΩ1Xt + Γ′1νi,t+1 +X ′tΛ1νi,t+1)) ]
= exp
(





























Matching coefficients, the initial conditions are:
a(1) = α1 − α2 + 1
2
Γ′1ΣνΓ1
b(1)′ = (ξ1 − ξ2)′ + Γ′1ΣνΛ′1
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Using induction for an arbitrary time t+n+1, it is possible to characterize the recursive equa-
tions describing a(n), b(n), and H(n).





































































Taking this expectation involves using the assumption that t+1 and νi,t+1 are independent and
the lemma to take the expectation of a quadratic Gaussian on the t+1 terms:
= exp
(



















































































Matching coefficients, I find that the coefficients a(n), b(n) and H(n) are given by the recursions:




































Note on converged values of a(n), b(n), H(n)
We calibrate the model with state variables represented as deviations from the mean (i.e. X˜t ≡
Xt − X¯), although we could have done the following adjustment to have everything in terms of
Xt:
P (n) = a(n) + b(n)′X˜t + X˜ ′tH(n)X˜t
= a(n) + b(n)′(Xt − X¯) + (Xt − X¯)′H(n)(Xt − X¯)
=
(









Also note that we assume c is simply a vector of zeros, as variables are demeaned.
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C3 The Pricing Equation: Simplified Model
This model makes two simplifying assumptions: (1) we assume state variables are demeaned,
such that X˜t = Xt − X , with X˜t = (µ˜w,t r˜f,t g˜i,t F˜ Ii,t Et( ˜V Ri,t+1)), and (2) expected log returns,
µi,t, follow a quadratic Gaussian structure given by





such that α2 captures the mean local discount rate. In this simplified version of the model, cash
flows do not follow a quadratic gaussian process, and are simply another state variable in the
system.
Initial Conditions
For n = 1,




(−(α2 + ξ′2Xt +X ′tΩ2Xt) + e′3Xt+1) ]
= exp
(















3 + (−ξ2 + e′3Φ)′X˜t − X˜ ′tΩ2X˜t
)
Matching coefficients (and define α1 = e′3c), the initial conditions are:
a(1) = α1 − α2 + 1
2
e′3Σe3




Using induction for an arbitrary time t+n+1, it is possible to characterize the recursive equa-
tions describing a(n), b(n), and H(n).



























































e3 + b(n) + 2H(n)Φ
)′)
Matching coefficients, I find that the coefficients a(n), b(n) and H(n) are given by the recursions:


























H(n+ 1) = −Ω2 + Φ′H(n)Φ + 2Φ′H(n)′
(
Σ−1 − 2H(n)
)−1
H(n)Φ
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